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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the idea of a “Karnataka model of development,” with its emphasis 
on technology and governance led development. It is the introduction to a Symposium in 
Economic and Political Weekly on “Governance and Development in Karnataka.” Based 
on the papers in the Symposium, and on the wider literature, the paper explores the 
interpretation and application of the idea. It argues that while some of Karnataka’s 
experience does indeed conform to the model and thus holds out lessons for development, 
there are significant gaps between reality and the model, and these gaps have lessons for 
development as well.
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Governance and the “Karnataka Model of Development1” 
Gopal K. Kadekodi, Ravi Kanbur and Vijayendra Rao 
 
The Karnataka Model 
 
Karnataka embodies the challenges and contradictions that are faced by the rest of India – 
spectacular technology-led growth in Bangalore tempered with an abiding sense of the 
city’s ungovernability, enduring gender inequity and regional disparities, and a visibly 
increasing gap between urban and rural areas2.  Yet, Karnataka is also increasingly being 
seen a model of development.  Bangalore’s metamorphosis from a noun to a verb is the 
archetypical symbol of an India “unbound,” and Karnataka’s pioneering experiment with 
Panchayati Raj reform under the Hegde government in the 1980’s sparked the 73rd 
amendment and the consequent and continuing wave of devolutions in finance and power 
to panchayats.   This emphasis on technology-led growth coupled with local government 
reform is, at least in theory, a singularly innovative strategy to address the challenge of 
generating growth with equity and can be described as the “Karnataka Model” of 
development. 
 
The Karnataka model should more accurately be called the “Mysore model” because the 
strategy was not arrived serendipitously.    It has century-old roots in policy decisions 
taken by the princely state of Mysore.  As Manu Bhagavan (2003) has shown, the then 
Maharaja of Mysore, Krishnaraja Wadiyar, advised by his Diwan cum Chief Engineer M. 
Visweswaraya, instituted several initiatives to improve the quality of higher education in 
the state, with a particular emphasis on technology and the sciences. Additionally, in 
1905, the Government of Mysore persuaded JN Tata to locate the Indian Institute of 
Science in Bangalore subsidized by a land-grant, and an annual government subsidy of 
Rs. 50,000.  These initiatives did two things – they produced generations of highly 
trained engineers and scientists in the state, and they encouraged an atmosphere 
conducive to scientific and technological innovation3.  Both were, arguably, crucial 
elements in Bangalore’s “take-off4.”   
 
Similarly, the Mysorean roots of panchayati raj go very deep.  The historian Christopher 
Bayly (2006) has recently stated that the terms panchayat and “sabha” in the context of 
village institutions were first articulated by Ram Raz, based on his experience as a 
“native judge” in Mysore about 200 years ago. These were then adopted by North Indian 
                                                 
1 We thank Srilata Batliwala, Arjan De Haan, Jeffrey Hammer, Maitreyi Krishnaraj, Lant Pritchett, and 
other scholars for their help with this symposium. S. Madheswaran did a splendid job of supervising the 
conference logistics. 
2 See Narayana (2004) and Sen (2004) for an analysis of the factors behind Bangalore’s high-tech growth 
and the challenges of extending high-growth rates to the rest of the state. 
3 It is interesting to note another Wadiyar initiative that has had an international impact.  The Maharaja of 
Mysore instituted excellent Sanskrit schools and a university that, along with instruction in texts, taught the 
theory and practice of yoga.  BKS Iyengar and K. Pattabhi Jois were both students at the yoga school and 
Jois continued his studies at the Sanskrit university.  They, of course, went on to spearhead the international 
yoga movement via the Iyengar and Ashtanga schools that they, respectively, founded. 
4 See Kadekodi (2004a) for more on Visweswaraya’s vision. 
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writers and subsequently absorbed into the nationalist canon via Gandhiji’s vigorous 
advocacy (Gandhi, 1962).  “Modern” PRI reforms in Karnataka can be traced at least as 
far back as Krishnaraja Wadiyar’s expansion of local self-government in 1902-03 which 
created 8 district and 77 taluk boards.  Nataraj and Anantpur (2004) document the 
subsequent history of panchayat reforms in Karnataka;  In 1918, the Mysore Local 
Boards and Village Panchayat Act was passed which provided for the election of half of 
the representatives in district and two-thirds in taluk boards respectively; In 1926 a two-
tier scheme with village panchayats and district boards was established, abolishing taluk 
boards, with both bodies provided with power and independent sources of revenue; and in 
the post-independence period several acts and bills were passed culminating in the 1983 
Act under the Hegde government whose provisions were adopted, with a few 
modifications, by the authors of the 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution5.   
 
Karnataka, of course, is not entirely Mysorean.  It was constructed by merging Mysore 
State with the Kannada-speaking parts of Hyderabad, Bombay and Madras in 1956.  In 
particular, the districts that came from old Hyderabad tended to have lower living 
standards and infrastructure than the rest of Karnataka at the time, and this lag persists to 
this day causing a high degree of regional imbalance in the state (Sen, 2004).  This 
regional imbalance perhaps has as much to do with geography and climate as it does with 
policy, but the fact that it has prevailed for two centuries indicates important path-
dependencies in government and social action.   
 
In June of 2005 we organized an inter-disciplinary conference at the Institute for Social 
and Economic Change in Bangalore that examined various aspects of development in 
Karnataka.  In this issue we have selected a few papers from the conference that focus on 
the theme of governance, largely demonstrating that it remains a daunting challenge -- the 
theory of the Karnataka Model has far surpassed its implementation.  Challenges that 
remain, beyond regional inequalities, include the slow, incremental, nature of changes in 
many parts of the state, continuing gender inequalities, several shortcomings in the 
implementation of the PRI reforms, and a lack of attention to urban governance.   Since 
these concerns are shared by almost every other state in the country, the papers in this 
symposium have applicability well beyond the state’s borders. 
 
State and Local Politics, and Governance: 
 
Karnataka has a long history of using political and deliberative means to deal with 
difference and hierarchy.   Chamrajendra Wadiyar, Krishnaraja’s father, established the 
Mysore Representative Assembly in 1881 which was designed to give Mysoreans a 
forum to air their differences (Bhagavan, 2004).   While Brahmins dominated this body, 
the assembly helped increase the level of political awareness particularly among the two 
other dominant groups – Lingayats and Vokkaligas.  By the first decade of the 20th 
century these two groups formed associations to better their living conditions and to 
lobby the state government.   In 1919 a committee led by Leslie Miller – the Chief Judge 
of the Mysore high court – defined a category of “Backward Classes” in the state 
recommending affirmative action for non-Brahmins in educational institutions and state 
                                                 
5 Crook and Manor (1998) study the impact of the Hedge’s Panchayat reforms. 
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administrative services, special schools, scholarships, and hostels, to promote living 
standards among non-Brahmin classes.  These measures were quickly implemented and, 
subsequently, Vokkaligas and Lingayats have become potent social and political 
stakeholders in the state. 
 
James Manor’s contribution examines the contemporary implications of this by 
examining the political history of Karnataka since 1972.  He finds that while several 
changes have occurred, they have been gradual.  This is because, in his view, politicians 
in Karnataka tend to be tentative, even conservative. Two competing coalitions have 
contended for power, what Manor calls MOVD (Muslims, OBCs, Vokkaligas and Dalits) 
and LIBRA (Lingayats and Brahmins).  These group dynamics have made power sharing 
within rainbow collections a necessary condition for stable government.  This has made 
individual politicians less important than institutions, with no dominant political party.   
Bureaucrats have, consequently, retained considerable power with greater autonomy 
compared to other states.  This is has resulted in better crafted policies and more policy 
continuity.     But it has also directed political competition in a way that has led to a 
marked increase in corruption because of the need to satisfy different blocks of voters.    
 
While caste has remained an important marker of identity it has increasingly begun to 
signify difference rather than hierarchy.   The “materiality” of caste has also decreased – 
caste is no longer as significant in determining an individual’s access to tangible 
opportunities and assets, and high caste status offers fewer material advantages.   
Panchayats have become increasingly important, and this has brought group-based 
political competition to the lowest levels of government.   Links between low and high 
levels of government have shown improvement, but, because of changes in the nature of 
caste and in local governance, village society has become less cohesive with individuals 
mattering more than groups.   
 
Tim Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao, turn the focus to an econometric 
examination various aspects of political behavior within gram panchayats (GPs).   Their 
data come from a household and village survey covering 500 villages, and spread across 
all the four southern states, with over a third of the data from Karnataka.   The data were 
collected between September and November 2002 and therefore provide a snapshot of 
changes in gram panchayats about ten years after the 73rd amendment. Most results in the 
paper are from regressions with GP or village fixed effects, thus controlling for sources 
of variation across GPs and villages that are unobserved by the econometricians.  The 
paper reports that reservations for dalits and STs work in the sense that households in 
GPs that have presidencies reserved for SC/STs are 7% more likely to offer targeted 
benefits to dalits and STs.   On the other hand, the political geography of the GP seems to 
matter with the Presidents own village showing 10% more investment activity than other 
villages in the GP. 
 
Gram Sabhas are supposed to be lynchpin of the panchayat system, yet in these data it is 
found that only 77% of villages held at least one gram sabha in the previous year.  
Holding a gram sabha seems to have an egalitarian influence with more effective 
targeting of BPL cards to the poor and disadvantaged.  Perhaps because of this landless 
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and illiterate households are more likely to attend, but, on the other hand, women are 
much less likely to attend.  Finally, the authors examine the role of politician selection 
within gram panchayats finding that they come from elite groups within the village.  
Even with reserved categories, elites within those categories are more likely to become 
politicians. Moreover, politicians are more likely to obtain BPL cards, controlling for 
their socio-economic status and village level variation, which is evidence for political 
opportunism6. 
 
Kripa Anantpur’s paper complements this econometric work, by conducting a qualitative 
analysis of village politics in 30 villages in Karnataka.  She finds that, despite, the 
increasing prominence of gram panchayats, customary village councils (CVCs) continue 
to play an important role in village life7.  CVCs include various categories of 
“traditional” panchayats including caste panchayats, street panchayats and nyaya 
panchayats.  They perform a range of useful functions including the organization of 
village festivals, dispute resolution, social services, and informal development activities.  
Interestingly, they tend to be inter-caste institutions, and serve as deliberative forums 
with an emphasis on compromise.  They interact closely with gram panchayats, in 
selecting candidates for panchayat elections, encouraging uncontested elections, and 
selection of beneficiaries. The leadership of CVCs and GPs tend to overlap and villagers 
tend to view them not as competitors but as complements to gram panchayats8.   One 
question this raises if the activities of CVCs translate into activism in parallel formal 
bodies, such as water user groups, and whether these formal institutions complement or 
compete with panchayats. 
 
Ramesh Ramanathan focuses on his experience with Janaagraha, an NGO working on 
urban governance issues – largely in Bangalore.   He makes the important point that with 
all the talk about the 73rd amendment, the 74th amendment, on urban local government, is 
largely forgotten - an afterthought, ignored in national and state policy.   Ramanathan 
argues that this is a mistake.   Participatory planning, and increasing citizen’s voice in 
cities is just as important in urban as in rural areas, and more challenging because of the 
large size of the population9.   Janaagraha’s work in Bangalore has attempted to do this 
by a variety of different initiatives which include verifying voter and BPL lists, proposing 
benefit-sharing schemes with communities who are willing to monitor their members in 
order to increase tax-compliance.  Ramanathan proposes that a framework to adapt the 
spirit of the 73rd amendment in a manner that will have real impact; 1) Institute Ward 
Sabhas in a manner similar to gram sabhas, but also have a new tier of government below 
the ward level that will have a more manageable size; 2) Integrate the different tiers of 
city government with improved systems of accounting, accountability and monitoring; 3) 
                                                 
6 Also see Vijayalakshmi (2006) for a detailed analysis of corruption in Karnataka panchayats. 
7 This echoes Krishna’s (2003) findings in Rajasthan. 
8 Note that aside from Panchayat officials and CVCs, there is a third category of people who wield power 
within the panchayat system - “fixers” - whose job it is to assist in the manipulation of the system 
(Inbanathan and Gopalappa, 2002). 
9 There is evidence from Delhi that shows that squatter settlements spontaneously  tend to form 
democratically elected panchayat-like governance structures even in the absence of any state-led initiatives 
(Jha, Rao and Woolcock, 2007) indicating that the potential for deepening democracy in urban areas has 
been unrealized. 
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Have sequential and well-defined planning process building from grass-roots discussions 
on priorities and needs.   
 
Gender and Governance 
 
Poor governance can have a particularly adverse on impact on women by enhancing 
conditions of patriarchy.  Gita Sen, Aditi Iyer and Asha George demonstrate this in their 
study of gender inequity in health in Koppal district, which was part of old-Hyderabad 
state and therefore historically under-developed.  Sen, Iyer and George find women’s 
health is affect by systemic failures in both public and private health facilities.  
Government facilities, despite increasing funding, lack specialists and supplies, while 
private providers are dominated by informal medical practitioners.  In an emergency, 
women are forced to constantly shuffle between inadequate government facilities and 
poor quality private providers which are, respectively, plagued by poor accountability 
and lack of regulation. The adverse effects of this “forced pluralism” are compounded by 
disjunctions in diagnoses due to discriminatory attitudes.  Women tend to have quite high 
levels of health seeking behaviors, but preventable maternal mortality rates remains high 
because they are much less likely to be treated for their illnesses than men.   Women’s 
complaints are more likely to be listed as “not serious” by medical practitioners reflecting 
a lower recognition of their needs.  A combination of discrimination within the home, 
poor access to health services, and discriminatory attitudes results in women a systematic 
disenfranchising of women in the health system. 
 
Devaki Jain further explores the problem of how to best engender public policy, based 
upon her experiences as a Karnataka-based scholar-activist.  She argues that the inherited 
knowledge-base of public policy is inherently gender-biased because it is constructed 
within a patriarchal system. Moreover, women continue to lack a voice in policy 
decisions that affect them despite several years of effort.  To break this deadlock, women 
need to create a strategic “space of their own” but should have a say in all issues of 
relevance and not just those related to “women’s issues.”  The knowledge base should be 
engendered by mapping the social and economic location of women both within the 
household and outside.  Participation in leadership and political life, perhaps via 
reservations, can provide the turning point in changing the gendered nature of decision 
making10. Women need to become economic and political agents instead of passive 
recipients of special ladders and safety nets.  This she calls a “bubbling-up” model as 
opposed to a “trickle-down” theory of development.   
 
Jain illustrates these points with examples from her work in Karnataka.  To demonstrate 
the gender-bias in information she uses the examples of poverty and sericulture programs 
in Karnataka.  Poverty programs were based on data that data did not adequately capture 
the extent of women’s work or the double-burden they faced in working at home and 
                                                 
10 Studies of the impact of this have been mixed but provide an optimistic picture.  Duflo and 
Chattopadhyay (2004) find strong positive effects in West Bengal and Rajasthan, but Ban and Rao (2006) 
find that in the South Indian states the impact is tempered by institutional issues such as whether the village 
is upper caste dominated, whether the woman president has served in a previous term, and whether the state 
has a history of supporting panchayats. 
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outside.   Therefore special studies and surveys were conducted to map gender 
inequalities within the home, and the extent of women’s work outside.  This led to a 
change in policy where programs were modified to allow for the direct targeting of 
women.   Sericulture projects, assisted by the World Bank, were found to systematically 
deny the possibility that women were significantly involved in silk-rearing and farming 
activities.  A targeted study done to examine this found that they were, in fact, deeply 
involved – largely within the home - in tending mulberry plants, feeding silkworms, and 
removing waste.  Consequently the projects were modified to improve facilities for 
women to receive training in sericulture.   Finally, Karnataka’s pioneering efforts in 
reserving seats for women in panchayats, supplemented with training, have strengthened 
their hand in village decision making. 
 
Some Implications 
 
Governance has become the new buzzword of development (Kaufman, Kray and Zoido-
Lobaton, 2002).   But it does not matter any more now than it did before.  Karnataka has 
attempted to tackle the problem of good governance, albeit under different labels, for at 
least a century with distinctly mixed results.   However, it is clear that path-dependencies 
generated by these efforts have made a difference - at least in the world of ideas. 
 
However, the papers in this symposium highlight a common theme of a gap between 
ideas and implementation, between de jure and de facto governance.   Politics matter.  
Manor argues that the strong caste-based nature of political coalitions in the state have 
had the negative effect of politicizing caste in the state in a manner that is perhaps more 
acute than the other South Indian states.   At the same time caste-politics has also resulted 
in more cautious politicians who have, generally, avoided the excesses of some other 
states.  Coalition politics have led to more stable policies because bureaucrats have 
retained relatively more power in the state.   But, this argument should also be 
supplemented by examining this continuity within the context of the policies of the 
Wadiyar regime. 
 
With increasing devolution to panchayats, Besley, Pande and Rao show political 
considerations have also begun to matter at the village level with village politicians 
acting in ways that protect their electoral base.  Panchayati Raj institutions are not yet 
working in the manner envisaged by the 73rd amendment, particularly in the irregularities 
in holding gram sabhas.  Corruption is to some extent being localized with evidence of 
political opportunism by village politicians.  On the hand caste-reservations seem to have 
the desired effect of improving the lot disadvantaged groups.   Several concrete 
recommendations can be drawn from these results, including instituting a system to 
monitor effective and regularly held gram sabhas, and limiting the number of villages 
within each panchayat to reduce the extent to which political competition can influence 
intra-village disparities in panchayat investments, and instituting incentives – such as 
increasing the salaries of panchayat committee members – to reduce corruption within the 
PRI system. 
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Ramanathan demonstrates the utter lack of attention paid to governance in urban areas 
with the lackluster implementation of the 74th amendment.  Civil society groups can play 
a valuable role in changing this by highlighting attention to the problem and by initiating 
collective action to solve it.  Civil society groups, as Anantpur demonstrates, are active 
also in rural governance – in the form of Customary Village Councils though, unlike 
urban NGOs, these have long historical roots.  They do, however, interact closely with 
gram panchayats in selecting candidates, influencing village decisions and conducting 
important activities like dispute resolution that are outside the mandate of gram 
panchayats.   Ramanathan and Anantpur, therefore, identify the singular importance of 
civil society in improving governance.  While the theory of democracy emphasizes the 
central role of electoral accountability, Ramanathan and Anantpur point towards another 
type accountability that the political scientist Lily Tsai (2007) calls “social 
accountability”.  Organizations and movements outside government can hold the 
government to task and cooperate with it to generate better governance.  This is true both 
at the local level as shown in Kerala (Isaac and Heller, 2003), but also, more generally 
(Fung and Wright, 2003) to correct what can be described as “civil society failure” 
(Devarajan and Kanbur, 2005). 
 
Sen, Iyer and George highlight two important limitations in the Karnataka Model; First, 
that the large portions of Karnataka that come from the Nizam’s territories face 
challenges that are particularly daunting;   Second, that systemic challenges in 
governance have particularly adverse consequences for women – who face neglect within 
the home and exclusion outside which has adverse consequences for their health.   Jain 
fleshes out where and how gender bias occurs within systems of governance and points 
out two factors – in the gender-biased nature of how the state “sees”;  1) In the kinds of 
data it collects and the analyses it conducts;  2) In the fact that women are systematically 
excluded from decision making processes, a point that is also demonstrated by Besley, 
Pande and Rao who show that women are much less likely to participate in gram sabhas.  
It is also implicitly brought out in Manor’s political history which shows that a woman 
has never risen to prominence in the higher reaches of Karnataka politics.   
 
What lessons can we draw from this11?  What can other states within India, and countries 
outside, learn from Karnataka’s experience?  First, that good ideas do not always 
translate into good practices.  Second, that deliberative democracy can be nurtured by the 
state by actively instituting forums for deliberative interaction as in the case of the 
Mysore Representative Assembly and in gram sabhas in village panchayats.  Third, that 
in order for civil society groups to play useful roles as agents of social accountability – 
states have to be supportive and responsive to such groups.  Fourth, that despite good 
intentions pervasive forms of discrimination, particularly against women, can persist.  
Tackling this requires supplementing a gender-specific approach in data collection, with 
mechanisms that will broaden political participation.   Fifth, that deepening democracy is 
a very slow process with lots of ups and downs, and fits and starts, constant innovation, 
an active public sphere, and resistance from active social movements.   Good governance 
cannot be achieved overnight, but with persistent efforts it will bear some fruits.  
                                                 
11 See Kadekodi (2004a and 2004b) for concrete policy recommendations for Karnataka. 
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Hopefully, as time goes by, Karnataka’s Model of development will better reflect its 
reality.   
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Change in Karnataka over the Last Generation: 
Villages and the Wider Context 
 
by James Manor 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines social and political changes that have occurred since 1972 – at the 
village level where most of Karnataka’s residents live, and at higher levels when they 
affect villages.1  Throughout this discussion, we encounter an oddity.  Important changes 
have occurred despite the tendency of nearly all state governments to proceed cautiously, 
concentrating almost exclusively on incremental change.  Six major changes are worth 
noting.     
 
? In 1972 Chief Minister Devaraj Urs broke the dominance that Lingayats and 
Vokkaligas had exercised over state-level politics since Independence.  Since 
then, Karnataka’s leaders have constructed broad ‘rainbow’ coalitions in 
which important cabinet posts were given to leaders from every numerically 
powerful social group.       
? In 1983, the state’s party system changed when the Congress Party lost a state 
election for the first time.  Since then, the alternation of parties at state 
elections has (with one exception) been the norm. 
? After 1985, a Janata government generously empowered and funded 
panchayati raj institutions. 
? Caste (jati) has increasingly come to denote ‘difference’ rather than 
‘hierarchy’. 
? Society at the village level has become much less cohesive (discussed in see 
Part V).  
? After the late 1980s, a boom in software and out-sourcing occurred in greater 
Bangalore.   
 
Only the first and the third of these changes were the result of leaders’ decisions to 
induce dramatic change -- and since 1985, no such decision has occurred.2   
 
So change in Karnataka has mostly been gradual, because politicians there have tended to 
be tentative, even conservative – a word that they will not like.  But to ease their 
discomfort, it should be added that much of what we have seen has been enlightened 
conservatism – a tendency to pursue incremental changes which anticipate future 
problems in order to defuse them before they become acute.  That tendency is consistent 
                                                 
1   The paper largely omits changes that have occurred in the urban sector and in the state’s economy. 
2  One change which might be included in the list but which has been left out was Devaraj Urs’ land reform 
during the 1970s.  It has been omitted because it was radical neither in its intent nor in its impact.  As Urs 
himself recognised, it failed to address the issue of landlessness.  It dealt only with tenancy, and that was a 
far less serious problem here than in other parts of India because owner-cultivators constituted a much 
larger proportion of Karnataka’s rural population than in other regions.   
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with the traditions of government in former princely Mysore (roughly the southern half of 
contemporary Karnataka) since 1881.  So is an accompanying tendency towards caution 
lest powerful interests become dangerously alienated.  And yet incremental change has 
been pursued persistently enough to have a significant cumulative effect.   
 
One result of politicians’ enlightened conservatism has been that certain actions which 
might have served the interests of all rural dwellers – or of disadvantaged villagers – have 
not been taken.  That is regrettable.  But other actions have been – for the most part – 
beneficial.  Karnataka has thus avoided the extremes of inaction seen in places like 
Orissa, and of brutish governance seen in states like Bihar and, recently, Gujarat.  
Anticipatory changes – beginning with the Miller Committee in the 1920s and 
accelerating with Devaraj Urs’ mobilization of disadvantaged groups – ensured that this 
state experienced little conflict during the Mandal Commission controversy in 1990.  And 
incremental actions to promote communal accommodation prevented Hindu nationalists 
from producing the kind of polarization that occurred in many other states after 1990.          
 
We shall see that this enlightened conservatism can be traced to several strong, inter-
related tendencies within state governments since 1972.  Most governments have tended 
towards collective leadership in rainbow coalitions -- with leaders from a broad range of 
social groups exercising substantial influence.  Power-sharing at ministerial level has 
helped make individuals less important than institutions – including the bureaucracy 
which has suffered less damage than elsewhere.  Policies have therefore been 
comparatively well crafted.  And since rival parties have sought support from the same 
broad social base, policy continuity has been strong despite frequent changes of 
government.      
 
Because changes have occurred incrementally in Karnataka, they have for the most part 
endured.  They have not produced sufficient dislocation to allow opponents to muster the 
support needed to restore the status quo ante.   
 
The rest of this paper is divided into four parts.  Part II analyses changes at the state level, 
and Part III considers changes at the village level.  Part IV addresses links between 
villages and higher levels, between which there is greater vertical integration.  Part V 
considers social cohesion in Karnataka. 
 
II. THE STATE LEVEL 
  
Several changes at the state level need to be explored.  Those examined below have 
impinged, at least modestly, upon rural arenas. 
 
Deteriorating Standards? 
 
In Karnataka today, people often say – rightly -- that standards in public life have 
deteriorated.  For example, in March 2005, a former Chief Secretary of the state stressed 
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that when civil servants inform ministers (as they routinely do) that a potential action 
would be illegal, ministers increasingly disregard this advice.3     
 
But while standards have slipped, we need to compare this state with others – and when 
we do, things look less discouraging.  In many other states, civil servants no longer warn 
politicians of potentially illegal actions because they have been thoroughly intimidated by 
their masters, and because they know that such comments would have no effect.  In 
Karnataka, such advice is still conveyed regularly – and sometimes it is heeded.  When 
institutions and the rule of law have suffered under certain leaders there, steps have 
repeatedly been taken to restore them.  Three things help us to understand this 
comparatively modest slippage in standards.  They are discussed in the next three 
sections. 
 
Mercifully Few Destructive Chief Ministers 
 
Since Independence, only two destructive Chief Ministers have held power in Karnataka 
– R. Gundu Rao (1980-1983) and S. Bangarappa (1990-1992).   
 
Gundu Rao became Chief Minister because he offered Indira Gandhi the kind of abject 
loyalty that, by 1980, she demanded – and because he was a favourite of her son Sanjay.  
He centralised power in his own hands to an unprecedented degree and imposed ‘civil 
servant raj’.  This had one minor advantage – civil servants tend, for the most part, to 
maintain certain minimal standards when given their head.  But it was outweighed by 
serious disadvantages.  Corruption, which was centralised, soared.  Legislators were 
unable to exercise influence on behalf of their constituents.  They were often unable to 
get appointments even with middle-ranking bureaucrats.  Democratic government was 
thus stifled.  And grossly insensitive acts occurred.  When farmers were late in repaying 
government loans, the police seized moveable property – which a sensible Chief Minister 
would have regarded as politically insane.4       
 
Bangarappa did greater damage.  He placed unprincipled civil servants in key posts, and 
exiled the best to obscure postings.  Illicit ‘fund-raising’ was a central preoccupation.  
Bangarappa became the only state-level leader in the last 150 years to encourage 
parochial conflict – between Kannadigas and Tamils.  When this led to rioting in 
Bangalore, the Chief Minister’s aides rushed to inform him, only to find that he refused 
to consider their pleas for action until he had completed his badminton game.5  It was that 
sort of government.      
 
Two destructive Chief Ministers is too many, but two is a smaller number than is the 
norm in several other states.  And since neither of these leaders served a full five years, 
                                                 
3   Interview, Bangalore, 6 March 2005. 
4   His government is discussed in greater detail in J. Manor, “Blurring the Lines between Parties and Social 
Bases: Gundu Rao and the Emergence of a Janata Government in Karnataka" – which appeared both in the 
Economic and Political Weekly, 15 September 1984, and in J.R. Wood (ed.) State Politics in Contemporary 
India: Crisis or Continuity? (Westview, Boulder and London, 1984) pp. 139-68. 
5   Interview with an official who took the news to Bangarappa, Bangalore, 9 March 1999. 
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they were unable to institutionalize their damaging practices.  In both cases, they were 
ousted – Gundu Rao by the voters, and Bangarappa by a revolt of legislators who rightly 
feared voters’ wrath.  So the system proved self-correcting, and in both cases, politicians’ 
accountability to a sophisticated electorate provided the explanation.  Once out of office, 
they were thoroughly discredited and their successors restored standards – something that 
has not always happened in other states. 
 
Corruption and Criminalisation 
 
Corruption – in terms of the amounts of money illegally diverted -- has increased 
markedly since 1972.6  No accurate measurements are possible, but knowledgeable 
sources consistently attest to this.7   
 
Why?  First, politicians believe that ‘fund-raising’ can enhance their influence and their 
chances of re-election.  They have sometimes been right about the first of these ideas.  If 
a leader distributes substantial funds among subordinates or even opposition politicians, 
he8 can buy cooperation.  If he provides money to potential groups of supporters (or their 
leaders), he may strengthen their organisational capacity and win their backing.  This 
occurred under Devaraj Urs between 1972 and 1980 when corruption first took off.  He 
used illicit funds to establish and then build up caste associations among disadvantaged 
groups that had previously been poorly organised or entirely unorganised.  He felt 
compelled to do this to prevent Lingayats and Vokkaligas from re-establishing their 
former dominance.9   
 
But the notion that massive ‘fund-raising’ will help to secure re-election is baseless.  
Parties in power always have far more opportunities to amass illicit funds than do 
opposition parties.  Ruling parties therefore almost always have more campaign funds 
than their opponents.  And yet at the vast majority of elections in Karnataka and other 
states since 1983, ruling parties have lost.  If money decided elections, this would not 
happen.  Politicians pursue ‘fund-raising’, in the vain hope that it will win them re-
election.  (Because they know that re-election is unlikely, they tend to maximise personal 
profiteering while the opportunity exists, which also increases corruption.)   
 
Illicit ‘fund raising’ for parties has also occurred because state-level leaders – especially 
in the Congress Party -- have been required to provide national-level leaders with 
substantial sums.  This process became well established early -- in Devaraj Urs’ time -- to 
persuade his party’s national leaders not to intrude unhelpfully in the state’s politics.10    
 
There are, however, certain important checks and limitations on corruption in Karnataka 
which are less evident in many other states.  Most politicians know that excessive 
                                                 
6   This refers to corruption at higher levels.  Corruption at the local level is discussed in Part IV. 
7   Note that a Karnataka IAS officer has produced a useful book on corruption which was surely informed 
by his work in the state.  See S.K. Das, Public Office, Private Interest: Bureaucracy and Corruption in India 
(Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2001). 
8   Very few senior politicians in Karnataka have been women. 
9   These comments are based on discussions with Devaraj Urs in Bangalore in 1978. 
10   In interviews with this writer in 1978 and 1980, Devaraj Urs stated this explicitly.  
 16 
corruption damages their hopes of re-election – by undermining their reputations and 
their capacity to deliver goods and services.  The successors of Gundu Rao and 
Bangarappa sharply curtailed their excesses because they were seen as politically 
suicidal.   
 
These limitations have, however, been modest.  When a well-informed official in an 
international development agency saw evidence suggesting that the former Andhra 
Pradesh government received kickbacks of more that $1 million dollars on more than 100 
occasions, he replied that Karnataka had not lagged very far behind.11   But kickbacks do 
not occur at every opportunity,12 so the overall picture is ambiguous.   
 
The criminalisation of politics in Karnataka is far less serious than in many other states.  
Consider the contrasts with two.   
 
15 years ago, 155 Uttar Pradesh legislators (out of a total of 425) had criminal records – 
and things have not improved since then.13  Karnataka has seen nothing remotely like 
this.  Why?  Voters in UP (and certain other states) turn to criminals because (i) 
government institutions have become so degraded that criminals are seen to offer at least 
some of the responsiveness that those institutions do not provide, and (ii) political parties 
have undergone severe decay.  In Karnataka, the formal institutions are patently 
imperfect, and parties lack great organisational strength, but they have suffered far less 
erosion than their UP counterparts.       
 
Until the early 1990s, the only urban centre in South India with a well-developed 
criminal underworld was Vijayawada in Andhra Pradesh.14  During the late 1990s, those 
criminal organisations extended their influence from the coast across the region 
extending to Hyderabad -- because the economic boom in Hyderabad created 
opportunities, and because the ruling party there forged ties to them since it considered 
them useful allies.15  The economic boom in Bangalore has no doubt attracted the 
attention of some criminals.  But recent interviews with knowledgeable Karnataka 
                                                 
11   Interview, New Delhi, 9 September 2004. 
12   For example, in the mid-1990s, private companies seeking a contract to build a sizeable utility sent 
representatives to Bangalore to make final presentations before those who would make the decision.  After 
one company’s spokesman had finished, he was told by a senior bureaucrat that to secure the contract, he 
would need to pass Rs. 600,000 through the bureaucrat to the authorities.  The businessman made no 
response and immediately contacted an analyst of the state’s politics to ask whether this sounded like a 
genuine overture.  The analyst quickly checked with reliable contacts close to the government, and was 
advised that it was probably not a genuine demand, for two reasons.  The figure of Rs. 600,000 seemed too 
low for such a substantial project.  And this specific bureaucrat was probably not in a position to affect the 
decision.  This looked more like a free-lance attempt by that bureaucrat to make some money for himself.  
The analyst was advised to tell the businessman to telephone the Chief Minister’s office and explain what 
had happened.  The businessman did this and his company then secured the contract without paying a bribe.     
13  This emerged from this writer’s discussions with Paul R. Brass, an authority on Uttar Pradesh politics.   
14  Manor, Power, Poverty and Poison: Disaster and Response in an Indian City (Sage Publications, New 
Delhi, Newbury Park and London, 1993) chapter four. 
15  These comments are based on a detailed, confidential and unpublished study of governance in AP 
undertaken by this writer in 2001, with the assistance of three of the best informed analysts in that state – 
whose evidence on this point was highly credible. 
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officials, policemen and journalists indicate that criminal activities still fall far short of 
levels found in Andhra Pradesh, and that Karnataka’s politicians have done far less to 
develop links with criminals.  Karnataka politics has experienced very little 
criminalisation.   
 
Institutions Still Matter More than Individuals 
 
In many Indian states, political institutions have taken a battering from powerful, self-
aggrandising politicians since 1972.  Personalised patronage networks predominate over 
impersonal processes.  Bureaucrats have been so thoroughly browbeaten that they and the 
institutions which they inhabit retain little substance or autonomy.  Supposedly 
independent institutions beyond the bureaucracy have been subordinated to the whims of 
potent leaders.  We have seen far less of this in Karnataka than in many other states.  And 
when such excesses have occurred there, they have usually been followed by efforts to 
regenerate institutions.16   
 
This is mainly explained by three features of Karnataka’s politics.  First, the preference 
for rainbow coalitions at the state level has ensured that collective leadership has usually 
predominated.  This has prevented excesses by individual leaders, and limited damage to 
institutions.   
 
Second, most senior politicians there have risen through the ranks of their parties, so that 
individuals do not loom larger than parties.  It is thus unusual to find a party in Karnataka 
utterly dominated by one leader.  We saw signs of this in the Congress Party under 
Gundu Rao and Bangarappa (but they were soon ousted), and recently in the Janata Dal 
(S).  But the norm is collective leadership -- which is institution-friendly.          
 
Third, the alternation of parties in power has meant that no leader has been so successful 
at the polls that s/he becomes more important than the party and can do whatever s/he 
pleases.  This again has spared institutions the kind of damage which untrammelled 
leaders can do.    
 
Karnataka has also experienced less brutish government than several other states.  It has 
seen nothing remotely like the excesses witnessed under the present Gujarat government, 
in Haryana under Bansi Lal, in Maharashtra under the BJP-Shiv Sena government, or the 
surge in deaths in police custody under Naidu in Andhra Pradesh.17  No Karnataka leader 
has gone that far.                  
 
It is also exceedingly unusual in Karnataka for senior politicians to browbeat civil 
servants – a common occurrence in some North Indian states and an occasional 
occurrence in Gujarat, Maharasthra, and Tamil Nadu.  As a result, the bureaucracy in 
                                                 
16   For more on this process, see J. Manor, “Political Regeneration in India” in A. Nandy and D.L. Sheth 
(eds.) The Multiverse of Democracy: Essays in Honour of Rajni Kothari (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 
Thousand Oaks and London, 1996) pp. 230-41.  
17   Senior civil servants in Karnataka express astonishment at the “brutal” actions against alleged 
‘naxalites’ under the Naidu government. 
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Karnataka has maintained greater autonomy, institutional substance, and potential for 
constructive action than in most other states.  That has enabled successive Karnataka 
governments to develop more intelligently crafted policies than most other governments– 
including policies that affect the rural sector.18   
 
Policy Continuity amid the Alternation of Ruling Parties 
 
Since 1983, the alternation of ruling parties at state elections has been the norm in 
Karnataka.  In some states – most notably Uttar Pradesh since the early 1990s – when 
governments alternate, huge changes ensue.  The policies of previous governments are 
uprooted and contemptuously discarded, and key administrative posts are systematically 
purged of civil servants who served the previous government.  We have seen very little of 
this in Karnataka.   
 
This is partly explained by the preference for incremental policy changes.  This offers a 
striking contrast to Uttar Pradesh where dramatic policy shifts by one government, 
                                                 
18   The importance of this institutional capacity can be illustrated by a brief account not of policy affecting 
the rural sector, but of the interactions between Karnataka governments and major international 
development agencies.  In 2002, a World Bank official in Delhi told this writer that Karnataka was the only 
state government in India that with an impressive capacity to develop its own detailed negotiating positions 
in its dealings with the Bank.  This required the government to generate complex socio-economic analyses 
and proposals on its own, without help from the Bank which routinely provided such assistance to other 
state governments – a process that compromised their autonomy.  Karnataka could achieve this not because 
it had more good economists among its senior bureaucrats, but because it managed its bureaucracy in ways 
that enabled its economists to make crucial contributions to policy making.  (The state government also 
sought advice from formidable analysts available within the state – not least at ISEC.) 
     By giving bureaucrats greater autonomy, and by providing them with an enabling environment, 
successive governments have enhanced their own autonomy in their dealings with major international 
development agencies.  This has ensured that the state’s finances have been prudently managed, so that 
Karnataka does not share the desperate need of some other states for donor funds – something which can 
lead state governments into agreements which undermine their autonomy.  Thus when the World Bank 
offered the J.H. Patel government substantial funds, he was able to take advice from sophisticated advisors 
and – when they and he found the attendant conditionalities unpalatable – he refused the offer. 
     The strength of these institutions within the Government of Karnataka has not always endeared it to 
international donor agencies.  In recent years, Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh (Kalyan Singh) and Andhra 
Pradesh (Chandrababu Naidu) have gone to extraordinary lengths to cultivate major donors at a personal 
level.  When teams from donor agencies arrived in their state capitals, they had extensive access to these 
Chief Ministers who played the dominant role in negotiations.  By contrast, when such teams reached 
Bangalore, they dealt mainly with Chief Secretaries, Finance Secretaries and their teams of economic 
advisors.  At best, they might be given a meal with Chief Ministers.  (The use of the plural is crucial, since 
it indicates that these practices were followed under successive governments.) 
     This caused some dismay in donor agencies.  Egos were not massaged so assiduously in Bangalore, and 
it inspired suspicions about whether the real leaders there were serious about development.  At one point in 
the late 1990s, an analyst stressed to a major donor agency that when they negotiated with governments in 
places like Andhra Pradesh they were dealing with individuals, while in Karnataka they were dealing with 
institutions.  This should have made Karnataka more attractive since it indicated that policy continuity 
when governments changed was more likely, but that message was not fully absorbed. 
      This account focuses on high politics and on events that do not bear intimately upon the rural sector, but 
the same processes – creating conditions in which civil servants can contribute constructively to policy 
making – have had positive benefits for rural development too.  [Interviews since 1998 with senior officials 
of the state government and at the World Bank in Delhi.]    
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introduced with extravagant histrionics, are shredded when a new government takes over 
and introduces radically different policies with still more histrionics.  It is also explained 
by Karnataka’s parties’ tendency to appeal to the same social base (see the section just 
below).   
 
When a new government assumes power in Bangalore, it tends to sustain most of its 
predecessor’s policies – with some adjustments but little uprooting.  This has produced 
broad policy continuity which has enabled the incremental changes that nearly all 
governments have introduced to have – over time – a considerable cumulative effect that 
has often been felt at the village level. 
 
Continuity in Social Coalitions Underpinning Ruling Parties 
 
Nearly all state governments in Karnataka since 1972 have sought to construct a broadly 
inclusive rainbow coalition of all numerically powerful social groups.  Again Uttar 
Pradesh differs radically, with contending parties seeking votes from more limited and 
largely distinct sections of society.  Those parties magnify the differences between social 
groups and encourage antipathy between them.  Hence the dramatic changes in policy 
there.  The politics of division and spite that have predominated in Uttar Pradesh for over 
a decade have almost never been pursued in Karnataka.  
 
These comments about ‘rainbow coalitions’ refer to more than the representation of 
different social groups within the state cabinet.  It is possible to have relatively fair 
representation while leaders from certain social groups receive only tokenism – 
unimportant posts, or inadequate influence over the ministries that they supposedly 
control.  But governments in Karnataka since 1972 have provided leaders from a diverse 
social groups with genuine influence over reasonably important ministries.  Indeed, 
governments have tended to construct state-level cabinets which are even more broadly 
representative than the coalitions which voted them into power.19   
 
It has, however, become increasingly difficult to build and sustain extremely broad 
coalitions because tensions between various social groups have grown more acute.  
Consider Muzaffar Assadi’s stimulating arguments that two competing social coalitions 
have contended for power in the state: MOVD (Muslims, OBCs, Vokkaligas and Dalits) 
and LIBRA (Lingayats and Brahmins).20       
 
If those two coalitions held together coherently, MOVD would always defeat LIBRA.  
The former contains far more voters than the latter.  In practice, most governments since 
                                                 
19   This has become especially apparent in the period since the mid-1990s when data from the National 
Election Study have shown that the social coalitions which elect governments have sometimes been less 
broad than the array of groups represented in cabinets.  But it appears to have been true in earlier periods as 
well.  On the 2004 election, see Shastri and Ramaswamy, “Karnataka: Simultaneous Polls, Different 
Results, Economic and Political Weekly (18 December 2004) p. 5487. 
20   M. Assadi, “Muslims and Politics of Social Coalition: Some Experiments in the Electoral Politics of 
Karnataka”, Social Action (April-June 2003) pp. 145-58; and “New Political Alignments of Social 
Groups”, Economic and Political Weekly, 21 February 1998, pp. 382-83. 
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the alternation of parties began in 1983 have tended to appeal mainly to the MOVD 
groups.  But we have often seen variations in this trend.   
 
 Governments have reached out to Lingayats and Brahmins as well as to MOVD 
groups.  One was headed by a Brahmin (Ramakrishna Hegde) and two were headed, for a 
time, by Lingayats (S.R. Bommai and Veerenda Patil).  And those Lingayats came from 
both major parties – Bommai from Janata, and Veerendra Patil from Congress.  Since 
1983, both parties have given significant representation to all numerically powerful 
groups.  All cabinets have been broadly representative.  Both parties have had Vokkaliga 
Chief Ministers, and though only Congress has had OBC Chief Ministers, Janata has also 
given them prominence.  All Chief Ministers have also sought to include leaders from the 
two numerically powerful groups that have not provided Chief Ministers – Dalits and 
Muslims (although there has often been a shortage of Muslim legislators).21 
 
The BJP, however, which is no longer a marginal party, has focused mainly upon the 
LIBRA bloc.  This became apparent after Hegde aligned his version of the Janata Dal 
with the BJP.  He was a Brahmin, and Lingayats and Brahmins have loomed large in the 
leadership of the state unit of the BJP.  But he and the BJP recognised that they needed 
support from other groups.  The BJP has sought to mobilize MOVD elements around 
communal issues – with only limited success.  And the BJP and Hegde, until the latter’s 
death, appealed to regional resentments in northern Karnataka.  So here again, the 
dichotomy between MOVD and LIBRA blurs at the edges.        
       
Growing tensions between social groups may end the tradition of ‘rainbow coalitions’ by 
making it impossible for politicians to sustain the broadly accommodative approach that 
has long prevailed.  But that has not happened yet.  It is also possible that the BJP will 
gain power after the next state election – because they are the only alternative to the 
coalition between the Congress and the Janata Dal (S).  But if that occurs, it will not be 
because the LIBRA bloc brought the BJP to power – it lacks the numerical strength to do 
so.  It will be because many MOVD voters turned to the BJP out of frustration with the 
coalition government.  And that will impel a new BJP government to reach out to those 
people once it takes power – to pursue yet another broad coalition. 
 
III. THE VILLAGE LEVEL 
 
Karnataka’s villages have experienced diverse social and political changes in the last 
three decades.  Most of these have occurred gradually, but over time, many have had 
considerable cumulative effects. 
 
Social and Economic Change in the Villages 
 
In the years since 1972, agriculture has gradually declined in importance – both 
economically (as people turn increasingly to non-farm incomes), and socially (as the 
                                                 
21   The main reason for this is that Muslim voters are spread unusually evenly and thus thinly across the 
state.  They form a very substantial bloc in only three of the 224 assembly constituencies (interview with E. 
Raghavan and Imran Qureshi, Bangalore, 9 March 2005).    
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inter-dependence and hierarchical bonds anchored in old patterns of agricultural 
production have been eroded).  Change in this sector has been incremental but persistent, 
so that in many areas, the old social order has substantially crumbled.  This is apparent 
from studies by G.K. Karanth, V. Ramaswamy and others.  These indicate that there is 
much less order in village society, and that old rituals – and the collective arrangements 
for the management of resources linked to them – have withered.22          
 
G.S. Aurora has explained the background to these changes.23  He notes a decline in the 
number of larger land holdings and an increase in the number of medium, small and 
marginal holdings.  The numbers of marginal farmers and landless labourers have 
increased.  Many artisans have been “forced to join the ranks of the rural proletariat” as 
goods used by rural dwellers have come increasingly from urban industries. 
 
The proportion of lands put to non-agricultural uses has risen from 4.2% in 1956-57 to 
6.7% in 1997-98. The commercialisation of agricultural household economies has 
become a “dominant pattern”.  In former times, farmers concentrated on growing cereals, 
partly for payments in kind under the old jajmani system.  Now, as that system has 
disintegrated, they cultivate other crops for the market and pay workers in cash -- 
loosening the old, hierarchical social ties which also implied interdependence.  As it has 
diminished, dependence on external market forces – which carries serious risks -- has 
grown.  The use of high yielding varieties has increased, and with it the need for costly 
inputs.  To obtain these, farmers must take sizeable loans, and when crops fail, this has 
led to farmers’ suicides.  (Far fewer of these have occurred in Karnataka than in 
neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, but the total in the former – over 400 – is still alarming.)       
 
Four themes from Aurora’s analysis are immensely important.   
 
? The potency of hierarchy and interdependence within villages has declined. 
? Links to and dependence upon external forces have increased. 
? Individuals now count for more than collectivities within villages – which 
increases both the liberty and the vulnerability of individuals. 
? The result is a society that is more open and democratic, but in which people 
face greater risks -- since the old hierarchical order entailed not only injustices 
but certain collective protections against uncertainties.   
 
Changes in the Role, the Importance and the Materiality of Caste 
 
Given these changes, caste (jati) has diminished in importance, especially in one crucial 
respect.  It has increasingly come to denote ‘difference’ rather than ‘hierarchy’.  This has 
                                                 
22   See in particular chapters 11 to 14 in R. Baumgartner and R. Hogger (eds.) In Search of Sustainable 
Livelihood Systems: Managing Resources and Change (Sage Publications, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and 
London, 2004).  
23  G.S. Aurora, “Core Issues in the Agrarian Economy and Society of Karnataka” in ibid., pp. 247-64.  His 
focus was on Kolar District of Karnataka, but his comment apply to nearly off of the state.  
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caused certain invidious practices to decline, but it has also inspired greater tensions and 
conflicts between caste groups.  We see this in other states too.24   
 
This monumental change has occurred gradually.  When a visitor mentioned it to Krishna 
Raj, the late editor of the Economic and Political Weekly, the latter stressed that what 
surprised him was that “it took so long”.25  At present, we lack a full understanding both 
of why the change occurred and why “it took so long”.  M.N. Srinivas stressed the 
importance of the decline of the jajmani system that provided the material underpinnings 
of caste hierarchy26, and he was probably correct.  The role of politics was ambiguous.  
Political mobilization on caste lines tended to strengthen caste consciousness and at times 
reinforced hierarchies.  But the post-1972 mobilization of disadvantaged castes in 
Karnataka, and the egalitarian logic of one-person-one-vote undermined it.   
 
Government policies also had an ambiguous impact.  On the one hand, policies after 1972 
favouring disadvantaged groups contributed to the decline of hierarchy.  On the other, 
one reason that “it took so long” has been the cautious, incremental nature of economic 
liberalization in India.  Its leaders have carefully avoided radical changes common in 
China and much of Southeast Asia – because in a democratic polity, they are unwilling to 
risk massive social dislocation.  In China, around 200 million peasants have been induced 
or forced off the land.  Many of them live precariously round major cities, seeking work.  
This poses serious risks of political disorder.  The Chinese leaders, with their formidable 
coercive power, are prepared to countenance this.  Nothing remotely like that, or like the 
“social change in fast forward” seen in Indonesia,27 has happened in India.     
   
But despite the gradualism, immense changes have occurred.  One key example is a 
decline in the material utility of caste.  Two decades ago, this writer argued that caste 
(jati) in Karnataka existed not just at the level of ideas, sentiments or identifications, but 
that it possessed materiality.  A villager’s caste status and connections played a major 
role in determining whether s/he could gain access to tangible opportunities and assets.28  
Today, this remains true to some extent.  But high caste status offers fewer material 
advantages, and low status offers at least somewhat fewer disadvantages than before.  
And other things have gained in importance in providing or denying opportunities to 
villagers (see below). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24  For evidence from Madhya Pradesh, see A. Mayer, “Caste in an Indian Village: Change and Continuity, 
1954-1992” in C.J. Fuller (ed.) Caste Today (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997) pp. 32-64.  See also 
D.L. Sheth, "Secularisation of Caste and Making of New Middle Class", Economic and Political Weekly, 
21-28 August 1999, pp. 2502-10. 
25  Interview, Mumbai, 27 September 1998. 
26  Interviews with him, Bangalore, in 1996 and 1998.  
27  This phrase belongs to Anne Booth, an Indonesia specialist at the University of London. 
28   J. Manor, “Karnataka: Caste, Class, Dominance and Politics in a Cohesive Society” in F. Frankel and 
M.S.A. Rao (eds.) Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, (Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1984) volume one, pp. 322-61. 
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The Proliferation of New Channels Linking Local and Higher Levels 
 
This topic is discussed more fully in Part IV, but it is important to note it here, since it 
alters dynamics within villages.  Far more channels now exist to link individuals within 
villages to higher levels in the system.  Some of these – the electronic media (especially 
satellite television,29 but also telephones) mainly provide villagers with more information 
than they could obtain 30 years ago.  But others – improved roads, transport, panchayati 
raj institutions, other government structures, and civil society organisations – enable 
individuals to develop links to the wider world, which they can sometimes use to access 
new opportunities.  
 
Individuals Matter More, and Social Institutions and Groups Less… 
 
As caste (jati) -- a social institution -- has gone into decline, villagers seeking 
opportunities have increasingly turned to individuals who can (in G.K. Karanth’s words) 
“get things done”.30  And those doing the seeking have also often operated as individuals 
rather than on behalf of the social groups from which they come.  Thus, social institutions 
and groups matter less, and individuals matter more than before.    
                 
…But One Political Institution Matters More – Panchayati Raj  
 
At the same time, however, the comparatively generous empowerment and funding of 
panchayats in Karnataka have given – the gram (village) panchayat – a political 
institution -- considerable importance in most villages.  This has had ambiguous 
implications on two fronts.   
First, the growing importance of this democratic political institution has acted as a 
counterweight to what might be termed a tendency towards anarchy within villages -- 
which might follow from the decline of a substantially undemocratic social institutionism 
caste (jati).  But since people interact with gram panchayats not just collectively but also 
as individuals, it has in part enhanced the growing importance of individuals.               
 
Second, the empowerment of panchayats has sometimes enabled villagers to solve 
problems on their own.  But since gram panchayats often need administrative assistance 
from higher up to implement some decisions – like construction projects – villagers must 
still reach out to higher levels.  When that happens, individuals’ connections higher levels 
are important.  So here again, the results have been ambiguous.  (Panchayats are 
discussed further in the section just below, and again in Part IV.) 
 
Corruption At and Near the Village Level 
 
Corruption at lower levels presents a mixed, but somewhat less grim picture than at the 
state level.  Here as at the state level, our evidence is limited.  But the following, 
                                                 
29  See in this connection W. Crawley and D. Page, Satellites over South Asia: Broadcasting, Culture and 
the Public Interest (Sage Publication, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London, 2001).  
30   Interview, Bangalore, 9 April 2005. 
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sometimes unproven, points are probably accurate.  Corruption occurs at lower levels for 
diverse reasons.  Even candidates seeking lowly offices feel compelled to spend 
substantial funds – and to take out loans that must be repaid out of money illicitly raised.  
The market in transfers impels low-level bureaucrats to find similarly large sums, with 
the same result.  And when a nexus develops at the sub-district level among a small 
number of government employees and elected politicians, development funds may be 
diverted into their pockets.  We have, however, seen the emergence in recent years of 
significant correctives to this last type of malfeasance – as the result of the empowerment 
of panchayats. 
 
In Karnataka, as a consequence of democratic decentralisation, the number of people 
involved in corrupt activities has increased.  That was inevitable when the number of 
elected offices increased in 1987 from 224 (assembly seats) to over 50,000 (seats on 
panchayats).  But the key question is whether the overall amount of money stolen has 
declined.  Evidence from Karnataka clearly indicates that it has. 
 
Before 1987, when development funds reached the sub-district (taluk) level, four or five 
persons (the Block Development Officer, the Assistant Engineer and influential non-
officials) often met behind closed doors, stole a substantial portion of that money – 
around 40%, say people involved – and presented the remainder to ordinary people as 
100% of the development budget.  After 1987, when the system became so transparent 
that hundreds of people in every taluk knew what 100% of the budget actually was, such 
grand theft became impossible.  Estimates in 1993 placed the overall amount of funds 
stolen under the new system at around 5%.31  That figure may have increased in the 
ensuing years, but even if it has, the picture is still substantially brighter than before the 
empowerment of panchayats. 32   
 
IV. LINKS BETWEEN VILLAGES AND HIGHER LEVELS 
 
The number of channels that provide potential links between villages and higher levels 
has multiplied over the last 30 years.  This is the result of the emergence or growing 
importance of four institutions/actors discussed below.33  Before we examine them, it is 
worth noting that two institutions do not qualify for inclusion here.  First, the role of the 
police -- who have become more responsive in urban Karnataka34 -- has scarcely changed 
                                                 
31   This is discussed in more detail in Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia 
and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1998) chapter two. 
32   It is worth adding that the computerised Bhoomi programme, providing land certificates -- by-passing 
village accountants who took bribes for this service -- is said to have reduced petty corruption by an 
estimated Rs.895 million annually.  Public Affairs Centre, A Report Card on Bhoomi Kiosks (Public 
Affairs Centre, Bangalore, 2004).  Some readers may suspect that that figure is an exaggeration – and 
Narayana Gatty have found evidence to indicate that in northern Karnataka, villagers prefer to pay the 
traditional bribes rather than incur the inconvenience of travelling to computer kiosks within their taluks.  
But even if the actual figure were only half of that amount, it still represents a significant decline in 
corruption. 
33   A fifth, market forces, might be added to this list.  But that is best left to economists to analyse. 
34  Independent surveys by the Public Affairs Centre found public satisfaction levels with the city’s police 
rose from almost zero in 1994 to 17% in 1999, and then to 83% in 2003.  See, Development Outreach 
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in rural areas.  Second, the capacity of political parties to penetrate into rural arenas has 
declined over the last three decades.  But let us consider four more encouraging changes.          
 
The Proliferation of Government Programmes and ‘User Committees’ 
 
National and state governments currently implement a vastly greater number of 
programmes in rural Karnataka than in 1972 -- providing new channels between villages 
and higher levels.  And since many of these programmes create ‘user committees’ to 
consult villagers or their representatives (on health, education, forestry, etc) – and since 
in this state (unlike many others) panchayats influence those committees – fresh 
opportunities exist for local preferences to flow upward into the policy process.35  It 
should be stressed, however, that rural Karnataka has not witnessed the dramatic 
increases in government responsiveness that occurred in Bangalore under S.M. Krishna 
during the late 1990s.36     
 
Panchayati Raj Institutions 
 
Panchayats were substantially empowered and funded in 1987, and since then – despite a 
decline in their powers – they have remained reasonably strong by Indian and 
international standards.  This system has proved more successful that most others across 
the world, partly because its accountability mechanisms are unusually reliable.37 
 
Their role in providing links between villages and higher levels is ambiguous.  In certain 
respects, it is limited.  Panchayats exist at village, taluk and district levels, but this has 
not resulted in sustained interactions between elected members at different levels -- partly 
because panchayats at the intermediate taluk level are comparatively weak.  But 
information flows have increased massively, both upward and downward.  Governments 
find it far easier to transmit information downward because elected panchayat members 
can interpret policies to villagers in ways that the latter comprehend.  And officials at 
higher levels have experienced a massive increase in information flows from below – so 
they feel better able to perform their tasks.38          
   
Political ‘Fixers’ 
 
Comments above on the increasing importance in villages of people who can “get things 
done” refer to the large number of local-level ‘fixers’ who seek to arrange things with 
persons in authority at higher levels.  Two recent studies of ‘fixers’ in Karnataka39 found 
                                                                                                                                                 
(March 2004) p. 12; and J. Manor, “Successful Governance Reforms in Two Indian States: Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh”, report to the World Bank, 2004.      
35  By linking most ‘user committees’ to panchayats, Karnataka has avoided serious problems often found 
elsewhere.  See J. Manor, “’User Committees’: A Potentially Damaging New Wave of Decentralisation?”, 
European Journal of Development Research (spring, 2004) pp. 192-213. 
36   See again, the Public Affairs Centre surveys and Manor, “Successful Governance Reforms…”. 
37   Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation… 
38   Ibid., chapter two. 
39  J. Manor, “’Towel over Armpit’: Small-time Political ‘Fixers’ in India’s States” – published in a shorter 
version in Asian Survey (September-October 2000) pp. 816-35, and in a longer version in A. Varshney 
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that many of them do not come from the traditionally dominant landowning groups, and 
that those who do are usually not involved in cultivating patrimonial ties to clients.  They 
develop different types of relationships from those associated with the old village 
hierarchies and with Lingayat/Vokkaliga dominance.  They have tended to erode those 
hierarchies.  Most ‘fixers’ are more accessible than dominant caste leaders in the old 
hierarchies.40  And they help the democratic process to work more effectively, and 
government institutions and actors to become more responsive.                   
 
Civil Society Organisations 
 
Civil society organisations also provide villagers with more links to higher levels than 
three decades ago.  Today, they can be found in most rural arenas.  Local-level 
associations tend not to connect villagers with higher levels, but many which originate at 
higher levels seek to forge links to the grassroots.  We must not, however, overstate the 
coverage of the latter.  It is unlikely that more than a minority of villagers are reached by 
such organisations.41  So most important links between villages and higher levels are 
provided by the other three institutions and actors discussed above. 
 
V. HOW ‘COHESIVE’ IS SOCIETY IN KARNATAKA? 
 
To conclude, let us consider the answers to this question that emerge at the village and 
higher levels.  In 1984, this writer argued that Karnataka was a ‘cohesive society’ – not as 
cohesive as more homogeneous societies, but more cohesive than the societies found 
elsewhere in South Asia.  This was true despite invidious hierarchies and injustices 
within it.  The key to the explanation was the exceedingly low incidence of landlessness 
in former princely Mysore.42    
 
This had two important implications.  First, hierarchies and inequalities there were not as 
extreme as in other regions of South Asia – so that we encountered less of the harsh 
exploitation found elsewhere, and less severe alienation among the exploited.  Second, 
since old Mysore set the political tone for the enlarged state after 1956, accommodative 
politics which offered at least something even to disadvantaged groups took firmer root 
there than in other Indian states.    
 
Is society in Karnataka today still as ‘cohesive’?  The simple answer is ‘no’, but the 
details are complicated.  At the village level, caste hierarchies have eroded.  Since those 
                                                                                                                                                 
(ed.) India and the Politics or Developing Countries: Essays in Memory of Myron Weiner (Sage 
Publication, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London, 2004) pp. 60-86; and A. Inbanathan and D.V. 
Gopalappa, “Fixers, Patronage, ‘Fixing’ and Local Governance in Karnataka”, Working Paper 112, 
Institute for Social and Economic Change, 2002.  See also Anirudh Krishna’s research on similar actors in 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, whom he calls naya netas in for example, Active Social Capital (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2002).   
40   Inbanathan and Gopalappa, ibid., p. 18. 
41   In Bangladesh, where national-level civil society organisations are more formidable than state-level 
equivalents in Karnataka, they estimate that they reach only around 20% of the rural population.  Interview 
with the head of one of the two most formidable organisations, Dhaka, 7 March 1993. 
42  Manor, “Karnataka: Caste, Class… 
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hierarchies entailed objectionable practices, this change that can be seen as ‘progressive’.  
But it has also undermined the limited sense of interdependence and mutuality, which 
offered certain protections against uncertainties.  The old hierarchies proved remarkably 
durable because they adapted incrementally as conditions changed.43  They bent without 
breaking – until recently. 
 
Over recent decades, ‘caste’ has come to denote difference more than hierarchy.  The 
bonds linking higher and lower status groups have become more tenuous.  Villagers look 
for help less to neighbours who have high ascriptive status than to people who “can get 
things done”.  And those people are often not of high caste status.44  Thus at the village 
level, Karnataka has become a much less “cohesive” society.      
 
People who can “get things done” usually achieve this by using connections and channels 
to higher levels in the system.  Such channels have proliferated over the last three 
decades.  This has made villagers less inclined to try to solve problems through their own 
collective efforts and more inclined to look beyond the village for assistance.45    
 
This proliferation of channels does not mean that society in Karnataka has become more 
“cohesive” in another way – in terms of vertical ties between villages and higher levels.  
Society is more vertically integrated.  But the bonds that connect the villages with higher 
levels are too impersonal, impermanent and unpredictable to yield anything like 
“cohesion”.  We have seen a decline in social cohesion at the village level, and an 
increase in mostly political and economic integration between the local and higher levels.  
But the latter does not suffice to compensate for the loosening of social bonds at the 
grassroots.    
 
There are greater tensions between castes – although some analysts argue that this is 
substantially explained by better reporting of such matters.  There is evidence of at least a 
modest increase in suspicion between Hindus and religious minorities – despite the 
failure of Hindu nationalists to elicit much popular response through campaigns about 
Ayodhya or in Hubli and Chikmagalur.46  Retreats by recent state governments on the 
issue of land reform have inspired some popular anger over concessions to globalization 
and private companies.  Policy changes on common property resources have inspired 
some ‘naxalite’ activity.   
 
                                                 
43   For evidence of this durability, consider for example a survey of social attitudes conducted in the early 
1980s by K.C. Alexander.  He questioned village respondents in Alleppey District of Kerala, Thanjavur 
District of Tamil Nadu and Mandya District of Karnataka.  In the first two of those places, the old 
hierarchies had been so extremely unjust that they had broken down.  In Mandya District, however, the old 
hierarchies were far less inequitable – so he found that the hierarchies lived on.  K.C. Alexander, “Caste 
Mobilization and Class Consciousness: The Emergence of Agrarian Movements in Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu” in Frankel and Rao, ibid., volume one, pp. 392-400. 
44   Interview with G.K. Karanth, Bangalore, 5 March 2005.  
45   See for example, the arguments of G.K. Karanth, V. Ramaswamy and others in chapters 11 to 14 of 
Baumgartner and Hogger (eds.) In Search of….  
46   See for example, M. Assadi, “’Dargah Versus Peeta’: Hindutva’s Politics of Appropriating Syncretic 
Culture in Karnataka”, Indian Journal of Secularism, July-September 2003, pp. 93-109.  
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We see more resentment in rural areas about state governments’ urban bias than three 
decades ago, and greater exasperation in northern Karnataka over regional disparities.  
State governments are more preoccupied with ensuring that benefits flow to Kannadigas 
rather than to linguistic minorities.  On each of these fronts, we see growing impatience 
within a specific group -- rural dwellers, northerners and Kannadigas -- with the grand 
political settlement that has emerged from state governments’ pursuit of incremental 
change and broad accommodations embracing a large diversity of social groups.  These 
three groups are vastly powerful.  Rural dwellers and Kannadigas constitute huge 
majorities, and one perceptive analyst of Karnataka’s politics argues that northerners 
often decide state election outcomes.47    
 
Frustrations within such formidable groups raise serious concerns about the sustainability 
of two important themes in Karnataka over recent decades.  The first is accommodative 
politics at the state-level, the tendency of leaders to construct broadly inclusive cabinets 
since 1972.  The second is the ‘enlightened conservative’ tendency to undertake change 
in anticipation of potential conflicts – to defuse them before they become acute, in order 
to sustain accommodative politics. 
 
Will the increasing frustrations and social tensions at lower levels undermine 
accommodation at the state level?  Perhaps not, unless much greater antipathy develops 
between social groups than we have seen thus far – and maybe even if it does.  State-level 
politicians are likely to cling to the view that their ambitions are best served by 
developing broadly inclusive accommodations.  That persuaded leading Lingayats and 
Vokkaligas not to seek a restoration of state-level dominance after Devaraj Urs had 
changed politics in 1972.  That persuaded successive Chief Ministers to include in their 
cabinets leaders even from groups that had given them little electoral support – because 
this maximised their appeal.  Even if social tensions grow more acute, that logic may still 
apply.  The main potential exception to this is the BJP, which might pursue communal 
polarization if it came to power.  But some leading analysts have long expected them to 
conform to the accommodative tradition if they take office.        
 
In 2006, they finally managed to do so – in coalition with elements of the Janata Dal (S).  
The compulsions of coalition government have thus far prevented dramatic actions by 
BJP leaders that might prove polarizing.  Indeed, confusion and occasional conflicts 
within that government have prevented it from achieving much of anything during its 
first few months in power.        
 
Whatever happens in the future, it should by now be apparent that certain important 
changes have occurred – mostly incrementally – over the period since 1972.  Village 
society in Karnataka is less cohesive, but more integrated with higher levels, as a result of 
the proliferation of channels linking the villages to those levels.  It is less self-regulating 
(as a result of the decline of the old social hierarchies), but (as a result of panchayati raj) 
somewhat more self-governing.   
 
                                                 
47   This is E. Raghavan, editor of the Economic Times, Bangalore.  His view is not shared by this writer. 
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It is a less quiescent and orderly society, characterised by greater (caste, regional, 
linguistic, urban/rural and perhaps communal) tensions and, at times, conflicts.  And the 
loosening of hierarchical social bonds has made it possible, for the first time, that class 
conflict may become important in rural Karnataka.  State-level politicians’ preference for 
broadly inclusive accommodations, and the incremental changes that flow from them, 
have provided inadequate responses to interest groups caught up in these tensions.   
 
And yet despite that, government has become more responsive.  That is partly the result 
of the reasonably generous empowerment of panchayati raj institutions.  But it is also 
explained by the introduction of participatory mechanisms (mainly ‘user committees’ and 
self help groups) that promote at least some consultation in various developmental 
sectors.  These have been introduced both by governments and by some civil society 
organisations.     
 
These things are patent realities, but they and politicians’ accommodative habits may not 
suffice to prevent greater tension and turbulence in the society and politics of the state.  
Karnataka has become more democratic – thanks in part to the decline of the old 
hierarchies – but it has become more difficult to govern.  The instruments available to 
those doing the governing -- mainly formal institutions, agencies and programmes, since 
party organisations lack strength -- have not suffered the sort of damage seen in some 
other Indian states, and have increased in number and penetrative capacity.  But this has 
not eased the long-standing difficulty of ruling parties at getting re-elected, and if 
tensions continue to intensify, they could eventually bring an end to the accommodative 
tradition in state politics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
The Indian experiment in local village democracy – galvanized by the passage of the 73rd 
amendment in 1993 - is among the most ambitious in history. Moreover, the experiment 
with Panchayats in India is of global interest given the array of similar policy 
experiments going on around the world.1 It comes at a time when economists are re-
engaging with political economy issues in their thinking about policy.   
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that Panchayats have attracted significant academic 
attention2.  Since 1993 village governments in India, Gram Panchayats (GP), have been 
responsible for maintaining local amenities such as village roads and drinking water 
facilities, and for identifying beneficiaries for federal and state poverty alleviation 
programs. A key motivation for the 73rd amendment was the belief that local 
governments may be better placed (than, say, centrally appointed bureaucrats) to identify 
and respond to villager needs. It was also held that villagers may find it easier to monitor 
local politicians. Democratization of the public service delivery system has, thus, been a 
central element of the Indian decentralization experiment.  
 
This paper reviews findings from a research project on the political economy of Indian 
Gram Panchayats in four states in south India. The research is based on a household and 
village survey covering 522 villages in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu.  The decentralization experience of these four states shows significant variation 
(Matthew and Buch, 2000).  Karnataka was one of the pioneers of the Panchayat 
movement, and was the first Indian state to mandate regular Panchayat elections. Fiscal 
decentralization has advanced the most in Kerala, with forty percent of state expenditures 
allocated by Panchayats. Kerala Panchayats are characterized by high levels of villager 
participation and regular villager meetings.  Andhra Pradesh took a different route and, 
till recently, sought to energize a political alternative to the Panchayat system -- the 
Janmabhoomi program.  Finally, Tamil Nadu continues to have relatively weak Gram 
Panchayats with limited devolution of policy powers.   
 
We examine how features of the Panchayat system, in particular the design of political 
institutions affect how it target resources towards economically and socially 
disadvantaged groups in the village. We also examine politician selection. One of the 
striking features of the Panchayat experiment is how it has led to a new political class, 
                                                 
1 See Bardhan (2000) and Crook and Manor (1998) for background discussion. 
2 Shortage of space precludes us from surveying the extensive emerging literature.  Recent contributions 
include Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a, b), Foster and Rosenzweig 
(2001), Chaudhuri and Heller (2004), Manor (2004). 
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many of whom had never held public office previously.  We examine how selection 
mechanisms in Indian villages affect politician outcomes. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next question, we discuss survey design.  
Section three discusses some background institutional issues.  Section four reviews some 
concrete findings from the research while section four pulls together the policy 
implications. 
 
2. SURVEY DESIGN 
 
Our data come from a village- and household- level survey conduced in Andhra Pradesh 
(AP), Karnataka (KA), Kerala (KE) and Tamil Nadu (TN). The survey was conducted 
between September-November 2002.  Sampling occurred in multiple stages, and 
consisted of purposive sampling up to the level of blocks and random sampling within 
these blocks. Our final sample consists of 527 villages belonging to 201 elected GPs. 3 
 
For each pair of states, we selected two districts (one per state) that shared a common 
boundary.4 The district pairs were selected, with one exception, to focus on districts that, 
prior to the linguistic reorganization of states in 1957, had belonged to same 
administrative unit. Our sample consists of nine districts - Bidar (in KA) and Medak (in 
AP) from the erstwhile Hyderabad,  Pallakad (KE), Coimbatore (TN), Kasargod (KE), 
Dakshin Kanada (KA), Dharmapuri (TN), and Chithoor (AP), all from erstwhile Madras 
Presidency. In KA, we also sampled Kolar district which was a part of erstwhile Mysore.  
 
For each pair of districts which shared a common boundary three pairs of blocks were 
selected (that is, 3 blocks in each of the two districts).5  Two blocks form a pair if they lie 
in different states but are `linguistically similar'.  Using 1991 census block level data we 
defined two blocks to be linguistically similar if, of all the blocks in the district, they have 
the highest fraction of households with the same mother tongue.  The top three matches 
entered our sample. Linguistic similarity is a good proxy for shared cultural history, 
given the prevalence of caste and linguistic endogamy.  Hence, language matching 
provides a partial control for "unobservable" socio-cultural differences. The historical and 
administrative similarity of linguistically matched blocks was checked using princely 
state maps and the Report of the States Reorganization Commission (Govt. of India, 
1955). 
 
In AP, KA and TN we randomly sampled 6 GPs per block and within a GP all villages if 
the GP had 3 or fewer villages. If it had more than three villages, then we selected the 
Pradhan's village and randomly selected two other villages.6 To account for the much 
                                                 
3 See Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2004b) for an extended discussion of the project. 
4 One district in KA (Kolar) that shared boundaries with both AP and TN entered the sample twice. The 
same holds for one district in AP (Chithoor) 
5 If one district was matched with 2 different districts then 6 blocks were chosen from it (three per match). 
In one block in KE an additional block was sampled as a check on our language matching. This gave us a 
total of 37 blocks (12 in KA, 9 in AP and TN and 7 in KE). 
6 We excluded all villages with less than 200 persons from our sampling frame. All hamlets with 
population over 200 were considered as independent villages in drawing the sample. 
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higher GP population in KE we sampled 3 GPs per block and 6 wards per GP in KE. This 
procedure gave a total of 201 GPs and 527 villages.  Our survey used four different 
questionnaires to collect data at the village, politician and household level. 
 
We conducted household surveys (20 per village) in a random sub-sample of 259 villages 
giving us a sample of 5,180 households. The household questionnaire obtained 
information on household's socio-economic status, household structure, views and use of 
public services in the village, private government benefits. Respondents were also asked 
to rank-order problems in the village. Since the sample is divided between male and 
female and SC/ST and non-SC/ST respondents this provides yet another source of 
information on gender and caste differences on preferences about village problems.  
 
We also surveyed an elected member of the GP in every village (with precedence given 
to the GP head if he/she lived in that village) - this gives us a household sample of 544 
elected officials. In addition to all the questions on the household questionnaire 
politicians were also asked a series of questions about their conduct of GP activities. 
 
At the village level we administered a questionnaire using Participatory Rapid Appraisal 
(PRA) techniques (Chambers 1994) to a group of men selected to represent different 
caste groups in the village. The PRA questionnaire assessed villager views on problems 
in the village, the work done by the GP and prevalence of political oligarchy. For the last, 
we asked respondents to list the extent to which the Pradhan, former Pradhan and the 
Vice-Pradhan controlled prominent activities in the village. We also obtained a detailed 
listing of castes within the village, and land distribution both within and between castes. 
The PRA-based questionnaire was separately fielded to a (i) group of women and (ii) 
group of SC/ST individuals. These PRA obtained separate measures of women's and 
SC/ST problem ranking vis-à-vis public service delivery. 
 
Finally, we undertook an audit of all public goods in the village. This was conducted by 
an independent enumerator who visually assessed the quality of schools, clinics, roads, 
drinking water, and sanitation.  The enumerator was also asked to identify the extent of 
GP involvement in improving these facilities.   
 
3. BACKGROUND 
 
It is important to begin by engaging with the details of the Panchayat system and its 
operation.  Schedule XI of the Indian Constitution defines the functional items for which 
states may devolve responsibility to Panchayats. While states vary in the extent to which 
they devolve policy powers to the Gram Panchayat, most Gram Panchayats have 
responsibilities of civic administration in the village together with limited independent 
taxation powers. On average, roughly 10 percent of a GP's total revenue come from own 
revenues with the remainder consisting of transfers from higher levels of government.   
 
While the ambit of GP policy influence varies across Indian states, GPs typically perform 
(at least) two distinct policy tasks. The first is beneficiary selection for central and state 
welfare schemes. These are “low spillover” public goods because the benefits are likely 
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to accrue to individual households. These include a variety of transfer programs such as 
schemes that provide beneficiary households with funds to acquire housing, private 
electricity and water supply. Eligibility for these schemes is usually restricted to 
households below the official poverty line. Most schemes also require that a minimum 
fraction of beneficiaries be SC/STs.  
 
An important part of a GP’s job, and one on which we focused in our research, is 
identifying households which are `Below the Poverty Line’, or BPL households.   
Possession of a BPL card makes the household eligible for an array of government 
schemes, ranging from subsidized food through the public distribution system to free 
hospitalization. The GP, in collaboration with state government officials, is supposed to 
identify (via a census) households with income below the poverty line, and prepare the 
list of BPL households.  This list, and subsequent selection of beneficiary households 
under various schemes (from among the BPL households, is supposed to be ratified in 
Gram Sabha meetings.  All BPL households are eligible for a BPL card, also often 
provided by the government. This procedure makes the allocation of BPL cards highly 
political and the success or failure in targeting needy households a key issue. 87 percent 
of the politicians in our sample stated that elected GP politicians were responsible for 
BPL card allocation. 
 
The second area of GP policy activism is the construction and maintenance of village 
public goods such as street-lights, roads and drains. These are “high spillover” public 
goods since the benefits accrue more broadly across members of a village. The GP 
decides the distribution of these public goods within the village and across villages within 
a GP.  It also determines the quality of provision.   
 
Two important institutional features of the Gram Panchayat which are specific to 
decentralization in India are political reservation and village meetings (Gram Sabhas).  
The 73rd constitutional amendment mandated political reservation in favor of SC/ST for 
the Pradhan7 position, and required that the extent of such reservation in a state reflect the 
SC/ST population share in that state.  It also required that no GP be reserved for the same 
group for two consecutive elections.   
 
Panchayat legislation also requires that the Pradhan consult with villagers and ward 
members in deciding the choice of beneficiaries and allocation of public goods.  This is 
supposed to be done via village meetings, or Gram Sabha meetings, called by the elected 
local government to discuss resource allocation decisions in the village.  Seventy six 
percent of the villages in our sample reported have at least on Gram Sabha meeting in the 
last year. However, final decision-making powers in a GP are vested with the Pradhan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Also known, depending on the state, as President or Sarpanch.   
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4. FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we discuss some of the results from the research under three headings.  
We first study how the Panchayat system is targeting resources across households and 
villages.  We then discuss political participation and the operation of Gram Sabha’s.  
Finally, we will discuss the selection of politicians and its consequences.  Table 1 gives 
the basic data from our sample of households and villages from which the following 
analyses are drawn. 
 
4.1 Targeting 
 
One of the key problems in targeting public resources is to get them to those who need 
them most.  One key hope for the Panchayat system was that it would use the political 
process to create more effective targeting to needy households and villages.  Our data 
allow us to look at these issues at both levels as we have detailed data on which transfers 
households receive and which villages are favored. We focus on the targeting of 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households (SC/ST).  SC/ST households have 
suffered from significant historic social and economic disadvantage, leading to worse 
contemporary outcomes for this group. An important aim of the Indian state’s welfare 
policy has been to target resources towards this group (Pande 2003).  
 
In Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2004a), we use our household survey data to 
measure the provision of household public goods.  Here we used only 4059 households of 
which 981 were SC/ST spread across 193 villages.8 We measure a household's exposure 
to low spill-over public goods by a dummy which equals one if it had a house or toilet 
built under a government scheme or if it received a private water or electricity connection 
via a government scheme since the last GP election.  Approximately 7% of the sample 
households fall in this category. 
 
We also examine the activity of Gram Panchayats at the village level.  For our key 
measure -- an index of GP activity on high spillover (i.e. village-level) public goods -- we 
use information from our audit of village facilities.  Specifically, we used an index based 
on whether the GP undertook any construction or improvement activity on roads, drains, 
street-lights and water sources within a village since the last GP election.  (The index is 
normalized to lie between 0 and 1.)  Roughly 79% of our sample villages experienced GP 
activism on at least one of these public goods. 
 
We were interested in investigating whether the activity at the household or village level 
is related to reservation status.  To capture a village's reservation status, we constructed 
an indicator variable equal to one if the village belongs to a GP where the Pradhan is 
reserved for an SC/ST.  We used two different variables to measure the political 
influence of a village - the first equals one if the Pradhan resides in that village, and the 
second equals one if the GP headquarters are in that village. 
 
                                                 
8 We did not use data from Kerala in this study as the process of allocation in Kerala was very different. 
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The results are reported in Table 2.  Column 1 reports results from a regression where the 
left hand side variable is a dummy variable denoting whether the household benefits from 
a government scheme.  The regression includes village fixed effects to account for any 
factors that differ between villages and affect the extent of targeting.  The main finding is 
that SC/ST households are more likely than non-SC/ST households to receive household 
transfers suggesting that these groups are targeted within villages.  In column (2), second 
row, we examine the interaction between being from an SC/ST group and having a 
Pradhan from a GP that is reserved for an SC/ST.  We observe a positive coefficient 
indicating that SC/ST households living in a reserved GP are 7% more likely to receive a 
transfer under government schemes relative to living in non-reserved GPs.   
 
The column (2) regression explores whether this effect is robust to controlling for 
whether the household lives in the Pradhan’s home village.  Here we find that there is no 
benefit to an SC/ST household from either living in the Pradhan’s village or from living 
in the village where the GP headquarter is located.  Thus, it appears the improved 
targeting of SC/ST households is generated from reservations.   
 
Our results suggest that having a reserved Pradhan does indeed further the end of getting 
better targeting towards SC/ST households.  This complements the results on targeting 
towards women by female Pradhans found by Chattopadhyay and Duflo for Rajasthan 
and West Bengal and the evidence on state level targeting of SC/ST households by 
SC/ST politicians reported in Pande (2003). 
 
Another important aspect of targeting concerns resource allocation across villages.  To 
examine this, we look at measures of village activism at the village level as measured by 
the GP activism index.  We find that this index is on average 0.05 points higher in the 
Pradhan's village.  This is equivalent to a 10% increase in village activism by Panchayats.  
There is no advantage to being in the GP headquarters.  Moreover, having a reserved 
Pradhan has no consequences for village level targeting.   
 
As Table 1 shows, 39% of our sample villages have Pradhans drawn from them.  These 
also tend to be the larger villages within a GP.  We interpret the result in column (3) of 
Table 2 as a consequence of political geography, though we cannot rule out the 
possibility that larger (and potentially richer) villages both house the Pradhan and are 
more successful at lobbying for public goods.  States that have only one village per GP 
are clearly not going to create an advantage for any particular village whereas those with 
many villages per GP face a distributional issue.  If the Pradhan is from a particular 
village on a repeated basis, then our results suggest that this may create a serious 
distributional bias. 
 
4.2 Gram Sabhas 
 
The Gram Sabha has often been considered the lynchpin of the Panchayat system.  It has 
the potential to structure democratic institutions to ensure fair and efficient allocation of 
public funds.  The idea that encouraging citizen participation can improve the workings 
of a democracy is also echoed in the political science literature.  One role for 
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participation emphasized in that literature is to improve the flow of information into the 
political process beyond that available by electing representatives.  Thus, Verba et al 
(1995) characterize political participation as "information rich" acts and observe that: 
 
"From the electoral outcome alone, the winning candidate cannot 
discriminate which of dozens of factors, from the position taken on a 
particular issue to the inept campaign run by the opposition ..., was 
responsible for the electoral victory." (page 10). 
 
There are two main ways in which such meetings may improve the workings of 
government.  First, relative to elected representatives, these meetings may better reflect 
citizens' preferences on issues such as how to target resources to the neediest groups.  
Second, by providing a forum for monitoring the actions of elected representatives they 
may reduce agency problems in politics, and the extent of corruption.   
 
While holding Gram Sabhas is compulsory, their frequency and content owes a lot to the 
discretion of elected officials.  Officials from the State or District administration can also 
have a role in this by choosing not to attend, and therefore making the Gram Sabha less 
attractive to hold.  It is also the case that a well-attended meeting may have no bite on 
policy decisions.  We exploit our household and village surveys to examine the 
determinants of participation in Gram Sabha meetings, and whether having a Gram Sabha 
meeting affects beneficiary selection for welfare programs. 
 
In our PRA survey, we asked about whether a Gram Sabha meeting had been held in the 
past six months.  The household survey also asked individuals about Gram Sabha 
attendance.  Table 1 show that only 77% of villages held Gram Sabhas in the last year.  
This suggests a considerable degree of non-compliance with the law.  In our household 
data, Table 1 shows that only around 20% of our sample households report having 
attended a Gram Sabha meeting.   
 
Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) looks at the probability of holding a Gram Sabha meeting 
at the village level and find evidence that this is related to village literacy with more 
literate villages more likely to hold meetings.  Quite why this is true is hard to discern in 
these data.  However, it parallels a larger literature emphasizing the civic benefits of 
greater education. 
 
In Table 3 (based on Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a)) we use household data to examine  
who attends  Gram Sabha meetings, and whether holding Gram Sabha meetings is 
correlated with needy households access to public welfare as measured by receipt of BPL 
cards.  All specifications include village level fixed effects which control for variation at 
the village level.   
 
In column (1) the dependent variable is whether the household respondent attended a 
Gram Sabha meeting in the past year.  We observe that illiterates are less likely to attend 
a Gram Sabha meeting than others.  However, this effect is somewhat offset if the 
household lives in a village with greater overall literacy.  This reinforces the idea that 
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literate villages have stronger civic cultures.  It is also interesting to observe that SC/ST 
households and landless are also more likely to attend Gram Sabha meetings in villages 
that have a greater number of literate households.  Note that this is not a Kerala specific 
effect since the regressions control for variation at the village level using fixed effects. 
 
These findings are notable for two reasons.  First, there is some suggestion of a political 
externality from living in a more literate community.  Second, Gram Sabha meetings 
seem to be a forum used by some of the most disadvantaged groups in the village - 
landless and scheduled castes/tribes.  This suggests that these groups find the Gram 
Sabhas useful and that Gram Sabha meetings may play some role in moving policy in a 
direction favored by these groups.  Indeed, a key function of Gram Sabhas is to target 
resources to poor households.  We now look for evidence of the latter. 
 
In column (2) we estimate a household regression which exploits within village variation 
in individual characteristics to examine whether the targeting of BPL cards differs 
depending on whether the village had a Gram Sabha in the last year.    The results show 
that illiterate households in villages that have held Gram Sabhas in the past year are more 
likely to have a BPL card.  There is also evidence of greater targeting of BPL cards 
towards landless households.  In Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) we interact the 
characteristics that represent disadvantage - illiteracy, landlessness and schedule 
caste/tribe -- with the village literacy rate instead of whether the village had a Gram 
Sabha meeting.  All three of these interactions are also significant.  This does raise the 
possibility that holding a Gram Sabha meeting is correlated with other village 
characteristics that are important in shaping the way in which public resources are 
targeted. Therefore we cannot say that holding a Gram Sabha has a causal effect on 
targeting.  This is not an issue we can resolve with the existing data. However, these 
encouraging results on Gram Sabhas clearly deserve further careful investigation. 
 
Our results contribute to a wider debate on how institution design can shape public 
resource allocation and how the poor can increase their voice in public institutions.  It is 
frequently remarked that poverty is much more than material deprivation and that the 
poor may receive much less voice in the political process.  Moreover, a good deal of 
cynicism attends initiatives to strengthen that voice.   
 
While the context is very specific, our results sound a more optimistic note.  The 
illiterate, landless and SC/STs are significantly more likely to attend Gram Sabha 
meetings than other groups.  Moreover, there appears to be more targeting towards these 
groups where Gram Sabha meetings are held. The results are also suggestive of some 
externalities from literacy in the political process at the village level.  
 
On a less optimistic note, we find that women are less likely to attend Gram Sabha 
meetings than men.   Women respondents are around 20% less likely to attend a Gram 
Sabha than men.  Whether this has significant consequences for public resource 
allocation needs further investigation.  But it is clear the representativeness of Gram 
Sabhas is likely to be affected by this.  Other tools such as gender reservation in 
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Panchayat representation may go some way towards remedying this (see Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo (2004a). 
 
4.3  Political Selection 
 
By the year 2000, the 73rd amendment led to the institution of 227,698 new village 
governments, Gram Panchayats (GP), staffed by over two million elected representatives. 
Whether these individuals have different skills and motivations from those who 
previously made political decisions is hard to discern.  However, there is a growing body 
of evidence that political selection is an important consideration in political systems and 
the current context is an excellent one to think about this. 
 
The Downsian model of politics, which has dominated political economy for over a 
generation, has no role for political selection.  The role of politics is to seek out the policy 
position of the median voter, and not to examine who implements that policy.   But there 
is now increasing attention paid to the role of political selection in reforming and 
improving politics.   
 
Little is know in general about characteristics of politicians and how they differ from the 
general population.  Table 4 gives some insight into this in the current context.  It 
compares the sample of 540 politicians with the household sample in our data.  We report 
two sets of comparisons. First, we use our entire sample to compare politician and non-
politician households, and report the t-test for differences in means across these two 
populations in column (3). Second, we restrict attention to SC/ST households and 
examine whether within this group politician and non-politician households differ 
(columns (4)-(6)). In all cases, we weight the non-politician sample by the population 
share of SC/ST households in the village to account for our purposive sampling of SC/ST 
households. 
 
Looking across columns (1)-(3) an immediate finding, which is not particularly 
surprising, is that politicians are an elite group.  Politicians, on average, own 5 acres of 
land which is more than twice the average landownership of non-politician households.     
The likelihood that a politician comes from a household with a history of involvement in 
politics is 25%, as against a mere 6% for non-politician households.  Most politicians in 
our sample do not report politics as their primary occupation. This, in part, reflects the 
fact that most of them are first time entrants into politics. While both politician and non-
politician households tend to rely on agriculture, politicians are significantly more likely 
to be cultivators than agricultural laborers.    Politicians are also much more likely to be 
educated, enjoying an advantage of around three years of education per capita.  They are 
also much more likely to read a newspaper which reflects greater literacy in the 
population group. 
 
Columns (4)-(6) show that reserved politicians who belong to SC/ST also tend to be elites 
compared to their comparison group (non-politician SC/ST households).  Both SC/ST 
politician and non-politician households are, however, economically disadvantaged 
relative to the general population. Thus, while reservation is bringing wider participation 
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in politics, it tends to do so by picking elites from among traditionally disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
Whether having a political elite that is also an economic elite is moot.  It may reflect 
concerns about village politics being dominated by a set of narrow interests.  However, it 
may also be the case that the more educated and knowledgeable citizens are better placed 
to run the village and to provide citizens with what the public goods and transfers that 
they need. 
 
The last two rows of Table 4 show, however, that the political elite is more likely to 
claim BPL cards and to participate in public works programs in spite of them appearing 
less disadvantaged in economic dimensions.  This is evidence of political opportunism.  
While the difference in unconditional population means for politician and non-politician 
households receiving a BPL card is insignificant, in Besley, Pande and Rao (2005b) we 
show that within villages this effect is statistically significant.  However, there is 
evidence that the effect is diminished when politicians are more educated.   
 
Overall, these results reinforce the need to have a good understanding of the process of 
political selection and its consequences in village government.   
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The mainstream economics literature now engages with political economy issues in 
trying to understand what makes government work.  The study of Panchayats provides an 
excellent basis for thinking how the insights of modern political economy can contribute 
to our understanding of public service delivery in India.   While the Panchayat system has 
many specific features, there are potentially general lessons for experiments in 
democratic decentralization elsewhere. 
 
The mantra of decentralization is that it will achieve policies that better reflect the needs 
of citizens living in village India.   Our results on Gram Sabhas and their link to targeting 
provide some support for this idea.  The fact that reserved politicians target differently in 
three of our states also reinforces earlier findings that reservation the Gram Panchayats 
can achieve policy change. 
 
But there are important unresolved issues.  Politicians remain opportunistic undermining 
the most romanticized view of village government.  The fact that this may change with 
selection of politicians suggests that there needs to be further focus on methods to draft 
an honest and competent political class.  Policy measures that are worth debating include 
enhanced training for village politicians and use of wage incentives.   
 
The question of how to ensure that Gram Sabhas are held is clearly important.  Policies 
here could include better monitoring from above or finding means to enhance power of 
citizens to call Gram Sabhas.   
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Finally, our results call for a better debate about political geography and institutional 
means to guarantee that villages get an equal share of resources given that the Pradhan’s 
village appears to benefit most of all.  This could be in terms of redrawing Panchayat 
boundaries to create more Panchayats which contain only few villages or to have a more 
explicit mechanism for rotating the Pradhan’s chair. 
 
It is clear that there is much yet to be learned about how Panchayats work and to think of 
ways of improving the way in which they make policy.  However, conducting studies 
based on large samples of villages seems like an important way forward to enhance the 
quality of policy making and to understand whether democratic decentralization is 
fulfilling its promise.   
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   
Household data Mean 
SC/ST household 0.23 
 (0.42) 
Illiterate 0.27 
 (0.44) 
Landless 0.38 
 (0.48) 
Wealthy 0.29 
 (0.45) 
Ever attended Gram Sabha 0.20 
 0.40 
Possess a BPL Card 0.22 
 (0.43) 
Received Private Good 0.06 
 (0.24) 
Politician 0.09 
 (0.292) 
Village data  
Literacy Rate in 1991 0.42 
 (0.182) 
Fraction of villages which had a 0.77 
Gram Sabha in last year (0.41) 
Pradhans Village 0.39 
 (0.48) 
GP Headquarter 0.31 
 (0.460) 
Pradhan Reserved for SC/ST 0.20 
 (0.403) 
Public Good index 0.45 
  (0.30) 
Notes: All variables based on survey data, except the village literacy rate 
which is from the 1991 Census of India. Wealthy is a dummy=1 if 
household possesses a watch, a fan and either a TV or radio. 
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TABLE 2: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on resource allocation 
          
 Private good   Public goods 
 Household data  Village data 
 (1) (2)   (3) 
SC/ST Household 0.048*** 0.041   
 (0.016) (0.025)   
SC/ST Household*Pradhan  0.071** 0.071**   
reserved for SC/ST (0.031) (0.031)   
SC/ST Household*Pradhan village  0.03   
  (0.025)   
SC/ST Household*GP headquarters  -0.019   
  (0.025)   
Proportion SC/ST Households    0.041 
    (0.042) 
Pradhan Village    0.048** 
    (0.023) 
Pradhan reserved for SC/ST    -0.003 
    (0.039) 
Pradhan Village*Pradhan     0.003 
reserved for SC/ST    (0.051) 
GP headquarter    0.041* 
    (0.023) 
Fixed effects village village  block 
Observations 4059 4059  395 
R-squared 0.11 0.11   0.67 
Notes: "Private good" is a dummy variable which equals one if the household's house or toilet was built under a government scheme, 
or if it received a private water or electricity connection via a government scheme, all since the last GP election.  "Public good" is an 
index of whether the GP undertook any construction or improvement activity on roads, drains, streetlights and water sources after the 
last GP election. The SC/ST Household dummy equals 1 for SC/ST households. The Pradhan village dummy equals one if the 
Pradhan resides in the given village. The GP headquarter dummy equals 1 if the GP headquarter is located in the village.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3:  Gram Sabhas: Participation and Resource Allocation 
Dependent Variable 
Attended Gram 
Sabha  
Received BPL 
Card 
Village Characteristic Literacy Rate  Gram Sabha 
 (1)   (2) 
Illiterate -0.103***  -0.042* 
 (0.028)  (0.026) 
Illiterate*Village Characteristic 0.183**  0.091*** 
 (0.078)  (0.030) 
SCST -0.029  0.094** 
 (0.040)  (0.042) 
SCST*Village Characteristic 0.139  0.062 
 (0.097)  (0.047) 
Landless -0.073**  0.018 
 (0.029)  (0.030) 
Landless*Village Characteristic 0.232***  0.067* 
 (0.066)  (0.035) 
Female -0.086***  -0.009 
 (0.030)  (0.010) 
Female*Village Characteristic -0.242***   
 (0.076)   
Upper caste -0.007  -0.028* 
 (0.018)  (0.016) 
Wealthy -0.027*  -0.079*** 
 (0.016)  (0.014) 
Fixed effects Village  Village 
Observations 5240  5364 
R-squared 0.25   0.4 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at village level. Regressions also 
include respondent age and age squared as controls. 
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TABLE 4: Selection of Politicians 
Sample:  All  SC/ST 
 Politician Nonpolitician 
ttest for 
difference 
of means  Politician Nonpolitician 
ttest for 
difference 
of means 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Landownership 5.705 2.025 10.118  2.374 1.055 3.862 
 (0.353) (0.086) [0]  (0.296) (0.170) [0] 
Family political history 0.258 0.065 9.874  0.213 0.060 3.900 
 (0.019) (0.005) [0]  (0.037) (0.010) [0] 
Agricultural laborer 0.066 0.237 -12.660  0.161 0.460 -7.880 
 (0.010) (0.008) [0]  (0.033) (0.019) [0] 
Cultivator 0.481 0.217 11.533  0.315 0.145 3.830 
 (0.021) (0.008) [0]  (0.042) (0.014) [0] 
Years of education 7.276 4.750 11.860  6.161 2.880 7.180 
 (0.186) (0.103) [0]  (0.421) (0.174) [0] 
Newspaper readership 0.692 0.342 15.810  0.613 0.220 8.280 
 (0.019) (0.010) [0]  (0.044) (0.018) [0] 
BPL received 0.253 0.230 1.170  0.363 0.340 0.460 
 (0.018) (0.007) [0.23]  (0.043) (0.016) [0.64] 
Public works program 0.091 0.040 3.904  0.121 0.084 1.170 
  (0.012) (0.003) [0]  (0.029) (0.010) [0.23] 
Notes: The non-politicians means are weighted by fraction SC/ST households in the village to account for purposive 
sampling of 4 SC/ST households per village. The p-values for the ttest are provided in square brackets.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Governance discourse tends to focus strongly on formal political institutions. This is 
particularly true at the local level where decentralised governance has become 
synonymous with local governance. Given this strong focus on formal decentralised 
structures of governance, the role of customary village councils in local governance often 
gets overlooked.  There are two reasons for this. It is generally believed that formal 
institutions  are (a) quite distinct from the customary institutions and are relatively free of 
‘traditional’ influences that bear on them; and (b)  more powerful than  the customary 
ones , and so tend to 'drive them out'. However, the extent to which these assumptions are 
in consonant with local reality is debatable. Decentralised local government structures 
such as Grama Panchayats co-exist with customary village councils and often interact 
with them. Development outcomes, either positive or negative, at the local level are often 
determined by these interactions.   
 
Karnataka has a fairly long and impressive history of decentralisation. Democratically 
elected local government structures were institutionalised and political space created for 
marginalised groups long before the 1992 amendment that made Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs) constitutionally mandatory1. Despite this, local governance in 
Karnataka has not become fully formalised. At the village level, elected Grama 
Panchayats continue to co-exist with customary village councils (CVCs), which are 
rooted in traditional practices, values and power relations.  It is widely believed that 
customary institutions are instruments of caste dominance, oppressive in nature and 
shrinking in face of modernity, especially with the introduction of formal, elected, local 
Gram Panchayats. While these perceptions are not completely wrong, the research 
indicates that the picture is more complex.  
 
In reality, CVCs  – 
1. generally are inter-caste institutions consisting of caste leaders of different caste 
groups represented in the community and act as forums of deliberation with an 
emphasis on compromise rather than simple rule enforcement. 
2. in addition to enforcing ‘traditional’ rules and norms, also perform a range of 
useful functions at the village level often in a non-repressive manner.  
3. rather than disappearing in the face of modernity, often interact in a positive 
manner with the ‘so-called’ modern, formal local institutions that are said to be 
replacing them.  
 
This indicates that local governance in Karnataka is a complex and contested site where 
formal and informal local governance institutions complement each other in some 
instances and are in conflict at others.  
 
The objective of this paper is to unpack the dynamics of local governance in Karnataka 
by studying the interaction between two sets of rural institutions, (a) the formal, elected 
Gram Panchayats (GPs), mandated by the 73rd amendment to the Indian Constitution in 
                                                 
1 The 1992 constitutional amendment (73rd) established an elected three-tier government structure at the 
sub-state level known as Panchayati Raj Institutions. 
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1992, that typically cover a group of natural villages; and (b) the informal, long standing, 
village level CVCs, which undertake dispute resolution and a wide range of other 
activities at the level of the individual natural village. On the basis of field research in 30 
villages in Karnataka, this paper tries to present a more holistic picture of CVCs, 
including their role in village governance and service delivery (Section 2) and the ways in 
which they interact with Grama Panchayats (Sections 3). The concluding section 
analyses the implications of this interaction and its influence on local democracy in 
Karnataka.  
 
II. LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN KARNATAKA 
 
Karnataka is one of the better-developed states in India. Land reforms and other 
developmental initiatives and opportunities aimed at backward classes and dalits in the 
‘80s has created a society that is not as polarised as some of the other states in India. This 
has led to the formation of a fairly cohesive society (Manor, 1997). A less well-known 
fact about Karnataka relates to its long experimentation with decentralisation. Attempts to 
devolve powers to local bodies had been initiated even before independence (Natraj and 
AnanthPur, 2003). A serious effort to decentralise its political structures in Karnataka 
came about in the 1980s.   The first major landmark in Karnataka was the 1983 Act, 
which introduced a two-tier, elected sub-state level governance structure. A notable 
feature was 25 per cent reservation for women in these bodies even before this was 
mandated by the Constitution. Elections under this Act were held in 1987. The 1983 Act 
was substituted by a new law in 1993 (the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993) to 
accommodate the mandatory provisions brought in by the 73rd and 74th amendments to 
the Constitution. The 1993 Act provides for a three-tier structure – Zilla Panchayat 
(district level), Taluk Panchayat (Block level) and Gram Panchayat (village level).  
 
Grama Panchayats: 
Of the three tiers of PRIs, Grama Panchayat is the most important tier as it is directly 
involved in local governance specially given its proximity to the rural population.  
 
Some of the key features of Grama Panchayats in Karnataka are as follows: 
 
? Democratically elected bodies 
? Elections conducted once in five years. 
? Constituted for a group of villages (5-7000 population) with  one representative for every 
400 population 
? 33% seats reserved for women and 33% seats reserved for OBCs 
? Reservation of seats for SCs & STs in proportion to their population 
? Reservation for the post of president and vice president 
? Tied and untied funds from the state and central governments. 
? Vested with powers of taxation 
 
Given that Grama panchayats have become institutionalised and influential, one would 
expect that customary village councils (CVCs) at the village level in Karnataka to have 
become defunct and faded away. In fact it is generally believed that the ‘traditional’ 
village panchayats, studied and documented by Ishwaran (1968), Srinivas (1987) and 
 50 
others no longer exist in Karnataka. Village elites, instead of the village panchayat, are 
now seen as mediators of power relations and influencing the process of local governance 
(Inbanathan, 2000).  But field research in 30 villages from three different districts2 of 
Karnataka indicates that CVCs are not only prevalent but also quite active in all 30 
villages. Rather than declining CVCs continue to be ubiquitous and influential. 
 
Customary Village Councils3: 
CVCs are one among a variety of local institutions, structured mainly around caste, that 
exist in Indian villages. This is true of Karnataka also. The type of local institutions range 
from caste panchayats, street panchayats to CVCs.  Of all these local institutions, CVCs 
are the most important category of institutions from a democracy and governance 
perspective mainly because intra-village caste panchayats and/or street panchayats4 (for 
a single street or a group of streets) operate at sub-village level and have limited authority 
– restricted to a caste group in the case of caste panchayats or limited to the population of 
a street or few streets in case of street panchayats. But the CVC is an apex body with 
jurisdiction over the entire village. They are not formal political institutions, which have 
a set of clearly delineated responsibilities. Rather they are better comprehended as a 
‘pattern of dialectic, decision and action’ (Mandelbaum, 1970).  CVCs play a central role 
in village governance by maintaining social order and ensuring community harmony and 
thus fostering village solidarity. CVCs are long-standing institutions that draw their 
legitimacy from ‘traditions’ and customs and are quite distinct from the modern 
associations that are formed as part of external interventions such as user committee 
groups, micro-credit groups etc for a specific purpose.   However, leaders of the CVC are 
often found represented in ‘modern’ local bodies such as watershed committees, water 
and sanitation committees, forest committees etc. 
 
Customary Village councils go under a wide variety of local names in Karnataka. In 
southern part of the state, particularly in Mysore district, CVCs are know locally as 
‘panchayati’ (Council), ‘Halli panchayati’ (Village Council), ‘nadu’ or ‘nadu 
panchayati’ (Regional Council), ‘nyaya panchayati’ (Justice Council) or even ‘nyaya 
samiti’ (Justice Committee). In northern Karnataka particularly in the area covered by the 
former Dharwad district, the terms ‘pancharu’ or ‘Hireru’ (village elders) are prevalent, 
while in one village the CVC is known as the ‘Civic Board’.  In Raichur district the 
normal term is ‘Daiva’ (God). However, for the purpose of this paper I will refer to them 
as customary village councils (CVCs). 
 
Unlike Grama panchayats, CVCs functions at the village level and have authority only 
over the ‘natural’ village within which it operates. Typically a single Grama Panchayat 
may include several CVCs. In contrast to Grama Panchayats, the basic structure of 
CVCs is rooted in ‘tradition’ and customs. Srinivas describes ‘village councils’ (CVCs) 
as being ‘informal and flexible’ bodies with ‘no hard and fast rule about who should 
                                                 
2 10 villages each from Mysore, Dharwad and Raichur districts were chosen to study the interaction 
between the formal and informal local governance institutions.  
3 For a detailed description of CVCs, see ‘Rivalry or Synergy? Formal and Informal Local Governance in 
India’, IDS working Paper No.226, June, 2004. 
4 I came across street panchayats in only one big village where the ILGI was relatively weak.  
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constitute them’. He has also observed a variation in membership over space and context 
(2002:81). Mandelbaum’s (1970) detailed study of ‘village panchayats’ from different 
parts of the country indicates a similar flexible pattern of representation. Basically there 
are two types of CVCs based on the caste composition of the village. (a) In a single caste 
village the caste panchayat also operates as the CVC, (b) but in village with multi-caste 
population, the CVC is a broader forum that includes the caste leaders of all caste groups. 
Essentially all CVCs have a core set of leaders of various caste groups represented in the 
village. However, the variation is visible in the extent of inclusion of other members such 
as SC leaders, GP members and new leaders. Caste leaderships tend to be hereditary titles 
but the inclusion of new members is based on more modern criteria such as education, 
mobility, their political linkages, ability to interact with government officials and so on. 
There are instances of corrupt or discriminatory CVC leaders being replaced with those 
that have the respect of the entire village community (Ananth Pur, 2004).  
 
CVCs broadly have a similar pattern of representation – a set of members or panchas 
headed by a leader- Yajamana.  The membership to CVCs is intrinsically embedded in 
caste and gender.  Virtually all panchas are men and are usually the caste leaders5 of 
individual caste groups present in the village. The size of a CVC is broadly proportional 
to the number of caste groups present in a village. Although headed by Yajamanas, CVCs 
are rarely, if ever, controlled by a single, dominant caste leader or big landowner of the 
village. It is perceived as a more deliberative forum, where decisions are arrived at after 
discussions and consensus. This ‘egalitarianism’ is not unique to Karnataka CVCs but 
also found in the village councils of Rajasthan where ‘panchas' (representatives) of all 
caste groups sit as equals on the central platform’. (Krishna, 2002: 136).  
 
A major criticism against CVCs is that they reinforce caste and gender hierarchies. The 
pattern of representation in the CVC, to a certain extent, confirms this view. This is 
particularly visible in the marginal representation, in CVCs, of Scheduled  Castes6 (SC) 
in some villages to complete exclusion of women in all the 30 villages.  However there is 
evidence that many CVCs are adapting to the changing socio-political context. For 
instance, there is a better representation for SCs in villages with dominant SC population 
(at least in three villages SC and Scheduled Tribe members were the Yajamanas of the 
CVC) and in a couple of villages, female elected members of the formal Grama 
Panchayat sometimes were invited to join in the deliberations of the CVC for specific 
purposes7. Krishna finds that in Rajasthan, ‘though representatives of the scheduled 
castes (previously known as untouchables) sit some distance apart or even at a lower 
level from other panchas, they have equal say in the decision, particularly when a person 
from their own caste group is involved as a party’ (Krishna, 2002:136). In Karnataka, 
particularly in some villages of Mysore district, SC leaders sit together on the same 
platform with other caste leaders while resolving disputes. This ability to adapt has made 
                                                 
5 Some caste groups in a few villages have a leadership, usually hereditary but at times elected, and 
accounts (of funds collected by that particular caste group for religious and other purposes) that are 
checked by the people belonging to that particular caste group around every Hindu New Year. Caste 
Panchayats have jurisdiction over all families belonging to that caste in the village. These organisations are 
often quite formal and institutionalised.  
6 Those belonging to caste groups previously considered as ‘untouchables’.  
7 Specially disputes related to women. 
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CVCs more pluralistic (with limitations) and also able to project a more modern image to 
outsiders.  
 
Many CVCs have also begun widen their base of representation in an attempt to adapt to 
local democracy. Apart from the core membership (caste based), CVCs include other 
members many of whom are members of the elected Grama Panchayats.  and their 
membership in the formal Grama Panchayats. The emergence of new and parallel 
leadership at the village level is not a new phenomenon and is commonly found in most 
rural areas (Bailey, 1960, Beteille, 1971, Krishna, 2002). But Karnataka seems to differ 
in that the 'new leaders' often find a place on CVCs and play active roles there (Ananth 
Pur, 2002).  
 
CVCS do not have any permanent source of income. Donations collected for religious 
activities and fines imposed on villagers found guilty during the dispute resolution 
purpose are the two main sources of income. CVCs ability to raise local resources is 
reported in greater detail elsewhere. In Karnataka CVCs perform a wide range of useful, 
collective activities. With the formal elected Grama Panchayat taking care of the 
development needs of the villagers, CVCs have not become redundant as they provide 
valuable services to the rural citizens that are not offered by the formal Grama 
Panchayats.  The following is a list of activities/functions that CVCs generally perform at 
the village level. CVCs may perform some or all these functions depending upon their 
influence and degree of activism. 
 
1. All 30 CVCs were involved religious activities, such as organising religious 
festivals, rituals and processions (Jathre), temple construction, repairs and 
maintenance. In some villages a separate temple committee is constituted to 
oversee the preparations for the Village Jathre. Such temple committees tend to be 
much more broad based and consist of leaders of the CVC along with other 
village notables. Most CVCs collect donations- cash or kind- from the villagers 
for these activities.  
2. CVCs were involved in dispute resolution in all 30 sample villages. They not 
only arbitrate disputes but also help maintain local law and order and thus play a 
key role in the internal regulation of villages. The types of disputes that come 
before the CVCs include petty disputes, thefts, encroachment issues, minor 
property disputes, drunken brawls and marital problems. Criminal cases are 
handed over to the police. Villagers do not necessarily see dispute resolution by 
CVCs as an end point, but rather as the first opportunity for justice because it is 
quick, affordable and accessible.8 In most villages, villagers have the option of 
approaching the police station or the formal legal system if disputes are not 
satisfactorily resolved there. On an average 80% of local disputes are resolved by 
the CVCs in these 30 villages. There are also a few instances of pending disputes 
being brought back from the law courts to the CVC for resolution.  
3. CVCs also provide social services and support to those in need.  There are a 
number of cases of CVCs’ helping destitute or widowed women to get a share of 
                                                 
8 While in most cases villagers respect the ILGI as an institution capable of delivering fair judgement, there 
are instances where ILGIs have been accused of being biased and corrupt.  
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their husbands’ property, helping widows in the village to get widow pension 
and/or ration cards, collecting funds from the villagers to help accident victims 
(generally from poor families), arranging funeral rites for the insolvent people, 
organising mass marriages for the poor, donating stationery to local school 
children, or supporting the education of gifted students. CVCs have also played a 
significant role in maintaining communal harmony in villages with substantial 
Muslim populations. CVCs in 24 out of 30 sample villages were involved in 
providing various forms of social support to the villagers. However these 
activities are not part of their regular functions and are taken up as and when 
required.  
4. Some CVCs have also taken up development activities using their own 
initiatives and resources. CVC members have donated or solicited donations of 
land from villagers or neighbouring villagers for building roads, schools, 
anganwadis (pre-schools), community halls and/or living quarters for village 
government functionaries such as local nurses, teachers, and doctors.  CVCs in 23 
out of 30 sample villages were involved in some sort of development activities 
but the degree of activism varied significantly. CVCs are not always successful in 
mobilising cash resources for development purposes but are more influential in 
soliciting donations of land or labour from the villagers for development 
purposes. This is mainly because there is a general feeling among the villagers 
that development activities are the responsibility of Grama Panchayats and 
should be funded by the government. However, a couple of CVCs have managed 
to raise resources for own development projects.  Some of the innovative 
activities of the two CVCs are listed below – 
• Constructed an approach road to the village. Villagers also donated tractors, 
labour and some adjoining land to widen the road. 
• Purchased 4 acres of land for the construction of a high school building in the 
village, ensuring that female students had easier access to higher education.  
• Purchased land for building a small hospital in the village.  
• Built a community hall which is available free of charge for local weddings  
• Organised health camp in the village.  
• Repaired and modernised the local school by donating T.V., sound system.  
• Organised a legal awareness camp in association with Grama Panchayat 
members, local youth club and women’s groups9.  
• Concerned with the receding ground water table in the village, one of the CVC 
has purchased 1.5 acres of land, for Rs. 50,000/- from their own contributions, for 
constructing a tank. Subsequently, the CVC collected funds from higher tiers of 
local governments and local MLAs10 and MPs 11 and further extended this tank by 
                                                 
9 One of the CVC leaders in this village, who is also a practicing lawyer, initiated this legal awareness 
camp by linking up with the district legal cell, which gives free legal aid to the citizens. A range of issues 
such as Hindu personal law, Muslim personal law, legal aspects related to land revenue, vehicles, property 
rights and others were discussed. The villagers not only participated in large numbers but also were 
interested in making this an annual event. 
10 Each Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is given Rs. 40 lakhs as constituency development fund. 
11 Each Member of Parliament (MP) has access to 20,000,000 million rupees for development activities in 
his/her constituency. 
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another 2.5 acres. This tank has not only regenerated the water table in the village 
but also provides a regular source of water for the villagers. 
 
These two are rather exceptional cases as not all CVCs exhibit the same level of 
innovativeness in initiating development activities. But reports from different parts of the 
state indicate that CVCs do play a significant role in local development activities and 
either substitute or complement formal development initiatives.  
 
5. Another area where the CVC is becoming an important actor in local governance, 
relates to informal resource mobilisation. CVCs, in all the villages studied, were 
involved in some form of informal resource mobilisation.  The amount raised per 
year may range from a minimum of Rs.1000/- to a maximum of Rs.1,00,000/-. 
Informal resource mobilisation may include donations or contributions in cash 
and kind. Many CVCs maintain bank accounts and submit the expenditure 
statement to the villagers once a year.  Apart from raising resources for religious 
purposes, CVCs also play an important role in mobilising resources for 
development projects. Increasingly a number of development projects initiated 
through GP now require matching contributions from the villagers. It is here that 
the CVC’s ability to raise local funds comes into play. One such programme is the 
rural water and sanitation programme, which requires 10% matching grants to be 
raised by the community. While in a few villages, CVC has been successful in 
raising this matching grant, in others the project was not initiated, as the CVC was 
not involved in the process. Some CVCs have also donated money collected 
through fines (from the process of dispute resolution) and additional or left over 
funds collected for religious festivities for this purpose. However, as mentioned 
above, there were just two cases of CVCs mobilising local resources on their own 
for village development.  
 
How are CVC decisions enforced?  The CVC leaders I interviewed agree that their 
decisions, particularly regarding dispute resolution, are not absolutely enforceable.  One 
or other party to the dispute has the option of accessing formal police or judicial 
channels.  CVCs still manage to enforce most of their decisions through social pressure. 
For example, a person who has openly violated the dictates of the CVC does not find 
support in the village in times of need or distress unless he or she openly tenders an 
apology to the CVC for violating its dictates.  However, the legitimacy of CVCs and the 
extent to which they are able to enforce their decisions are somewhat contested.  There is 
a general perception that they no longer enjoy the influence they once did when formal 
local institutions were relatively weak. But they remain very influential. Villagers, 
especially women, believe that in a context where they are still distant from the formal 
law and order mechanisms like the police and the judiciary, there is a need for locally-
rooted institutions that provide justice and maintain local law and order.  
 
While the institutional structure of CVCs embodies an inherent contradiction to the 
democratic principles, their functional characteristics complement the functions of local 
democratic institutions.  But despite their progressive and functional aspect, as an 
institution dominated by the village elite, CVCs are largely seen as vehicles for ‘elite 
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capture’ of local democratic institutions and processes. The extent to which this 
proposition is valid is tested in the next section where I explore the different ways in 
which CVCs interacts and influences Grama Panchayats.  
 
III. INTERACTION WITH GRAMA PANCHAYATS: 
 
In India, the Constitutional amendment that mandates local governance has remained 
silent on the role of ‘Informal/customary institutions’ in local governance. It does, 
however, make provision to accommodate the tribal laws and customs for tribally 
dominated regions. In fact special Constitutional provisions have been designed to protect 
the tribal governance structures by bringing the tribally dominant regions under the Vth 
schedule of the Constitution and providing them a central role in local governance. In 
1996, a national level legislation – ‘The Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the 
Scheduled Areas) Act 1996’- allowed for the accommodation of the tribal laws and 
customs in tribally dominated regions.12 This development came in the wake of 
objections and protests that formal, local governance structures as mandated by the 
Constitution would impede and destroy the tribal ways of life (Mahi Pal 2000). CVCs do 
not get similar recognition in the Constitutional amendment mandating local governance. 
This makes the role of the CVCs in formal, local politics in the Indian context somewhat 
unique, as they do not have any legally or formally assigned role to play in the process of 
local democracy. The interaction between CVCs and Grama Panchayats has remained 
largely un-explored as these two institutions occupy different spaces, mainly state and 
non-state spaces. They also operate at different levels - formal and informal levels.  This 
makes the interaction almost invisible not only to the outsiders but also to the villagers.  
 
CVCs interact and influence GPs various ways. I’ve grouped these interactions into two 
main categories. 
(a) Influence over GP Elections (IGPE) 
(b) Involvement in GP Activities (IGPA) 
 
(a) Influencing GP Elections (IGPE):  
CVCs try to influence the GP elections by – 
1. Trying to influence the choice of candidates for GP elections – in 29 out of my 
30 research villages, CVCs have played a role in influencing the selection of 
candidates for GP elections held during years 2000 and 2005. However the data 
reported here pertains to 2000 GP elections. The process of influencing the choice 
of candidates for elections may take place either before nominations are filed or 
when they are being finalized. There have been instances of CVCs asking some 
candidates to withdraw in favour of their candidates. However, the dictates of the 
CVC may not always be accepted, as contesting local elections has become a 
‘prestigious’ issue to the villagers. This is especially true of the village youth. The 
CVC, as a village forum, not only exhibits caste and gender monopolies but also 
has an inherent age-ist bias. Village youth, while allowed to participate in the 
                                                 
12 India has a significant tribal population. It is estimated that they constitute about 8 per cent of the total 
population. Quotas are provided for the tribal population in various spheres to make the governance and 
development process more inclusive. 
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CVC meetings, are not permitted to speak unless permitted by the CVC leaders.  
Thus the village youth, traditionally excluded from the CVC, have begun to use 
the GP elections and membership to establish their influence in village politics 
while the CVC tries to utilize GP elections to extend its sphere of authority. These 
tensions rather than dissipating are likely to exacerbate in the future.    But in 
situations where contested elections have taken place, villagers admit that most of 
the successful candidates were those originally chosen by the CVCs. 
 
2. Trying to contest elections themselves or through their relatives thus leading to 
overlap of leadership in both institutions – In 26 out of my 30 villages, some 
form of overlap of leadership exists. For example, the Yajamana of the CVC in 
one village is also the president of the GP. In another village, a CVC leader was 
the previous president of Grama Panchayat. In the same village, the son of the 
CVC Yajamana is presently a member of the Grama Panchayat. In a number of 
villages, panchas are also members of the Grama Panchayat. The extent of 
overlap of leadership for all 30 villages is around 32% of all GP seats. Overlap of 
leadership also occurs with higher tiers of local governance such as Taluk 
Panchayats and Zilla Panchayats. However this aspect has not been included in 
our research as elections to Taluk and Zilla Panchayats are contested on the basis 
of party politics and I have not investigated the influence of party politics on the 
choice of candidates. 
 
3. Ensuring that their candidates hold the positions of president or vice president 
of GPs where possible – CVCs has played an important role in ensuring that 
elected GP members from their village get access to the positions of president or 
vice president of GP. Even in cases where CVCs have not been fully successful in 
influencing the choice of candidates for GP elections, they have played a decisive 
role in ensuring that the position of president or vice president is allocated to their 
village.  However this is mainly dependant upon the type of reservation that is 
applicable to that particular GP. In 13 out of 30 sample villages the CVC had 
played a role in securing the position of president and/or vice president to the 
candidates from their village. Overall, about 28% of positions of president or vice 
president were held by either CVCs leaders or candidates selected by them in 30 
sample villages.     
 
4. Trying to control election outcomes by encouraging uncontested elections - 
CVCs have tried, where possible, to concretise their choice of candidates by 
trying to ensure ‘unanimous’ (uncontested) elections. In 18 out of my 30 sample 
villages ‘unanimous’ elections took place in 2000: in four cases all the seats were 
uncontested, and in 16 villages at least one or more seats were uncontested and a 
total of 38% of GP seats were filled up through uncontested elections in the 30 
research villages This appears to be in accordance with the general trend in 
Karnataka. In the 2000 Grama Panchayat elections, 26 per cent seats of all GP 
seats in Karnataka were filled by ‘unanimous’ elections (The Hindu, 1st March, 
2000). However CVCs’ influence in controlling election outcomes by ensuring 
unanimous elections is not absolute but subject to a range of factors both external 
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and internal. Involvement of political parties, reservation of seats, village youth 
aspiring for leadership positions, and increased awareness in local political 
participation and representation have all contributed to a visible decrease in the 
percentage of unanimous elections. A preliminary look at the results of the 2005 
GP elections reveal that the number of seats filled up through uncontested 
elections in these villages have come down significantly.     
 
(b) Involvement in GP Activities (IGPA) –  
In almost all the villages I studied, the CVC leaders play an important role in negotiating 
with the formal, local representatives and institutions for benefits to the village even 
where they have had little involvement in the selection of formal local representatives. 
CVC leaders and members play an important role in the (a) implementation of 
development projects and (b) selection of beneficiaries for anti-poverty schemes. 
a) Implementation of development projects - By and large the CVC supports its 
GP members in ensuring that development projects allocated through the Grama 
Panchayat are delivered to the village. Consultations with the local leaders, 
regarding the implementation and location of development project in the village, 
by the GP members are most common. Often the CVC influences decisions 
related to the location of roads, streetlights, water taps or drainage. The CVC 
leaders constantly put pressure on the elected members for development projects 
such as construction or repairs of school buildings and community halls, provision 
of drinking water, roads, and drainages. This was evident in all 30-study villages. 
CVC leaders also monitor their performance and erring or inefficient elected 
representatives are often pulled up.   
 
 In addition, the CVC also try to improve the village infrastructure by soliciting 
donations, in cash or kind, for village development as mentioned above.  The 
involvement of the CVC in the implementation of development projects can be a positive 
feature of local democracy as it encourages local participation and decision-making in the 
development process. But this intervention assumes negative undertones if these 
decisions are biased in favour of the village elite as it has an adverse implications for the 
welfare of the village poor. 
b) Selection of beneficiaries for anti-poverty schemes - An important aspect of the 
influence deals with decisions impacting directly on the poor.  The process of 
selection of beneficiaries for anti-poverty schemes takes place in the Grama 
Sabha – the village assembly. All adults in the village are members of the Grama 
Sabha and are allowed (and expected) to participate in this process. Those 
representing the CVC often use this formal space to influence decisions regarding 
the selection of beneficiaries. The CVC leaders feel they are better placed to 
identify beneficiaries as they are better attuned to the local reality. The 
involvement of CVCs in this process often makes it more transparent.  But this 
democratic decision making process gets subverted when it is used to strengthen 
the CVC’s position in the village, by favouring those that support them. Field 
research indicates both these two types of outcomes. 
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A comparison of the interaction between CVCs and GPs in 30 sample villages indicates a 
wide inter-village variation in the level of interaction. CVCs also seem to be more active 
in more developed districts like Mysore and Dharwad compared to Raichur, which is one 
of the backward districts. However my sample is too sparse to analyse this statistically.  
 
Villagers’ perceptions of CVCs’ interaction with GP:  
 
The field data depicts a rather a negative view of CVCs as institutions undermining local 
democracy.  People representing the CVC, it appears, not only influence the choice of 
candidates, but also try to control elections outcomes by ensuring uncontested elections 
and where possible attempt to occupy formal positions. The impact of this influence is 
especially visible in women’s re-election to Grama Panchayats (Ananth Pur 2002).  By 
denying rural citizens a chance to participate in free and fair elections, CVCs seem to be 
subverting the process of democracy and capturing local democratic institutions.  This 
view, by implication, perceives rural citizens as mute, passive recipients of this process.   
 
In order to assess the awareness and perceptions of villagers regarding the interaction 
between CVCs and GPs, a perception survey was carried out in all 30 villages. Based on 
random sampling, a total of 2183 villagers (of which 51% were males and 49% were 
females) were interviewed. Villagers’ awareness regarding the role played by CVCs in 
influencing GP elections as well as their involvement in GP activities was assessed. A 
series of cross-tabulations was carried out to study the levels of knowledge of different 
groups of people regarding the interaction between CVCs and GPs. Variables such as 
gender, caste, occupation, age and literacy were cross-tabulated with levels of 
knowledge. In general, cross-tabulation indicates that independent variables such as 
literacy, occupation, caste, and landholding make little difference to the levels of 
knowledge. Perception survey of villagers from 30 villages indicates that villagers are 
quite aware of the role played by the CVC in local elections.  Nearly 74 per cent of the 
surveyed villagers were aware that CVCs were involved in selection of candidates for GP 
elections. Villagers were not only aware of the CVC’s role in local elections but also, at 
times, supported and at others, opposed the CVC’s influence over local elections. The 
role played by CVCs in election process is perceived by the villagers in different ways: as 
making the democratic process more efficient; as reducing unnecessary expenditure on 
election campaigning; or maintaining community peace as elections are seen as fostering 
factionalism within villages.  Even the overlap of leadership is not perceived as ‘elite 
capture’ by the villagers but a way of choosing effective and efficient leaders; those 
capable of performing and serving the village better by bringing development to the 
village. Unanimous elections where effected and accepted is seen as reducing costs 
(campaigning expenses), time and effort by the villagers.  
 
Equally the influence of the formal processes and institutions on the informal cannot be 
disregarded. As Grama Panchayats have become institutionalised and influential, 
villagers have begun to consider contesting local elections as being important and 
prestigious. This has led to an increased interest in local political participation and 
representation. Consequently a slow resistance to CVCs’ influence over local election 
processes is emerging.  In a couple of villages, the CVC Yajamanas who belong to the 
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dominant caste groups, have little interest in controlling nominations as all the seats in 
the village are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In another case, there 
was opposition within the village to the list of ‘consensus candidates’, as there were a 
number of villagers interested in contesting elections.  In yet another village, some people 
did not accept the unanimous choice of a CVC Yajamana’s son as the candidate for 
Grama Panchayat, and nominated another candidate. Although the CVC Yajamana’s son 
went on to win, the show of dissension itself indicates the changes that reforms from 
above, in the form of reservation of seats and the process of democratic decentralisation, 
have initiated in the rural regions. This view is further substantiated by the fact that there 
are at least couple of instances of panchas or their kin losing the elections to candidates 
who were not part of the CVC. This indicates the increasing importance of creating 
formal spaces as it has the potential to act as a counter to the local political monopolies 
that CVCs often represent. 
 
Villagers do not view these two institutions as competitive but as complementary, each 
serving different purposes and needs. This view is clearly reflected in their institutional 
preferences13.  Cross-tabulation of different variables such as gender, age, caste, and 
education with preference shows some interesting results. In general,   
There is a clear gender difference in preference.(a) Women prefer CVCs more -36% as 
compared with 17% to men. (b) 40% Men prefer GP more than CVC –but a slightly 
lesser percentage of men – 35% - want both CVC and GP.  
 
Two of the main reasons cited for wanting ‘both CVC and GP’ are that (1) the CVCs 
offer useful services not offered by GPs and (2) the CVCs make the formal process more 
transparent and accountable. Women prefer CVC as they feel that it provides local law 
and order at the village. Women’s clear preference for CVCs, despite the fact that they 
find no representation in CVCs, and the general shift towards wanting both institutions 
with increase in literacy indicates that the important role played by CVCs in local 
governance is often not recognised by the ‘outsiders’ who view them as oppressive and 
moribund institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 I’d asked an open-ended question as to which institution people preferred and why. Based on the answers 
given I categorised them into 5 groups- (a) don’t know (b) Only ILGI,(c) only GP, (d) Both ILGI and 
GP(wanting both the institutions) and lastly, (e) Neither. 
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Table 1. Villagers' Attitudes to Local Governance Institutions. 
Respondents' preferences for Customary Village Councils (CVCs) and/or Grama 
Panchayats (GPs) (%) 
 CVC only GP only Both CVC 
and GP 
Neither Don't 
know 
Total 
All 
respondents 
27 32 27 9 5 100% 
Female 
respondents 
36 25 20 12 7 100% 
Literate 
respondents 
22 36 34 5 3 100% 
Illiterate 
respondents 
30 29 22 12 7 
 
100% 
Source: Open-ended question about adult villagers' preferences were asked in the baseline 
survey conducted in 2002-2003.  We have interpreted and grouped the responses. 
 
 
In addition, qualitative and other data collected through interviews and focus group 
discussions illustrate the impact of formal processes in not only reforming CVCs but also 
producing better development and governance outcomes. For instance,  
 
• CVCs with high and synergistic interaction with Grama Panchayats are also 
engaged in initiating own development activities and engaging in public-private 
partnerships with formal institutions for development projects. CVCs are taking 
on new roles that involve interaction with formal institutions.  Some do more than 
work with and through elected Grama Panchayats: in relating to higher levels of 
government and electoral politics, they have become significant actors in their 
own right.  CVCs are supplementing and complementing formal development 
initiatives.  
• The constructive interaction between CVCs and Grama Panchayats has also 
positive implication for local governance. Focus group discussions with poorer 
groups in the villages were carried out to assess their awareness and opinion about 
the programmes of the Grama Panchayat and the involvement of the CVC leaders 
in this. Awareness and satisfaction with Grama Panchayat programmes and 
activities was high in villages with high IIGP compared to others. In these 
villages, the villagers also reported that corruption, an important indicator of 
governance, was less because of the involvement of the CVC leaders in Grama 
Panchayat activities. Villages with low IIGP had high reports of corruption by 
Grama Panchayat members and less satisfaction with the activities of the Grama 
Panchayats.  
 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: 
 
Research in Karnataka indicates that CVCs play an important role in local governance 
not only as social institutions but also as agencies that impact development process. In a 
context where local governance is being formalised and decentralised up to the village 
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level, these institutions assume importance as they play a significant role in local 
governance.   
 
Two key findings that stand out from this research are:  
(a) CVCs co-exist, interact with and influence GPs and this influence is not always 
negative.  What we see in Karnataka is a ‘hybrid’ situation. Villagers are not only 
aware of this interaction but also seem comfortable with this hybridity of having 
access to both institutions. Rather than conflicting, CVCs in Karnataka seem to 
complement the initiatives of Grama Panchayats14.  
 
(b) CVCs are more active in interacting and influencing GPs in better developed 
districts compared to less developed districts. This indicates that CVCs are not 
disappearing but reinventing themselves with development and modernity.  
 
The notion that development or progress is associated with defined patterns of 
institutional change has a long history.  The modernization theory of the 1950s and1960s 
was but one highly articulated version of that general pattern.  So too has been the recent 
insistence by most international aid and development agencies that 'good government' in 
developing countries is in large degree of matter of adopting certain standard political 
and legal institutions.  These assertions of the value of what is sometimes termed a form 
of 'institutional monoculture' inevitably generate counter-reactions.  Some of the most 
productive counter-reactions are based on empirical research.  They demonstrate (a) that 
dichotomous notions of bad (= old) versus good (= new) institutions often leave us 
unable to explain effective institutional performance; and (b) that it is generally very 
important not to confuse the form of institutions with the functions that they carry out.  
Effective institutions can often be characterised in terms of ‘institutional dualism’: the 
combination of putatively 'traditional' (= old) with 'modern' (= new) norms, relationships 
and practices (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005).  CVCs in Karnataka could be viewed as 
an example of institutional dualism, and, for practical policy purposes, treated in the same 
way that Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2005:2) enjoin us to think about the treatment of 
dualistic institutions generally: to distinguish those that "serve, or at least do not 
contradict, the majority’s needs and aspirations, from similar looking organisations that 
block or even reverse improvements in economic performance and social welfare"; and to 
recognise "the hidden positive functions of certain dualistic practices, such as giving poor 
people access to resources or allowing them an informal voice in the political system." 
 
The purpose of the paper is to present a clearer understanding of the local institutional 
arrangements in Karnataka and the ways in which they interact with each other. Evidence 
from the field indicates that the CVCs influence local democracy in many ways and this 
merits further enquiry, especially in the context where policy makers, donor agencies and 
NGOs have been investing resources, both financial and human, to strengthen formal, 
                                                 
14 Preliminary regression analysis indicates that ILGIs are most active and interactive where GP 
headquarters are located in the same villages as ILGIs and where these GPs are effective and efficient. Here 
GP efficiency is measured by their revenue raising as assessed thorough their Total Own Revenue 
collection and their outcomes/outputs assessed through people’s awareness and satisfaction with GP 
performance and activities.   
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elected local institutions.  For this investment to be productive a better and deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of local governance is essential.   
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SECTION 1: THE CONTEXT- AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Federalism and Urban Decentralisation in India 
 
With all the focus on Panchayati Raj institutions in India, urban decentralisation has 
received far less attention in the country, suffering for long from policies that saw 
urbanisation as a trend that needed to be slowed if not stopped altogether.   
 
With the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992, we completed the federal 
puzzle in our country, creating units of local self-government at the rural and urban 
levels.  While there are still enormous challenges in implementing the legal provisions 
with regard to rural decentralisation, tremendous energy is being expended within many 
state governments to solidify this process.  Issues such as untying of funds, streamlining 
of programmes, capacity building and training of Gram Panchayat members are among 
the hottest potatoes being tossed around in state legislatures.   
 
So, in this journey towards a healthy federalist governmental arrangement, the patient 
incrementalism of policy-makers seems to be working fairly well.  While there are gaps 
in intergovernmental institutions that can oversee and regulate the interchanges, given the 
magnitude of the local government initiative in the last decade to expand of the base of 
the third level, it seems that enough is going well. As George Mathews says, “The 
Panchayats–Districts and below are now treated as third stratum of governance. 
…Today in India if there is a strong Centre it is not by virtue of its powers over other 
units but because the lower units – States, Districts, Blocks, Villages–are powerful. This 
is exactly opposite of what India started with.  Thus, one can say that strong regional and 
state level political parties have strengthened India's democracy and federal character.”1 
 
Unfortunately, these statistics hide an uncomfortable truth: the base of the pyramid is 
expanding only for rural local government.  Such leadership is sorely lacking in urban 
decentralisation.  Caught in the penumbra of the spotlight on their rural brethren, urban 
dwellers are finding themselves in a governance vacuum, with all signs of the situation 
worsening.  Consider the following statistics for Karnataka2: 
 
                                                 
1 Democracy at Work : Evolving Federalism Through Political Representation in Socio-Cultural Pluralism; 
By George Mathew, Director Institute of Social Sciences 
2 Urban Development Department, Government of Karnataka, and Department of Panchayati Raj 
Institutions, Government of Karnataka 
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The representation ratio between citizens and their elected representatives is almost ten 
times larger for urban areas.  In a city like Bangalore, the ratio is 42,000 citizens for 1 
Elected Representative.  One possible interpretation of this could be that government is 
more than 100 times further away for the resident of Bangalore than the average rural 
dweller. 
 
In addition to this, the idea that every registered voter is a member of a Gram Sabha, and 
should participate in decision-making through this vehicle is one that at least has formal 
sanction in rural decentralisation, if not much track record. 
 
In contrast, urban areas have the concept of the Wards Committees, which are meant to 
be constituted for the City Corporations.  In Bangalore for example, there are meant to be 
28 (recently revised to 31) such Ward Committees, which are fatally hampered by the 
combination of a debatable nomination process, limited citizen representation and an 
ambiguous mandate.   
 
So, while it may seem reasonable to believe that decentralisation is now only an 
implementation challenge in India, the reality is that we have an extremely skewed 
federalist structure at the third tier.  And this situation is getting worse, because while 
India was 28% urban at the turn of the century, it is projected to be 46% urban by 2030.3 
 
This failure to have a coherent rural-urban approach to decentralisation is a big lacuna in 
Indian federalism.  Indeed it is astonishing that – despite the general rigour that has 
characterised India’s approach to democratic institutionalisation, often correctly placing 
due process at a premium to short-term outcomes – there has been such an intellectual 
vacuum with respect to urbanisation, with very few champions of the cause.   
 
This lopsided approach can be traced even to the drafting of the two seminal pieces of 
legislation that have given rural and urban local governments their current positions– the 
73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments respectively – and perhaps explains the 
                                                 
3 World Urbanization Prospects: the 1996 revision.  Department for Economic and Social Information and 
Policy Analysis, Population Division, United Nations.  1996 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION RATIOS, 2000 
RURAL KARNATAKA URBAN KARNATAKA 
POPULATION 3.2 crores POPULATION 1.7 crores 
Level No. of 
units 
No. of 
Reps 
Level  No. 
of 
units 
No. 
of 
Reps 
Zilla Panchayat 27 890 City Corporations 6 410 
Taluk Panchayat 176 3,255 City Municipal Councils 40 1,308 
Gram Panchayat 5,659 80,023 Town Municipal Councils 81 1,919 
   Town Panchayats 89 1,373 
Total No of Elected Reps 84,168 Total No. of Elected Reps 5,023 
Citizen: Rep Ratio 380:1 Citizen: Rep Ratio 3,400:1 
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difference in attitude that people in government have towards these two forms of local 
government even today.  The 73rd Amendment was the culmination of over four decades 
of struggle and intense debate by a range of players: three generations of Gandhians, 
advocates of rural self-government, and champions of three-tier federalism.  This saw 
numerous initiatives at promoting Panchayati Raj institutions as well as two national 
committees separated by two decades – the Balwantrai Mehta Committee in 1957, and 
the Ashok Mehta Committee in 1977.  Associated with this energy – possibly because of 
it - there is also a great deal of documentary evidence on the evolution of rural 
decentralisation in India.  Unfortunately, this richness of material is absent when it comes 
to urban decentralisation.  There were some noises about urban challenges through the 
early decades of our Independence with the constitution of an All India Council of 
Mayors which consistently demanded greater urban autonomy.  The mid-80s saw the 
crystallizing of some of this energy: for example, one of the recommendations of the 
National Commission on Urbanisation (NCU) was to suggest that Article 40 of Directive 
Principles of State Policy - requiring states to organise Panchayats as units of local self-
government in rural areas – be expanded to include urban areas as well.   
 
In discussions that this author has had with some of the key actors in the drafting of the 
74th Constitutional Amendment, this is the picture that emerges on how this amendment 
came about: even as the original Amendment (64th CAA) for Panchayati Raj was being 
drafted during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister in the late 80s amidst much 
debate, one of the senior Congress Party members asked the Prime Minister what was 
being done about municipalities.  Until this issue arose, no protracted debate on this 
subject had occurred across the country, and no advocates of urban self-government had 
as yet emerged on the Indian political landscape – at least none who had national impact.  
At this point, given the urgency in passing the laws, an urban decentralisation amendment 
(65th Amendment) was drafted within a period of a few months, mirroring in some ways 
the structural aspects of rural decentralisation, capturing in others the unique needs of 
urban areas, but missing the essential spirit of the rural amendment – the centrality of the 
citizen and the bottom-up nature of local self-government.4  Both amendments failed to 
pass, and were eventually passed in 1992 as the 73rd and 74th amendments respectively. 
 
This gap, created at the very genesis of the 74th Amendment, continues to plague urban 
decentralisation even today: our cities and towns do not have bottom-up structures that 
create more proximity between the citizen and their urban local government. And without 
citizen participation, federalism is like a batsman without a partner at the crease: 
decentralisation of what is called the 3 “F”s – funds, functions and functionaries – needs 
to be accompanied by accountability as well.  This accountability ought to be directly to 
citizens, rather than to some other level of government.  One form of such accountability 
is to provide formal opportunity for citizens to participate in local governance.  Citizen 
                                                 
4 Conversations on the subject that the author has had with Mani Shankar Aiyar and Mr. Sivaramakrishnan, 
both involved in drafting the original 66th Constitutional Amendment that dealt with urban decentralisation.  
Both the rural and the urban bills were defeated in parliament, and were only re-introduced after Rajiv 
Gandhi’s death in 1993, under Narasimha Rao’s tenure as Prime Minister, eventually passing as the 73rd 
and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. 
 69 
engagement is one of the critical success factors for federalism.5  Indeed, some would 
claim that citizen participation is at the heart of democracy itself6.  The absence of the 
opportunity to participate has other consequences beyond poorly functioning urban local 
governments, and these are related to the political education of the urban Indian.  In a 
young democracy such as India’s, local governments act as a political kindergarten to 
educate the citizen.  In the absence of this, the urban voter is not only disconnected from 
government, but also illiterate about the politics of change. So today, when we are often 
confronted with a cynical citizenry, it begs the question: what comes first, the 
indifference or the disempowerment? 
 
 
SECTION 2: THE CONTEXT - A CITIZEN PERSPECTIVE  
 
Our cities and towns in India provide many comforts: livelihood opportunities; relatively 
better infrastructure than rural areas; access to choice in education and healthcare, and so 
on.  While the quality compares poorly with developed countries, conditions are superior 
to what is available even a few miles outside the urban boundaries. 
 
However, viewed in a different sense, our urban centres do not have an essential 
“rooting”, an organic connection between the urban citizen and the government.  From 
the point of view of the individual citizen, there are significant gaps in urban living.  
Examples abound: there is no opportunity to participate in decisions on local 
development, no mechanism to stop the illegal violation of the local park, no system to 
prevent the neighbour’s residence from being converted into a hospital that could soon 
dump toxic waste in the storm water drains, no grass-root answer to manage the voter roll 
errors which are upwards of 40% in urban areas, no space to even vent one’s frustrations.  
While the urban resident can see herself as a producer of urban goods and services, or as 
a consumer of urban comforts, she cannot so easily see herself as a citizen.  In fact, her 
identity as a citizen in urban India is one that is minimally developed, if at all.   
 
These gaps exist for everyone.  For those within government, be it a Supreme Court 
judge, a Cabinet Secretary or an employee of the railways, they know all about the empty 
edifice of citizenry and often come to terms with their civic emasculation by leveraging 
their positions and titles.  Even for the elite, this same sense of disconnection prevails: the 
industrialists, the writers, the media, the film-makers, the intellectuals, even the 
activitists.  None of them can individually survive in the city without the coping 
mechanisms that their particular position offers them: their networks, their identities.  
Strip away these identities, and the hollow shell of basic “citizenry” will provide cold 
comfort.  Imagine if this is true for the “empowered” urban Indian, what it could be doing 
to the 35% and more of the urban dwellers who are the urban poor.  They are twice 
forsaken, once because of their state, and once by the State. 
 
                                                 
5 Fiscal federalism for emerging economies: lessons from Switzerland? Publius; 1/1/2003; Hosp, Gerald 
6 “India: Development and Participation” (OUP, 2002) by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen.  In the 3-pronged 
framework that the authors use to assess democracy in India – ideals, institutions and practice – the only 
element that finds place in all three prongs of the framework is the participation of citizens. 
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The fabric of any society begins with the individual, her sense of empowerment, her 
belief in her own agency.  In a society that is static or changing at a leisurely pace, most 
challenges can be addressed at a similar pace.  However, in a society that is urbanising 
rapidly, the changes are faster: old identities are being wiped clean and being replaced 
with an aching vacuum, where the underlying rules of engagement are increasingly 
transactional.   And this is what is happening in our urban areas.  Alienation is the 
underbelly of urban living in our country. 
 
It sounds odd to be talking of urban residents needing to be treated in the same vein as the 
rural citizen, when one compares the quality of life in urban India with the rural areas.  
However, in this context, the comparison is not about roads or water supply, education or 
health care, employment opportunities or gender equality.  It is about the fundamental 
right to be treated equally as a citizen fully engaged in the democratic process, with the 
same rights and responsibilities.  
 
 
SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF JANAAGRAHA’S EXPERIENCES  
Against the backdrop of a state that has not provided enough toe-holds for the urban 
resident to assert his identity as a citizen, grass-root work continues to show that people 
do not stay still, they react to this reality.  It is not that people don’t care, or don’t want to 
address this.  Across the length and breadth of this country, local communities sprout like 
wild grass, bringing groups of people together to address their local problems.  Whether it 
is in the form of Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), neighbourhood groups in urban 
slums, or even less formal community-based groups, these display an energy for change 
that in many cases has tremendous potential.  
And in the study of these communities, one discovers remarkable stories of self-help: of 
cleaning their streets of garbage, of procuring water supply in their slums, of community 
policing and so on.  But equally striking will be the observation that these demonstrate 
either a complete detachment from the state, or at best an ad-hoc, situational arrangement 
with the government.  They will also show the power of collective action, rather the 
empowerment of an individual citizen. 
In Bangalore, over the past few years, we have attempted to right this ship of 
decentralised urban governance through a citizen-led initiative for participatory 
democracy called Janaagraha (meaning Jana Agraha, or the moral force of the people).  
During this time, we have accumulated piece after piece of evidence to suggest that while 
the urban resident cares, and wants to take part, the state has not only denied her the 
formal spaces to engage, but often actively thwarts this desire. 
Examples of work that we have been involved with over the past few years in Bangalore: 
? A ward works campaign was Janaagraha’s launch, between December 2001 and 
May 2002: getting citizens to participate in the allocation of ward-level funds for 
local development.  This was the first campaign of Janaagraha, and marked our 
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approach: a collaborative one, emphasising partnership between citizens, their 
Corporators, and the city administration.  Done for the financial year 2002-03, 
citizens from 65 wards took part in this exercise; in 32 of these wards, citizens 
came together in strong numbers, and actively negotiated with their Corporators 
and BMP administration; in 22 of these wards, citizens were happy with the final 
works list that was produced.  This represented a total of Rs. 10.7 crores of works, 
out of a total ward works list of Rs. 50 crores.  A total of more than 5,000 citizens 
took part in the exercise, and hundreds of volunteers were involved in conducting 
the training programmes, and providing the engineering, technology and support 
activities.  Since there was no formal space for such citizen participation in ward-
level planning, each ward success was the result of one or more of a unique set of 
conditions: a resolute citizenry, a willing elected representative, a supportive 
administration.  Where these enabling conditions did not exist, the results were 
marginal or non-existent.  The experience demonstrated that citizens are willing to 
engage, take the trouble, and even compromise on their own needs, so long as 
they perceive the process as scientific, transparent, and fair.  Institutionalising this 
engagement would increase citizen participation manifold.  
 
? In the 2004 national elections, many citizen communities wanted to be involved 
in increasing voter registration and voter turnout.  There is sketchy documentary 
evidence to suggest that urban voter rolls have error rates that are 40% - 45%7, 
arising primarily from non-registration of valid voters, and bogus entries in the 
list.  Rural voter lists also have errors, but these are less than half the urban error 
percentages.  Also, several initiatives in various states have had significant impact 
in correcting voter lists in rural areas. To name one successful exercise, the 
MKSS exercise of getting the CEC to have the voter list read out formally at all 
rural ward sabhas (80-100 households) in Rajasthan resulted in a CEC notification 
(order 23/2003-PLN-II), resulting in the correction of over 7 lakh voter entries.  
Unfortunately, the CEC provision for the urban voter was a much-diluted one, 
requesting that the list be read out in mohalla committees or Resident Welfare 
Association meetings; this is because there is no similar politically legitimate 
platform for such an exercise, there is no ward sabha or grama sabha for the urban 
voter.   
The only alternative for communities is to conduct door-to-door verification of 
the voter list.  This suffers from two weaknesses: one, it is not a formal exercise 
of the government machinery; and two, it is extraordinarily time- and people 
intensive.  In spite of this, a pilot exercise was conducted in two polling stations, 
which showed that the error rates were in the region of 45%.  Unfortunately, there 
could be no institutional redressal of the matter, since the entire election 
machinery by this time was occupied with other pressing matters like EVMs, 
candidate disclosure and the rest.  
 
                                                 
7 Lok Satta study in Andhra Pradesh, available on their website: www.loksatta.org.  Also confirmed by 
Janaagraha in a sample study of 2 polling booths in Bangalore during Elections 2004. 
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Hence, the urban voter list continues to be error-prone, due to the lack of equality 
in treatment of the urban voter.  Is it any surprise that voter turnout is low and 
tending to become lower in urban areas, across all elections in our federalist 
system? 
? A “Ward Vision” campaign conducted between June to December 2003, where 
citizens at the ward level got together to prepare a vision for their ward.  In 10 of 
the city’s 100 wards, over 2,000 people attended 5 workshops to prepare detailed 
documents for their wards, including the expenditure requirements, and the 
sources of funds.  After analysing the funding sources, they discovered that the 
city was only collecting 30% of the potential property tax revenues at the ward 
level, and hence suggested an innovative plan to raise compliance.  Called Ward 
RECI-P (Revenue Enhancement with Citizen Participation), they suggested that 
citizens would support the city administrators to increase revenues, with the 
condition that a portion of the increased revenues be allocated for local ward 
development.   
Hailed as an innovative public finance solution to help local governments by 
eminent economists and public policy experts, this proposal is still awaiting a 
response from the local government.  The actual citizen plans would have done 
any government department proud: detailed, prioritised projects, with estimated 
costs.  However, because there was no formal mechanism for these plans to be 
produced in a participatory process, they are lying in cold storage.  The result is 
that the citizen participant is fast becoming an activist, demanding their rights: 
while some are willing to trudge this path, it is too large a burden to place on all 
citizens. 
? While all Janaagraha’s campaigns encouraged citizens across the spectrum to 
participate, the experiences in the first campaign showed that the poor needed 
additional focus to bring them to the governance table.  With this in mind, an 
exclusive campaign was undertaken, focused on the urban poor.   Swarna Jayanti 
Shehari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) is a Government of India urban poverty 
alleviation programme.  Unfortunately, the record of implementation of this 
programme was less than satisfactory in the Bangalore area8.   In 2002 
Janaagraha conducted a survey in respect of loans sanctioned under Swarna 
Jayanthi Shahari Yojana and produced a report titled “Case studies on delivery of 
loans to the urban poor”9. This led to the creation of ANKUR (Alliance for 
Networked Kinship of Underprivileged Residents), a platform which envisaged 
participation of all the stakeholders of SJSRY i.e. Government, NGOs, 
Beneficiaries and Banks.  A pilot project steered by the Karnataka Government’s 
Department of Municipal Administration was undertaken over a period of 12 
months, with the following features: 
                                                 
8 “Urban Poverty Alleviation India” by Supriti, Sharon Barnhardt, Ramesh Ramanathan, Ramanathan 
Foundation, 2002 
9 Janaagraha report submitted to Directorate of Municipal Administration, Government of Karnataka 
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• Bringing all the stakeholders on a common platform   
• Identification of Nodal branches for disbursal of loans 
• Standardisation of loan application forms  
• Joint identification of beneficiaries by the community, bankers & NGOs  
• EDP training for beneficiaries mandatory before release of loan 
• Participation of NGOs in the formation & nurturing of Thrift & Credit 
Groups 
The performance under the pilot project was as follows10: 
 
Components of 
SJSRY 
No. of 
Groups 
Coverage of BPL 
families 
Loan amount 
 (Rs.  in Lakh) 
USEP loans (ME)  0 341            78.72 
DWCUA 3 45              3.75 
TCGs 234 3656           125.00 
Total  237 4042           207.47 
 
While the results on improving the bank linkage through the SJSRY pilot were 
promising, Janaagraha’s purpose for improving the functioning of the SJSRY 
programme in Bangalore was a different one, related to the structural presence of 
community groups in the scheme: a pyramidal clustering of neighbourhood 
groups (NHGs), neighbourhood committees (NHCs) and Community 
Development Societies (CDS), representing over 1 lakh BPL families in 
Bangalore.   
 
The SJSRY programme not only provided a single platform through which to link 
to what was supposed to be a readymade community structure of the poor at the 
grassroots, but also one that was empowered to demand development outcomes 
from various arms of government that worked in the area of urban poverty (slum 
improvement boards, housing boards, city corporations etc) through the Articles 
of Association of the CDS, which were registered societies.   
 
However, the experience was that the city-wide SJSRY platform provided little 
tangible benefit to the poor in terms of public service outcomes, or governance 
outcomes.  There were several impediments to this process: 
1. The formal mandate to demand outcomes was only with the CDS, the apex 
institution, and not with the lower-level community structures like the NHC 
and NHG.  The six CDS’s that were established for the entire city meant that 
each CDS had a massive coverage area of 1/6th of the city, covering 
approximately 15,000 urban poor families. 
2. There was little social connection among the members of the CDS, since they 
came from different parts of the city, with no prior inter-personal contact. 
                                                 
10 SJSRY Pilot Project documentation reports submitted to GOK, and available with Janaagraha 
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3. Very little capacity-building effort had been expended for the CDS members, 
who were officially vested with a fair degree of authority to demand the 
presence of various government agencies, and pass binding resolutions for 
actions by these agencies, but little real use of these powers.   
4. CDS meetings did not take place within the geographic boundaries of each 
CDS (itself a vast geographic stretch), but at the nodal SJSRY office.  
Members did not get travel compensation or any pay for the time and cost in 
participating in the CDS meetings.  As a result, few of the CDS meetings were 
well-attended, and often did not even have quorum. 
 
Janaagraha’s efforts, over an 18-month period, in attempting to make an 
exclusive, legitimate, government-authorised platform for the poor work to bring 
them better local services were less than successful due to a variety of reasons: 
one, grass-root resistance from the administration despite senior-level leadership; 
two, the limited duration of the pilot; three, the inherent structural considerations 
of the programme that the CDS was too large and removed a platform to provide 
meaningful engagement for the poor.   
 
While the first two issues are part of any social change process, the third issue 
gave us pause to see if it was even worthwhile to make the CDS work.  This 
resulted in an effort to work with the local neighbourhood communities.  The 
responses at this level were far greater, with poor residents willing to engage on 
issues that mattered to them locally: water supply, sanitation, electrification of 
lanes, health concerns and so on.  It was interesting that the poor were willing to 
engage at a neighbourhood level that did not have any formal legitimacy, while 
not using a platform like the CDS that had power, but was somewhat removed 
from their specific concerns.   
 
There was one additional positive experience: given the reasonable level of 
middle-class involvement in other campaigns of Janaagraha, they expressed 
interest in knowing more about the SJSRY campaign, and working with local 
community clusters of the poor in their wards.  This resulted in Janaagraha linking 
the middle-class with the urban poor at the ward-level, with many interesting 
positive outcomes11.   
 
? One of the significant issues that arose in the SJSRY campaign was the choice of 
beneficiaries, and the veracity of the BPL list.  There were many claims by NGOs 
that the list had many flaws in it, and even by other government departments (the 
Food and Civil Supplies Department refused to use the SJSRY list for the release 
of its BPL ration cards).   
 
Arising out of this, Janaagraha undertook a separate exercise to verify the BPL 
lists across 3 government agencies: Food and Civil Supplies (F&CS), Municipal 
Administration (DMA) and Karnataka Slum Board.  A detailed report prepared 
jointly by Janaagraha and these 3 agencies has been submitted to the Government 
                                                 
11 Documentary examples of middle-class and poor interactions available with Janaagraha 
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of Karnataka.12  The key finding of the study was that the list of common BPL 
names among all three agencies was less than 6%.  Given the startling nature of 
the statistic, it was clear that substantial work needed to be done to improve the 
quality of the BPL list.  The proposal submitted to government suggests the 
creation of a Common BPL List (CBL) that could be used by all government 
agencies.  While no action has been taken on the report, it must be admitted that 
this process would only eliminate multiple lists, and not necessarily address the 
issue of the authenticity of the list itself. 
 
There were several learnings that emerged out of these experiences for Janaagraha: 
 
1. While the myth of the cynical urban citizen is not without merit, there are still 
sufficient numbers of urban residents willing to participate.  Over the past three years, 
more than 1 lakh citizens have participated at some level in one or more of 
Janaagraha’s activities13. And this is when there is no formal sanction for citizen 
participation.  Robert Putnam writes of the level of citizen participation in Portland, 
Oregon at 10%, where citizen participation was actively encouraged by the city 
government.14.  Clearly, these are large proportions at the grassroots, numbers that 
could ensure robust participatory outcomes.  There is nothing to suggest that they 
cannot be achieved in urban India when formal roles are given to citizens. 
 
2. Even though the CDS platform for the poor provided a great level of political 
legitimacy to the poor, there were several lacunae that prevented it from being used 
appropriately.  One possible explanation could have been that real political legitimacy 
needed to come at a level that was much more personal, much closer to home for the 
individual to feel empowered.  Also, the CDS platform was a parallel form of 
political legitimacy, which – in the long run – would only undermine the legitimate 
political structures of local government.  It could be argued that the demands of the 
poor are best achieved within the institutional framework of governance, rather than 
establishing structures outside it.   
 
3. The lowest level of political representation is the unit of the ward, one that has a 
reasonable limited geographic boundary, a political representative, and the possibility 
of a grass-root platform for direct political participation.  It seems that the ward ought 
to become the unit of all endeavours, with the establishment of additional structures 
within it, to ensure organised citizen participation. 
 
This hypothesis has some merit to it, when looking at the Kerala experience with 
poverty alleviation (including SJSRY), through a programme called Kudumbashree.  
The SHG members of Kudumbashree have secured many outcomes for themselves 
                                                 
12 “Common BPL List Report”, a joint report submitted to Government of Karnataka by Food and Civil 
Supplies, Municipal Administration, Karnataka Slum Board and Janaagraha, 2004.  Available with 
Janaagraha 
13 Janaagraha campaign documents 
14 “Better Together” Robert Putnam 
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outside of the Kutumbashree programme, through their participation in the Grama 
Sabhas of the particpatory planning campaign that the state has established.15 
 
4. The BPL list experience demonstrated that while administrative reforms are critically 
needed to ensure proper targeting of beneficiaries, there also needed to be a grass-root 
component, where beneficiary identification could be done at a locally legitimate 
level itself.   
 
Interestingly, the study on the effectiveness of Grama Sabhas also found that 
“targeting of landless and illiterate individuals is more intensive in villages that have 
held a Gram Sabha meeting. Moreover, these effects are economically significant 
with an 8-10% increase in the probability of receiving a BPL card in a village that 
held a Gram Sabha.”16 
 
The correlation between the conducting of Grama Sabhas, and the improvement in 
the quality of the BPL list in such areas, suggests that similar outcomes could be 
likely with urban sabhas as well. 
 
5. Voter list issues are somewhat similar to the BPL list issue, in that there are concerns 
with the quality of the list, both in terms of inclusion and exclusion.  Even if there 
were a one-time clean up of the list, it begs the question of how this can be done 
consistently over time.  A structural solution to this question would be one where 
there is a politically legitimate platform for the voters in a polling booth; given that 
the numbers involved (approximately 1000-1200 voters), compare with those of 
grama sabhas in the rural areas, there could some merit to this argument. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Several documents on the convergence of the People’s Planning process in Kerala, and the poverty 
alleviation programme called Kudumbashree 
16 Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey evidence from South India” Tim Besley, Rohini Pande and 
Vijayendra Rao, Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming), 2005 
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SECTION 4: INSTITUTIONALISING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION – A PROPOSAL 
 
From a constitutional standpoint, there has always been a bias towards the rural voter, 
whether it be the Directive Principles of State Policy or the 73rd Constitutional 
Amendment.17  While the voter was a central figure in the 73rd Amendment, in the 74th 
CAA on urban decentralisation, there is no mention of the phrase “a body consisting of 
persons registered in the electoral rolls”.  Even in Article 243S, which discusses the 
Ward(s) committee, the Amendment is still engaged with institutional arrangements 
rather than recognising the centrality of the registered voter, as in the case of rural 
decentralisation.18 
 
These Constitutional Amendments have percolated down to State laws for rural and 
urban decentralisation that mirror these biases.  Two reports were prepared to assess 
urban decentralisation - the National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution (NCRCW), and the Sen Committee Report to review Decentralisation in 
Kerala.  However, these reports, while making incisive observations about the poor 
functioning of urban decentralisation and the need for greater citizen involvement, did 
not go far enough to fill the fundamental gap in the architecture of decentralisation to 
give a clear and formal to every urban voter.19 
 
Janaagraha’s experiences in Bangalore are not unique – they reflect those of many other 
civil society and community-based organizations across the country.  Collectively, they 
provide substantial evidence that urban residents – even in large metros – care deeply 
about their city, and wish to participate.  Indeed, the amount of social energy that can be 
harnessed is extraordinary, if the appropriate structures are made available to the citizen. 
 
Urban local governments also face a range of other challenges that require changes in 
law, jurisdiction, administrative streamlining, decision-support systems etc.  Credible, 
realistic solutions are available for these issues as well, so that a holistic governance 
environment can be created in urban India.  We cannot adopt an “either-or” approach to 
                                                 
17 Directive principles of state policy: Article 40, which states “Organisation of village panchayats. The 
State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as 
may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.” Article 243b of the 73rd CAA 
which states  "Gram  Sabha" means a body consisting of persons registered  in the electoral rolls relating to 
a village comprised within the area of 
Panchayat at the village level;” 
18 Article 243S which states “(ii) The  Legislature  of  a State may, by law, make  provision with respect to-
(a) the composition and the territorial area of a Wards Committee; (b) the  manner  in  which the seats in a 
Wards  Committee  shall  be filled.” 
19 National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRCW Report): One example is 
suggestion 1.62 c, which only requires “knowledgeable residents” of a ward to be included.  If this were 
suggested for rural decentralisation, there would have been howls of protest, with justified accusations of 
elite capture of political institutions.  Similarly, in the Sen Committee Report for Kerala, the concept of the 
Ward Sabha is not thought of as mandatory, but rather as a vehicle that can be used only in smaller 
municipalities (population less than 1 lakh).  In 1991, there were 296 Class 1 cities with a population 
greater than 1 lakh, out of the 3,610 urban centres in the country.  They contained over 65% of the total 
urban population in the country, meaning that over 150 million Indians are living in cities and towns that 
would be considered too large for them to exercise their fundamental rights as citizens.   
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resolving issues of urban governance: all reforms are required, and we need to find the 
intellectual bandwidth and institutional energy to push for all necessary reforms.  
 
The suggestions for reforms in municipalities being made here will concern themselves 
only with two aspects: one, ensuring that the urban citizen has access to a platform for 
full freedom of expression; and two, that this mechanism also functions as a platform of 
accountability from the local government.  Both these aspects are being clubbed together 
under the broad heading “Institutionalising citizen participation in urban areas”.   
 
Any response to such a demand for citizen participation needs to address the following 
issues:  
1. The creation of a mechanism for every registered voter to participate in issues of 
local government, in a meaningful manner.  This means creating an appropriate 
tier below the ward-level.   
2. An unambiguous role for these ward- and sub-ward platforms, so that there is a 
seamless integration between their role, and that of the municipality.  This role 
should be comprehensive, extending from planning to budgeting to oversight and 
financial authority, and possibly also to spatial planning issues like zoning, 
change in land use and comprehensive development plans that can be built 
bottom-up. 
3. The integration of the internal systems of the municipality to support such a 
decentralised architecture: appropriate accounting and budgetary systems; 
administrative support; establishment of necessary bank accounts; ward maps and 
GIS systems; data collection mechanisms at the ward-level on issues like building 
starts and other such economic activities; voter rolls and BPL lists, and so on. 
4. A calendar of activities that define clearly how these grassroot decision-making 
systems are linked to the processes at the municipality.  For example, the 
municipality budget is to be placed before the Taxation and Finance Committee at 
a certain time of the year, normally around January.  It is then placed before the 
Council within a few weeks, for approval.  In any proposed system 
decentralisation, full teeth to their roles can only be provided if they have a say in 
the budgeting process.  This means that a calendar of their budgeting process 
needs to be created, to synchronise with the overall municipality calendar.   
 
In fulfilling the above requirements, the first is the most critical: the establishment of the 
appropriate legitimate political and accountability “spaces”.  Once these are done, then 
these spaces can be mandated with functions, roles and responsibilities, with appropriate 
support systems, to fulfil these responsibilities.  
 
This document concerns itself only with the first issue: the structure of decentralisation 
that links urban governance to the last citizen. The other issues of functions duties and 
responsibilities are addressed separately in a separate document.  The figure below 
illustrates the solution being suggested: 
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Figure: Proposed Urban Decentralisation Structure 
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Figure 1 above describes the proposed structure in detail: 
It can be understood in terms of PLATFORMS and PARTICIPANTS. 
PLATFORMS: There are three, at the level of the Municipality (A), at the level of the 
Ward (B), and at the level of the Polling Station, called the Area Sabha (C).  There shall 
be a Ward Committee in every ward, irrespective of the size of the Ward or the 
Municipality.  While the first two are well-known, it is the Area Sabha that is being 
newly introduced.  The footprint of every polling station could be the smallest unit in 
such an architecture; this could be called an Area Sabha.  Each of these is a legitimate, 
formal space, which will be defined in terms of constitution, composition, functions, 
duties and responsibilities.  
 
PARTICIPANTS:  
Every registered voter of a polling booth (boundaries of the polling booth will be defined 
by the Election Commission) shall be a member of that Area Sabha.  This creates an 
urban equivalent of the Grama Sabha, retains a reasonable level of intimacy, and 
recognising the unique features of urban dwellings. 
 
At the next level of the Ward Committee, the current practice of nomination to the Ward 
Committee can be replaced by a nomination of an Area Sabha Representative from the 
Area Sabha.  The benefit of this structure is that it automatically adjusts for the size of a 
municipality or ward, rather than have a prescribed single size being defined for a Ward 
Committee.  Large municipalities would have wards with greater population, more 
polling booths, and hence more Area Sabhas, resulting in larger Ward Committees.  
Smaller municipalities would have smaller population in each ward, hence fewer Area 
Sabhas and fewer members in each Ward Committee. 
 
The elected Councillor of the Ward shall be the Chairman of the Ward Committee, and 
continue to represent the Ward in the Municipal Council. 
 
Role of informal structures: The presence of a formal structure of decentralisation to the 
citizen will create the appropriate participatory and accountability mechanism for the 
citizen.  However, this does not mean that informal community structures like local 
resident associations, neighbourhood groups and ward-level federations will become less 
important.  If anything, these structures can now become more effective beyond their 
social role, by linking their public issues at the grassroots into the appropriate platform, 
either the Area Sabha or the Ward Committee.  The lessons from rural decentralisation 
indicate that while informal structures are important, parallel power structures should not 
be created. 
 
Janaagraha has prepared a draft “NAGARA RAJ BILL”, embedding the above structure 
into a legal document, with details like the constitution, composition, functions, roles and 
responsibilities of the Area Sabhas and Ward Committees.  This document has emerged 
out of the examination of the platform that was provided with the 74th Amendment, the 
good work already done by some selected states like West Bengal and Kerala, and also 
the grassroot experiences from a citizen standpoint.  The drafting has been done in a 
manner that would allow the Bill to be passed separately, or included as an Amendment 
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to the Municipalities Acts of States as a chapter exclusively dealing with 
Institutionalising Citizen Participation in Urban Governance.  Some sections of this Act 
could require other parts of a state’s Municipality Act to be modified, such as the 
budgeting process mentioned above.   
 
The structure above solves many problems of urban governance described in the earlier 
sections of this document, as detailed below: 
1. It will give formal voice to every voter to participate in issues of local 
governance, removing the lopsided treatment of the rural and urban voter that has 
prevailed since the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were passed. 
2. This 3-tiered municipal governance structure will also create accountability of the 
municipality directly to the citizen herself.  Issues of transparency, decision-
making, and so on can be addressed at the level of the Area Sabha, rather than 
creating complex processes of reporting to State Government bureacracies. 
3. These platforms will also expose citizens to the need to participate, rather than 
stand on the sidelines and complain.  While participation cannot be expected to be 
widespread, this process of political engagement will bring citizens closer to 
government, and seek solutions to public issues from our public institutions rather 
than outside them.  In some sense therefore, Area Sabhas are as much about 
government accountability to citizens as they are about citizens’ accountability to 
themselves. 
4. The creation of local engagement allows for localised solutions to emerge, as well 
as a flexibility and dynamism that are healthy attributes for any institution. 
5. Other institutions could also use these platforms to integrate into their 
requirements: even a small handful of Area Sabha members can verify 
membership rolls to the voter lists, and maintain the accuracy of the voter lists. 
The Election Commission, in turn, could formally use the Area Sabha to update 
the voter lists.  Similarly, departments of government that require BPL lists could 
have these verified at the level of the Area Sabha, much like the Grama Sabha 
experiences in rural India.  The Police department could use the Area Sabhas for 
community policing initiatives.  Disaster management situations will have a 
readymade, widespread grassroot platform for information dissemination and 
coordinated action.   
6. Given the nature of the Area Sabha, its composition will be heterogeneous, 
cutting across caste, community and economic lines.  Engagement at the Area 
Sabha could therefore have significant social implications, in generating social 
capital in ways that are otherwise unlikely to occur.   
7. A few important findings with respect to Grama Sabha functioning warrant some 
discussion here, in light of the potential implications for Area Sabha functioning: 
a. Literacy levels and Grama Sabhas: the positive correlation between 
literacy levels and grama sabha functioning holds positive implications for 
Area Sabha, given that urban literacy levels are higher than rural. 
b. The evidence suggests that Grama Sabha meetings “seem to be a forum 
used by some of the most disadvantaged groups in the village - landless, 
illiterates and scheduled castes/tribes. This suggests that these groups find 
the Gram Sabha useful and that Gram Sabha meetings may play some role 
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in moving policy in a direction favored by these groups.”  The same could 
be true of urban Area Sabhas as well, possibly solving an issue of elite 
capture in urban planning and public expenditure.20 
c. The study finds correlation between levels of awareness of the Grama 
Sabha, and levels of participation.  A case can be made that given the 
density of urban settlements, and more powerful tools of communication, 
coupled with higher literacy rates, the likelihood of greater awareness of 
Area Sabhas could also be greater, thus leading to potentially greater 
participation.  This higher awareness also has another possible effect: how 
it changes the mental attitude, from emasculation to empowerment.  
Irrespective of whether a voter participates or not, she now has the 
knowledge of the opportunity to participate.  This needs to be measured as 
well, in terms of what voters begin to feel about “empowered”, 
irrespective of their actual participation. 
d. The Grama Sabha findings also observed that participation from women is 
lower in rural areas.  here again, Area Sabhas could be more powerful as a 
forum for women, given higher levels of literacy and emancipation of 
women in urban areas 
8. If anything, the hypothesis could be that not only will the sabha concept work 
well in urban areas, and generate socially equitable outcomes, but that these could 
also be a more significant presence in local governance issues than rural areas, 
and possibly more successfully address universal participation issues across caste, 
economy and gender. 
 
The proposed benefits of citizen participation in urban areas are in the realm of 
hypotheses.  These need to be urgently tested, not only for their own reasons, but also the 
positive and normative impact they can have on rural decentralisation, and the cross-
fertilisation of successful practices and learnings.  Such common platforms across rural 
and urban centres could also create mechanisms for rural and urban citizens to reach out 
to each other directly, rather than only through removed political processes.  This has 
major significance in peri-urban areas, and the fringes of urban growth, where deep 
schisms are being created everyday due to the damaging consequences of jurisdictional 
schizophrenia. 
 
CONCLUSION 
India stands at the inflection point of two critical trends: the increasing importance of 
local governments, and a critical mass of urbanisation.  Both these have significant 
implications for governance outcomes on a range of important quality-of-life issues for 
citizens.  Citizen participation is not just a moral argument, it is a strong accountability 
mechanism for local governments.  While rural participation is imbedded in the 
                                                 
20 Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi’s Slums, Jha, Rao and 
Woolcock, World Bank Paper, July 2005.  The study shows the presence of “informal leaders (who) are 
accessible to all slum dwellers, but (that) formal government figures are most accessed by the wealthy and 
the well-connected.”  This highlights the need for legitimate participatory spaces in urban areas, open to all 
voters across the social spectrum. 
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Constitution, citizen involvement in urban areas is still very indirect.  This needs to be 
urgently corrected.  This paper describes the context of urban decentralisation, the need 
for citizen participation, and also offers a solution that can be imbedded into law at the 
State and Municipality levels, without having to change the Constitution.   There are 
credible reasons to believe that substantial benefits can accrue by creating institutional 
mechanisms for citizen participation in urban areas. 
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Systematic hierarchies and Systemic failures: 
 
Gender and Health Inequities in Koppal District 
 
Gita Sen, Aditi Iyer and Asha George1 
 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Although Karnataka is among the more socially advanced southern states of India, it lags behind 
its other southern neighbours, particularly Kerala and Tamilnadu on many dimensions. According 
to the Karnataka Human Development Report of 1999, Karnataka was in the middle among the 
15 major states on many dimensions of human development (GOK 1999). The primary reason for 
this middling position is that average indicators for the state conceal striking disparities among 
the districts within it. The northern districts of Karnataka, of which Koppal is one, form a cluster 
of poorly performing districts that pull down these average indicators2. 
 
Koppal is one of the poorer districts in Karnataka where drought periodically takes its toll on the 
agrarian economy. The lack of income and livelihoods security forces people to migrate or 
undertake work at great risk to their health. Deprivation is widespread. Public services, including 
for health, exist but are inadequately developed and largely of poor quality. Even private services, 
because of the widespread poverty of consumers, tend to be thin on the ground, and leave much 
to be desired in terms of their quality. Belief systems are strongly gender-biased; traditional 
practices include many that are inimical to women’s health and well-being. Poor women’s lives 
are marked by low levels of literacy, inadequate diets, hard labour, below minimum wages, 
recurring fatigue and illness. 
 
In the midst of these hardships, poor women are also more vulnerable to inferior health outcomes 
due to denial of their human rights, including their reproductive and sexual rights. Maternal 
morbidity and mortality are high even as son preference and high infant death rates contribute to 
repeated childbearing. Reproductive morbidity is common but is often unspoken or taken as a 
‘natural’ part of women’s existence. Anaemia is endemic but is only casually – and ineffectively 
– addressed by public health programmes. Many of these problems have clearly been present over 
a long period of time. More recently, the threat of HIV infection looms over the region, and 
infection rates including among women have been going up sharply due to a combination of poor 
awareness, weak prevention, cyclical out-migration for work, and the denial of women’s sexual 
and reproductive rights. Koppal shows up poorly in many of the health indicators that health 
administrators and policy makers use. 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of work done at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore under the Gender and Health 
Equity Project. We would like to especially thank Chandan Mukherjee for his unstinting willingness to provide 
statistical and econometric advice and Shon John for competent statistical assistance. We also wish to acknowledge 
our anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on the first draft of this paper. 
2 See the Report of the Nanjundappa Committee (GOK 2004) for a detailed analysis of the historical and 
contemporary reasons for these intra-state disparities. 
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Health and health care inequities in Koppal reflect systematic hierarchies based on gender, caste, 
economic class, and life-stage; they also reveal systemic failures in health care services, both 
public and private. Although over the years, the government has implemented many public health 
programmes, they appear to have made little difference to girls’ and women’s health status or 
health care access on the ground. Three main reasons can be attributed. First, significant gender 
biases, low levels of health awareness and lack of acknowledgement of certain health problems 
by families and by health providers have a negative impact on health–seeking behaviour. Second, 
widespread poverty and, especially recently, rising health costs reduce access even to public 
health services. Third, government health services have tended to be so top-down in their 
approach, so gender-biased (or at best gender-blind), so poor in quality and so unresponsive that 
they have been unable to bridge the gap between service providers and their intended 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, NGO-implemented projects have tended to be difficult to 
replicate or scale up. 
 
The unfortunate interplay between systematic hierarchies and systemic failures makes it possible 
for families and communities on the one side and health providers on the other to exonerate 
themselves and hold the other side responsible for poor health status and outcomes. Families and 
communities tend to blame health providers for insensitivity, negligence, and the sheer absence of 
services; health providers typically hold the view that women and their families are ignorant, 
superstitious, and careless. Our research reveals undoubted elements of truth on both sides. 
Nonetheless the ‘blame game’ diverts attention away from the absence of accountability by both, 
and the low levels of acknowledgement overall of women’s health needs. At the same time, 
however, changes are also occurring. For instance, whether because of government awareness 
programmes or not, health seeking by women and their families from private and public providers 
is far higher than one might anticipate, especially for maternal health. Despite this, preventable 
maternal deaths continue to be high, and women die in unconscionable numbers from causes 
related to childbearing. 
 
The paper will present empirical evidence and analysis of health inequities in 60 villages3 in two 
talukas (sub-districts) of Koppal. It draws on insights gained through research, community 
mobilisation and institution building efforts for the Gender and Health Equity Project. It will 
argue that both the systemic and the systematic elements need to be tackled if any policy or 
programme changes are to really take hold. The research to date has had four main components: 
• A health survey of 1920 households; 
• A census of private health care providers; 
• Qualitative research about government service delivery; 
• Qualitative enquiry into maternal deaths. 
 
 
 
 
2) KOPPAL DISTRICT – HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER 
 
                                                 
3 56 villages were selected by MSK, four of which have tandas large enough to be considered administratively by 
MSK as separate villages, which leads to the total of 60 villages.  A tanda is a sub-group of houses populated, in the 
project site, by a ST group (Lambanis). 
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Karnataka with its population of 52 million accounts for a little over 5% of the population of 
India (Census of India, 2001). The present Karnataka state was formed in 1956 by combining 
Kannada language districts from the then states of Madras, Hyderabad, Bombay and Coorg with 
the former princely state of Mysore. As was true in other parts of India (e.g. Kerala), the area 
under the princely state of Mysore was better on social and economic indicators at independence 
than the districts that had been under direct colonial rule. On the other hand, the Northern part of 
the state belonging to the old “Hyderabad Karnataka” which was under the Nizam’s rule, tended 
to be much worse off.  
 
These differences have persisted after independence as noted by the Nanjundappa Committee’s 
Report (GOK 2004). While many reasons such as the drought-proneness of agriculture, and semi-
aridity can be adduced for the greater poverty of the northern districts, significant gender 
inequalities and biases seriously hamper social and economic development in this region. These 
inequalities are a major reason for the poor health and other indicators of the region. They also 
come in the way of government health programmes and constrain their effectiveness while 
providing a ready excuse for government functionaries and even NGOs for their own limitations. 
Table 1: District-wise selected key indicators of Karnataka 
Sl 
no 
Districts Percent 
female 
literacy  
Percent 
girls 
married 
below 18 
years 
Percent 
current 
users of 
FP 
Method 
Percent 
birth 
order 3 
& 
above 
Percent 
safe 
delivery 
Percent 
comple
te 
immuni
zation 
on 
Percent 
decadal 
populati
on 
growth 
rate  
Regions 
1 Hassan 59.32 15.20 75.10 19.70 69.70 92.80 9.66 Old Mysore 
2 Shimoga 67.24 16.50 69.30 22.80 83.00 92.90 12.90 Old Mysore 
3 Kodagu 72.53 22.00 70.60 18.80 79.40 94.80 11.64 Old Mysore 
4 Dakshina Kannada 77.39 4.50 63.70 32.00 91.50 86.00 14.51 Old Mysore 
5 Uttar Kannada 68.48 15.00 66.00 27.20 86.10 89.90 10.90 Bombay Karnataka 
6 Udupi 74.02 4.50 63.70 32.00 91.50 86.00 6.88 Old Mysore 
7 Mandya 51.62 37.00 71.70 26.10 61.90 88.00 7.14 Old Mysore 
8 Mysore 55.81 47.90 65.40 23.90 69.70 92.70 15.04 Old Mysore 
9 Bangalore Rural 78.98 21.05 63.00 16.40 79.10 83.70 34.80 Old Mysore 
10 Bangalore Urban 78.98 37.00 60.10 26.10 90.60 77.00 34.80 Old Mysore 
11 Chitradurga 54.62 30.05 59.90 34.40 53.80 88.40 15.05 Old Mysore 
12 Tumkur 57.18 27.10 61.30 27.30 63.50 88.00 11.87 Old Mysore 
13 Dharwad 62.20 36.50 61.20 37.40 65.30 74.80 16.65 Bombay Karnataka 
14 Chamraj Nagar 43.02 47.90 65.40 23.90 69.70 92.70 9.16 Old Mysore 
15 Chikkamagalur 64.47 37.00 71.40 26.10 78.00 83.50 11.98 Old Mysore 
16 Kolar 52.81 33.50 57.10 29.70 59.20 90.60 13.83 Old Mysore 
17 Gadag 52.58 36.50 61.20 37.40 65.30 74.80 13.14 Bombay Karnataka 
18 Belgaum 52.53 55.80 61.80 36.70 68.60 64.80 17.40 Bombay Karnataka 
19 Haveri 57.60 36.50 61.20 37.40 65.30 74.80 13.29 Bombay Karnataka 
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Table 1:  (Cont’d) 
Sl 
no 
Districts Percent 
female 
literacy  
Percent 
girls 
married 
below 18 
years 
Percent 
current 
users of 
FP 
Method 
Percent 
birth 
order 3 
& 
above 
Percent 
safe 
delivery 
Percent 
comple
te 
immuni
zation 
on 
Percent 
decadal 
populati
on 
growth 
rate  
Regions 
20 Bellary 46.16 44.20 50.40 48.60 54.00 52.60 22.30 Hyderabad Karnataka 
21 Davangere 58.45 35.50 59.90 34.40 53.80 53.80 14.78 Old Mysore 
22 Bijapur 46.19 64.80 47.10 43.00 50.10 53.20 17.63 Bombay Karnataka 
23 Bidar 50.01 67.60 50.60 52.90 52.50 50.30 19.56 Hyderabad Karnataka 
24 Raichur 36.84 57.10 45.40 52.80 48.00 37.20 21.93 Hyderabad Karnataka 
25 Gulbarga 38.40 47.70 39.20 53.70 47.70 25.30 21.02 Hyderabad Karnataka 
26 Bagalkot 44.10 64.80 47.10 43.00 50.10 53.20 18.84 Bombay Karnataka 
27 Koppal 40.76 57.10 45.40 52.80 48.00 37.20 24.57 
Hyderabad 
Karnataka 
Source: GOK 2003, Pg 10 
 
Koppal, a small northern district carved out of the erstwhile Raichur, is a dry district with four 
talukas, a population of 1.193 million, and an overall literacy rate of 55% (IIPS forthcoming). Its 
indicators are near the bottom for the state. Table 1 which includes a number of human 
development indicators places Koppal at or very near the bottom on many of these. Although not 
uniformly the lowest on all the sub-indicators, this is cold comfort since it lies fairly close to the 
worst levels for all. Table 2, drawn from the all-India district level Rapid Household Survey 
conducted in 1998-99 under the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) programme corroborates 
this for a number of specific health-related indicators for women. 
 
Additional data from the same source (IIPS forthcoming p 48-49; Koppal – Key Indicators) 
reveals the following: age at first cohabitation among currently married women (ages 15-44) was 
below 18 in 73.9% of the cases; 41% of them had illiterate husbands; and 51.4% of girls married 
during 1999 (until the survey) were below 18. 
Table 2: Range of RCH indicators in Karnataka 
 Indicators Minimum Maximum Koppal 
       
1 Girls married below 18 (%) 2.2 Kodagu 59.4 Raichur 51.4 
2 Illiterate eligible women (%) 19.9 B’lr urban 74.9 Raichur 66.8 
3 Total fertility rate 1.37 Mandya 2.98 Raichur 2.77 
4 Birth order 3 and above (%) 11.9 B’lr urban 51.0 Gulbarga 48.2 
5 Infant mortality rate (per1000 live births) 16.3 B’lr urban 88.7 Koppal  
6 Knowledge of any modern family 
planning methods (%) 
97.3 Raichur 99.8 Gulbarga 98.5 
7 Current use of modern FP methods (%) 40.3 Gulbarga 73.5 Mandya 42.4 
8 Full antenatal check-up (%) 12.8 Gulbarga 49.8 Bangalore rural 24.4 
9 Safe delivery (%) 41.2 Gulbarga 95.7 Bangalore urban 52.8 
10 Full immunisation (%) 48.1 Gulbarga 95.2 Bangalore urban 50.2 
11 Eligible women aware of HIV (%) 37.7 Raichur 89.2 Kodagu 41.4 
12 Use of gov't health facilities for antenatal 
care (%) 
7.2 Uttar 
Kannada 
60.6 Kodagu 19.4 
Source: IIPS forthcoming 
 88 
For women in Koppal, in addition to a life of hardship shared with poor men, gender power takes 
the form of curtailed autonomy and domestic violence. Women are married into their in-laws’ 
households while very young, making it harder for them to have a voice of their own. Once 
married there is tremendous pressure to bear children, especially sons. The health implications of 
having closely spaced pregnancies at a young age further exacerbate existing malnutrition, 
anaemia and the risks of future maternal morbidity and mortality. 
 
Apart from son preference, high fertility in northern Karnataka (Sekher et al. 2001), is also a 
counter to high neonatal and infant mortality with the trade off being women’s reproductive well 
being. It is not considered unusual for a woman to have repeated miscarriages or abortions. The 
reasoning being that if a pregnancy is lost, a woman can always get pregnant again (Umamani & 
Yogananda 2003). Yet such attitudes hold significant risks for women’s health, especially 
considering existing levels of unrecognised but high reproductive morbidity. Maternal deaths, 
however, represent only the extreme end of a continuum of underlying maternal morbidity. Not 
only are the risks to women of maternal mortality and morbidity undervalued, but so are their 
direct linkages to neonatal well being and survival. 
 
Such risks to women’s and newborn health are heightened by the hazards of poverty as has been 
documented in various studies in different parts of south India. In Andhra Pradesh, all of the 
women dying from pregnancy and obstetric complications were reported to have been working as 
labourers for subsistence reasons (ANS 2001). In Tamilnadu, many women who had uterine 
prolapse ascribed their condition to heavy manual labour within a week or fortnight following 
delivery, possibly explaining why the mean age for developing symptoms was 26 years 
(Ravindran et al 1999). In southern Karnataka, women continued to undertake strenuous work 
until late in their pregnancy (Mathews et al. 2001). When pregnant and postnatal women are 
forced to do heavy manual labour in order to survive, health education messages asking them to 
“take rest” while pregnant have little relevance to the hard reality of their lives. 
 
 
3) METHODOLOGY 
 
Our research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to study the patterns of systematic 
hierarchy and system failures in health-seeking behaviour and access to health care. The 
quantitative data are based on a cross-sectional survey designed to document intra- and inter-
household inequities in health care-seeking during sickness and pregnancy. It also sought to elicit 
household level attitudes to education of girls, attitudes to gender power, and domestic violence. 
A household census conducted prior to the survey in 60 villages enumerated 15,358 households 
and 82,901 individuals. A unistage-stratified sampling design was adopted with households as the 
sample units. The project villages under each PHC were grouped, and each group treated as a 
separate stratum. With eight PHCs in the project area, there were thus eight strata. A sample was 
drawn from each stratum to the extent of 12.5% of all the households within it leading to 1920 
households. 
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4) SYSTEMATIC HIERARCHIES 
 
Our broad starting hypothesis was that intersecting hierarchies of economic class, caste and 
gender (as well as the individual'’ position in the life cycle) would affect attitudes to her health 
needs, and health seeking behaviour. In this paper we do not go into the details of all these 
intersections, but only focus on the ways in which gender affects health seeking behaviour. 
Nonetheless it is impossible to avoid commenting on the class and caste realities that permeate 
and define people’s lives, their perceptions, and their behaviour because of their possible 
interactions with gender hierarchies. 
 
a) Economic class and caste 
 
The economic position of a household is largely defined, in this poor and largely unirrigated 
agricultural district, by relationship to land, which in turn defines the extent of the household’s 
dependence on sending out its members as casual wage labourers.  As Koppal is a dry and 
drought prone region, agricultural productivity depends not merely on the amount of land owned 
but also on the possibility of ground water irrigation. Bore wells and “pump sets” are important 
assets for this reason. In our survey, most households (84.1%) owned some land, but only 24.3% 
owned pump sets. The overall share of landless and small (< 5 acres) unirrigated farm-owning 
households was as high as 51.8%. 23.9% of households owned unirrigated land equal to or above 
5 acres. Households owning irrigated land constituted only 24% of all households. 
 
Our survey did not undertake a detailed study of the quality of irrigation, but this is obviously 
important in determining the extent to which a household can rely on income from self-
employment versus sending out family members as wage labourers. Overall, the major source of 
income for most households was through self-employment (53.4%), followed by casual wage 
labour (39.8%). Regular wage employment was rare, as only 5.2% of the households derived 
their income from it. This picture varied considerably by the household’s landholding. 
 
Landless households depended mainly on casual wage labour (61.6%) and artisanal work such as 
basket or pot making (21.1%). Among unirrigated landholding (< 5 acres) households, only 
36.1% managed on self-employment; 57.9% of these also depended on casual wage labour. By 
contrast, self-employment without resort to casual wage labour characterised the larger 
unirrigated landholding (equal to or > 5 acres) households (70.1%), as well as the irrigated 
landholding households whether small (72.8%) or large (91.1%). Nevertheless, it is clear that 
owning a plot of land larger than 5 acres or owning a small irrigated plot does not insure almost 
30% of such households from casual wage labour. 
 
Most families (78.3%) owned the houses they inhabited. However, only 29.1% of the owned 
houses were pucca4 structures. Around one-fourth (or 22.7%) were semi-pucca structures but 
48.1% were kuccha structures. While electricity was not uncommon, very few of even the pucca 
houses had piped water (15%) or toilets (4.2%). Government-allotted housing was only 14.3% of 
the total (much less than the 26.7% population share of SC/ST households for whom such 
                                                 
4 Adopting the NSS definition, we defined pucca houses as those that had pucca roofs and pucca walls. Semi- pucca 
houses were those that had pucca roofs but kuccha walls, or kuccha roofs but pucca walls. Kuccha houses were those 
that had kuccha roofs and kuccha walls. 
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housing is meant), not all of which was pucca, and only 57% of which had electricity while none 
had toilets or piped water supply. 
Table 3: Caste, class and landholding 
  Percent 
landless 
Percent 
owning less 
than 5 acres 
of 
unirrigated 
land 
Percent 
owning 5 or 
more acres 
of 
unirrigated 
land 
Percent 
owning less 
than 5 
acres of 
irrigated 
land 
Percent 
owning 5 
or more 
acres of 
irrigated 
land 
Percent 
casual 
wage 
earning 
households  
Percent 
distribution 
of all 
households 
        
Upper castes 13.3 28.6 29.1 8.5 20.2 24.7 28.3 
Middle castes 11.4 35.2 28.0 9.8 15.6 36.9 37.8 
SCs / STs 20.9 45.8 14.3 11.7 7.2 59.2 26.7 
Muslims 29.6 31.2 17.1 8.5 13.6 39.9 4.1 
All households1 15.9 36.0 24.0 9.8 14.3 39.8 100.0 
Source: Gender and Health Equity household survey 
Note:     13% belong to other castes 
 
Caste variations tend to follow the economic class patterns5 as can be seen from Table 3 above. 
Upper castes have more large irrigated holdings than the average; while they also have more 
landless households than the middle castes, this may reflect the fact that almost 9% have regular 
employment as the major source of income. Middle caste landholding is near the average for all 
households although they have less irrigated landholding above 5 acres than the average. SC/ST 
households have higher proportions of landless and casual wage labourers. 
How do these variations in the economic and social status of households translate into health-
seeking behaviour? Are there significant differences across households and within them by 
gender, age or life-cycle status? 
 
b) Health care needs and gendered health seeking 
 
The survey classified illness by its duration – short-term (lasting < 3 months) or long-term (> 3 
months), and by its severity.6 Self-reported morbidity was high overall, with 82% of households 
reporting at least one sick person during the reference period. Considerable care was taken in 
designing probes to overcome the well –known biases in self-reported morbidity, although this 
may not have been completely successful because our interviewers were local people who were 
trained by us but were relatively inexperienced. Treatment seeking for illness was also high – 
almost 90% of illnesses reported for girls / women, and over 90% for boys / men were treated.7 
 
                                                 
5 A detailed enumeration and checking of caste groups was undertaken; details are available in Annexure 3 of Iyer 
(2005). 
6 Severity for short-term sickness was measured in terms of difficulty in eating normally, in doing regular work in – 
and outside – the house, and being able to go outside the house. For long-term sickness, severity was measured in 
terms of difficulty in going to school, doing housework or other work, and in income-earning. 
7 The high levels of treatment-seeking in our survey may be affected by two factors: the confounding of illness with 
treatment, wherein people only acknowledge illness as such if it is treated; second, the fairly broad definition of 
treatment-seeking used in the survey. Nonetheless, even our qualitative and in-depth inquiry into the circumstances 
of maternal death reveals the same phenomenon of high-levels of health seeking. 
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Within this overall picture, health-seeking behaviour varied along a number of dimensions, such 
as gender within the household, and also by the economic class of the household, and the duration 
and severity of the illness. Economic class in this analysis is represented by per capita household 
consumption expenditure quintiles.8 
 
The analysis below first presents some cross-tabulated data for short- and long-term illnesses. For 
short-term illnesses the responses were classified into two categories based on whether the person 
ever received treatment. For long-term illnesses, the responses were classified into three 
categories based on whether the person ever received treatment, and whether the treatment was 
discontinued. Multinomial logit regressions were also run on the data to check for the nature and 
statistical significance of interactions among economic class and gender9.  
Table 4.1: Health-seeking by gender and economic class 
Short-term sicknesses  Gender-based groups within 
per capita consumption 
expenditure quintiles Ever treated (%) Never treated (%) p value1 
Quintile 1 (poorest)       
Female 1488    (89.0) 184    (11.0) 
Male 1334    (96.5) 48      (3.5) 
0.000 
Total 2822    (92.4) 232      (7.6)   
Quintile 2       
Female 1385    (84.5) 255    (15.5) 
Male 1285    (94.1) 80      (5.9) 
0.000 
Total 2670    (88.9) 335    (11.1)   
Quintile 3       
Female 1587    (89.5) 187    (10.5) 
Male 1201    (94.9) 64      (5.1) 
0.000 
Total 2788    (91.7) 251      (8.3)   
Quintile 4       
Female 1304    (93.7) 87      (6.3) 
Male 1179    (97.4) 32      (2.6) 
0.000 
Total 2483    (95.4) 119      (4.6)   
Quintile 5 (richest)       
Female 1170    (89.1) 143    (10.9) 
Male 942    (98.3) 16      (1.7) 
0.000 
Total 2112    (93.0) 159      (7.0)   
Source:  Gender and Health Equity household survey  
Notes:  Totals are population estimates  
Percentages are over the total number of sicknesses within each quintile & sex group 
1Chi-squared test, degrees of freedom = 1 
 
                                                 
8 The plausibility of these self-reported consumption expenditure data has been crosschecked by examining the 
distributions and also comparing the corresponding National Sample Survey data. 
9 There are clearer hypotheses about how and why gender and class might influence health seeking than there are for 
caste. Caste is likely to affect the choice of provider and quality of care obtained, but not the decision of whether or 
not to seek treatment. Our analysis of gender and caste vis-à-vis health seeking for short- and long-term sickness 
shows that caste per se does not discriminate among households when it comes to discontinued-, or non-treatment. 
Interactions based on caste are part of our ongoing work but not explored in this paper. 
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Table 4.1 shows that, for short-term sickness, the proportions of girls/women who were never 
treated10 was significantly higher than the same proportions of boys/men within every 
expenditure quintile. However, there is not much variation across the expenditure quintiles per se; 
treatment levels generally appear to be high regardless of household economic class. 
 
Table 4.2 suggests that for long-term sickness, there were both gender and economic class 
differences (in the expected directions) among those with continued treatment. There were also 
significant gender differences in all the quintiles for those who were never treated. Girls/women 
were more likely to never be treated for long-term illness in all households. However, when 
treatment was discontinued, it appeared to vary both by economic class and by gender. 
Furthermore, these gender differences are not uniform across the quintiles, indicating the 
presence of interactions between gender and economic class, which we tested further with the 
regression analysis.  
Table 4.2: Health-seeking by gender and economic class 
Long-term sicknesses  Gender-based groups within 
per capita consumption 
expenditure quintiles 
Continued 
treatment (%) 
Discontinued 
treatment (%) 
Never treated 
(%) p value1 
Quintile 1 (poorest)     
Female 632    (49.1) 465    (36.1) 190    (14.8) 
Male 494    (59.5) 296    (35.7) 40      (4.8) 
0.000 
Total 1126    (53.2) 761    (35.9) 230    (10.9)  
Quintile 2     
Female 638    (50.8) 466    (37.1) 151    (12.0) 
Male 654    (71.9) 216    (23.7) 40      (4.4) 
0.000 
Total 1292    (59.7) 682    (31.5) 191      (8.8)  
Quintile 3     
Female 789    (56.7) 421    (30.3) 181    (13.0) 
Male 631    (70.3) 182    (20.3) 84      (9.4) 
0.000 
Total 1420    (62.1) 603    (26.4) 265    (11.6)  
Quintile 4     
Female 798    (65.0) 309    (25.2) 120      (9.8) 
Male 543    (67.6) 219    (27.3) 41      (5.1) 
0.001 
Total 1341    (66.1) 528    (26.0) 161      (7.9)  
Quintile 5 (richest)     
Female 812    (66.9) 283    (23.3) 119      (9.8) 
Male 546    (73.1) 169    (22.6) 32      (4.3) 
0.000 
Total 1358    (69.3) 452    (23.0) 151      (7.7)  
Source:  Gender and Health Equity household survey  
Notes:  Totals are population estimates  
Percentages are over the total number of sicknesses within each quintile & sex group 
1Chi-squared test, degrees of freedom = 2 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the lower and more insecure the household’s economic 
status, the greater the chance that health seeking will be rationed within the household, and this is 
                                                 
10 We refer to sick persons and sicknesses interchangeably while discussing Tables 4.1 and 4.2, because most persons 
(73.9%) in fact reported only one sickness.  
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borne disproportionately by girls and women. This suggests that greater economic security (and 
higher income levels) may reduce the rationing phenomenon, and with it some but not all of the 
health-seeking differences between women and men. However a caveat is in order. While we 
may be tempted to assume that the improvement is because of income security, economic 
vulnerability may not be the only reason; other factors such as educational status may play a role 
as well. 
 
Logit regression analysis with interaction terms for gender and economic class (using two models 
– Model 1 for the aggregate sample, and Model 2 with dummies for male versus female and poor 
versus non-poor) presented results that corroborate those above, and extend our understanding11. 
For short-term illnesses, Model 1 suggests that the likelihood of not being treated is significantly 
higher if the person is older, female, or poorer, or if the illness is less severe. Children and the 
young may be more likely to be treated (in an area with higher than average infant and child 
mortality rates) because of concerns about their greater vulnerability; it may also be the case that 
in this poor region, older people are less likely to take time away from work for short-term 
ailments. This requires further qualitative investigation. Gender bias clearly discriminates against 
all women whether poor or non-poor. However although the aggregate sample suggested 
significant economic class differences,  Model 2 only showed some economic class differences 
among men (10% significance level), and not among women.  
 
For long-term illnesses, Model 1 showed that the likelihood of continued treatment is higher the 
more severe the illness, or if the person is male, the head of the household, or belongs to the top 
two expenditure quintiles. Whether the person was an income earner or not in the household was 
also highly significant but in an unexpected direction suggesting that income earners were less 
likely to be continuously treated. Our tentative explanation for this is that there is a trade-off 
between earning income and receiving treatment (possibly because of the time and distance 
involved in seeking treatment) and therefore income earners may never be treated or may 
discontinue treatment.12 Model 2 showed that gender differences in continued treatment were 
strong (1% significance level) in the poorer groups but not among the better off. There were also 
significant differences (1% significance level) between poorer and better-off women, but not 
between poorer and better off men. Thus poorer women were less likely to receive continuous 
care for long-term illness than better-off women, and also compared to poorer men. The test for 
the interaction between gender and economic class showed that gender differences in the 
likelihood of continued treatment were also significantly different between the poor and the better 
off.  
 
There were some differences in the variables affecting complete non-treatment versus 
discontinuation of treatment. In Model 1 a person was more likely to never be treated for a long-
term illness if the illness was less severe, but also if the person was female or from a poorer 
household (only 10% significance level), or an income earner. Model 2 showed significant gender 
differences (1% level) within both richer and poorer households. There were significant class 
differences among women (5% level) but not among men. Gender is clearly a more important 
                                                 
11 While the cross tabulations have been presented by quintile, we believe that there is variation even within the 
poorest and the better-off quintiles. This variability is being explored in our on-going work. For the purposes of this 
paper, the regressions were run using a fairly standard dichotomy between poor (bottom 3 quintiles) versus better-off 
(top 2 quintiles). 
12 This runs counter to received wisdom and further exploration is clearly warranted. 
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discriminator than income when it comes to never being treated and economic class also impacts 
more strongly among women than among men.  
 
On the other hand, treatment was more likely to be discontinued (Model 1) if the person was from 
a poorer household, was not the head of the household, and was an income earner. These effects 
were not however uniform for men versus women. Model 2 with interactions showed some 
gender differences among poorer households (10% significance level), but no gender differences 
among richer households. But economic class was a more important discriminator among women 
than among men as there were no economic differences among men, but strong differences 
between richer and poorer women.  
 
These results suggest that gender and economic hierarchy operate at different levels and interact 
in important ways. If we think of being treated at all versus never being treated as the first level, it 
is gender that discriminates more between people, and even economic class differentiates poor 
from non-poor women, but does not differentiate between men. Once people begin to receive 
treatment, it is economic class that seems to be more important than gender per se, but even here 
class appears to operate specifically for women and not for men.  The disaggregated Model 2 
provides far more nuance to our understanding of the interactions than the aggregate Model 1. 
These ‘layered’ interactions are explored further in our ongoing work. 
 
An examination of the reasons given for lack of treatment throws some more light on basic 
gender power differences. For both females and males, the major reasons for never treating or 
discontinuing treatment were only a few: either the illness was not considered serious by the 
patient or the family, or the treatment was too expensive, or the patient felt s/he was not getting 
cured. Short-term illness among men was also not treated because they said they didn’t have the 
time for treatment. However the relative importance of the reasons given by women and men 
varied. Never treating either short or long-term illness because they thought it was not ‘serious’ 
was the most important reason for women. For men, expense was the dominant reason for never 
treating illness. Expense was an important barrier to treatment for women as well but lack of 
acknowledgement of illness (as reflected in the statement that it was not serious) was the more 
salient barrier. This barrier has its roots in powerfully ingrained gender norms that instil in 
women from an early age a lack of confidence or self-worth, a lower recognition of their needs, 
and a value to suffering in silence. Men have few such internalised norms of behaviour. 
 
Both women and men gave ‘not getting cured’ as a major reason for discontinuing treatment for 
long-term illness. More detailed analysis of the evidence shows that women tended to give up 
treatment more quickly. 
 95 
Table 6: Percent distribution of main reasons for non-treatment of sicknesses 
Short-term sicknesses Long-term sicknesses 
Never treated Discontinued treatment Never treated 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Main reason for no treatment N = 856 N = 240 N = 1944 N = 1083 N = 760 N = 237 
       
I did not know what to do 6.4 0.0 1.5 0.7 9.6 3.4 
I did not think it was serious 39.1 23.3 11.1 12.6 42.6 29.1 
Family did not think it was serious 11.9 10.0 1.2 2.2 12.5 6.8 
No one to accompany me 2.8 3.3 0.7 0.0 3.2 3.4 
I didn't have the time 2.8 10.0 1.6 0.0 0.9 3.4 
Too expensive 23.1 46.7 20.0 21.6 17.6 40.5 
Health provider unavailable 1.9 3.3 1.6 3.7 0.0 3.4 
Health provider unhelpful 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.4 
Medicines make me ill 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 
Not getting cured 3.6 0.0 43.4 30.0 5.1 6.8 
Other 7.4 3.3 4.7 5.8 7.4 0.0 
No response 0.0 0.0 13.0 23.4 0.0 0.0 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Gender and Health Equity household survey 
Notes:   Totals are population estimates  
 
Our discussion in this section highlights the fact that systematic hierarchies of economic class and 
gender play an important role in structuring the health-seeking behaviour of households. While it 
is noteworthy that the extent of health-seeking overall is high, there are also important ways in 
which it is distributed across different groups. Such rationing appears to happen both because of 
economic constraints, and also on the basis of deeply ingrained gender norms.  
 
5) Systemic failures 
 
The systematic hierarchies within communities and households that limit health-seeking 
behaviour favouring women, are compounded by major failures of the health system. These 
failures are discussed in this section with a particular focus on maternal health. Systemic 
weaknesses have been documented in our research through a census of private health providers 
that was undertaken in the 60 villages, as well as in the surrounding larger villages and towns 
within the district. Information was collected about the characteristics of traditional birth 
attendants, spiritual and traditional healers, provision stores selling tablets, private doctors, rural 
medical practitioners (RMPs)13, medical stores and laboratories. Detailed qualitative information 
of the government health services was also obtained through in-depth observation and interviews. 
 
                                                 
13 RMPs stands for rural medical practitioners. They are also sometimes called registered medical practitioners, 
although the Medical Council of India no longer registers them. They are usually men who primarily practice 
allopathy despite not having any formally recognised medical qualifications. We considered all those private doctors 
who did not hold current formally recognised medical degrees (MBBS, BAMS, BHMS, BUMS, BYNS, BDS) as 
RMPs. 
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In addition to this survey research, we documented the experiences of 12 women with obstetric 
complications, 9 of who died despite seeking care from health providers from primarily one 
taluka. These data provide compelling information that highlights how poor women in need of 
obstetric services interact with plural, unaccountable, and unregulated health systems in 
Koppal.14 
 
a) Government health provision 
 
The Karnataka Government has established an extensive network of health facilities structured 
according to a hierarchy of services based in theory on population norms15. Facilities have 
proliferated due to the preference of elected representatives for sanctioning PHCs and hospitals in 
their own constituencies and due to the availability of budget lines for infrastructural 
development. Several PHCs had new labour rooms constructed with funding from the 
Reproductive and Child Health programme and foreign funding supported infrastructural 
improvements of secondary level hospitals, with the aim of improving referral. 
 
In Koppal, this investment in infrastructure has not translated into comprehensive emergency 
obstetric care as none of the higher-level government facilities have all the required specialists or 
critical supplies.  Neither policy makers nor implementers have addressed the lack of technical 
inputs for emergency obstetric care (including abortion) by ensuring the availability of specialists, 
upgrading the emergency skills of existing personnel and ensuring their access to critical supplies 
such as blood, anti-epileptic and haemorrhage drugs. 
 
Even if the logistics of ensuring emergency obstetric care through appropriate inputs, supplies 
and staffing were addressed, there still remain large managerial barriers to improving the 
effectiveness of maternal health care services. A key contribution of the Karnataka Task Force on 
Health and Family Welfare was to highlight the need to address vacancies at the primary health 
care level (GOK 2001). Medical officers, lab technicians, nurses and male junior health assistants 
(MHWs) were recruited within the district on a contract basis, while junior female health 
assistants (ANMs) were selected for training and recruitment at the state level. Although staff 
postings are biased against equity considerations through corruption, vacancies in primary health 
care service delivery in Koppal have substantially improved. 
 
However progress on the more systemic problems identified by the Task Force (corruption, 
neglect of public health, distortions in primary health care, lack of equity, implementation gaps 
and weak ethical imperatives) has been more difficult to achieve. These cannot be addressed 
through managerial reforms alone. They require strategies to combat the political pressures that 
sustain such inequitable features of health systems. 
 
b) Private health providers 
 
                                                 
14 Detailed analysis is available in George, Iyer and Sen (2005) 
15 CHC, PHCs and sub-centres are supposed to cover populations of 100,000, 30,000 and 5,000 respectively. In 2001, 
PHCs and sub-centres in Karnataka were catering, on average, to smaller populations than specified by national 
norms: 20,817 and 4,285 respectively. CHCs, on the other hand, were dealing with larger population loads than 
envisaged – 1,40,117 persons (GOI 2004).  
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In addition to the government health system, a large number of informal providers including 
spiritual and traditional healers, shopkeepers selling tonics and tablets, traditional birth attendants 
and RMPs exist at the village level. Our provider survey interviewed 548 providers working in 
the 60 villages covering a population of about 82,000 people. This included 35 spiritual healers, 
133 traditional healers, 178 traditional birth attendants, 47 RMPs, 1 qualified Ayurvedic doctor, 
152 provision stores and 2 medical shops. Although there are a few private specialists in the 
largest towns, the rural reality of Koppal is defined by a health care market dominated by 
informal providers. The district capital in contrast was where we interviewed 65% of qualified 
private doctors16, 41% of medical shops and 50% of laboratories. The 4 largest commercial towns 
surrounding the project area, including the district capital, accounted for 36% of 90 RMPs, 93% 
of 43 private doctors, 84% of the 70 medical shops and all the 8 laboratories interviewed through 
our census. 
 
The end result of the combination of an unaccountable government health system and an 
unregulated private health system is that women have few qualified providers who can handle 
obstetric complications. In an emergency, women and their families are forced to run from one 
provider to the next, often back and forth between government and private providers, all too often 
without being assured of the services they desperately need. 
 
This forced pluralism is reflected in health seeking behaviour during delivery. In terms of 
assistance during childbirth, according to our household survey the main provider who helped 
women during normal deliveries were: traditional birth attendants (60%), RMPs/private doctors 
(14%), relatives (18%), ANMs and lady health visitors (6%) and government doctors (0%). When 
there was a complication during labour some women did seek more ‘skilled’ providers by turning 
to RMPs/private doctors (26%) and government doctors (8%). Nonetheless 45% of women with 
complications still sought the help of traditional birth attendants as a main provider. 
 
Apart from their dominant role in assisting women during delivery, traditional birth attendants, 
unlike other health providers, play an important role in cleaning, massaging and bathing both 
mother and child for several days after delivery. Traditional birth attendants also take ritual care 
of the placenta. They are trusted and familiar village level confidantes, who assist women with 
home deliveries in the customary squatting positions to which women are accustomed. But, 
despite being so responsive to women’s needs, it is a concern that only 36% of traditional birth 
attendants in the project area reported following 4 of the 5 “cleans” needed for a safe delivery. 
 
Unlike traditional birth attendants, RMPs are less involved in the time-consuming work of 
assisting women during the long hours of delivery and the hard work of caring for mothers, their 
babies and placentas after birth. Yet RMPs are more literate and command more social status than 
traditional birth attendants. RMPs are perceived by communities to be much more responsive 
than government health workers, although they have fewer qualifications (or none at all). Unlike 
government health workers they will make house visits regardless of the time of day, live in the 
village and can always be relied upon to provide injections and tablets. Indeed during and after 
delivery an RMP’s primary role is to provide oxytocin, tetanus toxoid and vitamin B injections. 
However, the irrational use of oxytocin, especially in injection form, can lead to a higher risk of 
                                                 
16 This includes practitioners with degrees in dental sciences, Ayurveda, Unani, Homepathy and Allopathy. Out of 43 
private doctors, 13 (30%) were allopaths. 
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uterine rupture, higher fetal distress and maternal morbidity. In addition to providing and 
charging for injections, RMPs also seem to play an important role in mediating access to health 
care for poor, often illiterate families, unfamiliar with larger towns and formal health care 
institutions. 
 
Women’s experiences of child-bearing in Koppal have to be seen in the context of the 
weaknesses of these plural health systems. Our research shows that women and their families 
made heroic attempts to seek health care prior to and during delivery. These iterative efforts by 
families and women result in ineffective outcomes because health systems fail to acknowledge 
women's requests for help and are not held accountable for the systemic failures that continue to 
allow women to die. It is our argument that these gendered failures in acknowledgement and 
accountability are responsible for the multiple delays that prevent women from accessing the 
effective care that could save their lives. 
 
Family planning, antenatal care and a stress on institutional deliveries are critically important, but 
when they are not integrated into a continuum of care, they are not sufficient to save women’s 
lives. All the maternal deaths we documented in Koppal did receive antenatal care and live within 
accessible distance of a subcentre or PHC. And they made serious efforts to seek out health 
providers, both private and public. Yet despite all their efforts, the women died. 
 
c) Gender biased services 
 
Gender bias serves to devalue, and worse, stigmatise women’s experiences, their bodies and 
biological processes. For example, in southern Karnataka, pregnancy is seen as a time during 
which ‘dirty’ or ‘bad fluids’ are accumulated in the body, bleeding after delivery is considered 
important as it drains the body of this bad blood. Delivery is also a ritually polluting process, 
after which a long period of cleansing and penance is required. During this post partum period, 
elders enforce restricted mobility, diets and fluid intake for newly delivered mothers (Kilaru et. 
al., 2004). These biases directly interfere with the recognition of obstetric complications, like 
haemorrhage, as well as inhibit health care seeking in the postnatal period. 
 
Health professionals also de-legitimise women’s point of view. One reason why women are not 
able to get effective care despite physically accessing government facilities is due to the lack of 
agreement between women and health providers about what their health needs are. Although 
women seek help for labour pain, medical officers diagnose them with lower back pain or ‘false’ 
labour pain. This disjuncture between women’s experiences of labour pain and its medical 
diagnosis indicates several problems in communication and care seeking. Women might be 
misinterpreting their experiences or health providers may be misunderstanding the situation. 
Social bias may also be at play by inhibiting women from speaking freely about their intimate 
reproductive health concerns with health providers from a different gender, class, educational and 
caste background. At the same time, health providers may have social biases that invalidate 
women’s experiences. Finally, biases may exist in the technical understanding of what constitutes 
labour pain. Due to these factors, the process of seeking care and advice may be quite complex in 
practice. 
 
Access to government facilities for institutional delivery once successfully negotiated does not 
mean an end to marginalising experiences. It is not just that cleanliness is not assured, but that the 
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treatment received by women can be dehumanising. Women and their families are often left in 
labour rooms by themselves. They have to trust health workers who are strangers, often having to 
seek them out from other wards or their quarters. Women are expected to deliver in a position 
that is different from what they are used to at their homes and which helps the health worker 
more than it helps them. Even for normal deliveries, medical rituals involve shaving the pubic 
area, administering IV drips, repeated deep vaginal examinations and episiotomies. Health 
workers learn their skills in hospital wards giving orders to women in labour who are allowed 
little control over their situation. Yet if complications arise, health workers tell families, who are 
neither informed nor in control, to be prepared to face the consequences (Caleb Varkey 2004). 
 
Women with poor entitlements within families and in health systems tolerate high levels of pain, 
discomfort and humiliation. Not only are their rights to protest weakened by their unequal access 
to resources, including finances, expertise, and authority, but also because of the shame that 
surrounds women’s bodies and the ‘normalisation’ of many women’s reproductive morbidities. 
Explicit gender bias thus operates to disenfranchise women objectively through unequal status, 
and also normatively through disempowering normative local traditions and medical frames of 
knowledge. 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
Our experiences based on the Gender and Health Equity project in Koppal have highlighted the 
interplay of systematic hierarchies and systemic failures in determining health outcomes for poor 
women. Government providers of services often blame communities for their ignorance and 
superstition, while people accuse providers of bias, neglect and irresponsibility. What our 
research shows is that there is partial validity on each side but neither is true by itself. 
 
A striking finding of our quantitative and qualitative research and field level interactions is that, 
whether for general illnesses (short or long-term) or maternity, women and their families invest 
considerable effort and resources in many instances in seeking health care. Yet the combination 
of poverty, biased gender norms, and unresponsive and unregulated health systems results in this 
investment going to nought. The result is that disproportionately women suffer illnesses and die 
from entirely preventable causes. 
 
While our research has focused on two talukas of a single district, we can probably extrapolate 
our findings to much of northern Karnataka. What should be obvious is that these systematic and 
systemic factors underwritten by gender bias and underpinning gender biased outcomes must be 
addressed urgently if the state is to fulfil its development potential. 
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Annexure 1: Results of logit regressions – estimates of odds ratios 
Short-term sicknesses LONG-TERM SICKNESSES  
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT 
Continued treatment=1 
Logit Regression 
Non treatment=1 
             Otherwise=0 
LOGIT 
REGRESSION 
Continued treatment=1 
         Otherwise=0 Discontinued treatment=2 Non-treatment=3 
Independent variables2 Model 11 Model 22 Model 11 Model 22 Model 11 Model 22 Model 11 Model 22 
Age 1.017 *** 1.017 ***             
Sex (dummy: female=1) 2.703 ***   0.667 ***   1.153    4.170 ***   
Income earner (dummy: non-earner=1)     1.668 *** 1.658 *** 0.632 *** 0.636 *** 0.496 *** 0.498 *** 
Household head (dummy: others=1)     0.690 ** 0.688 ** 1.764 *** 1.773 *** 0.714  0.714  
Severity 0.811 *** 0.809 *** 1.119 ** 1.114 ** 0.936  0.939  0.767 *** 0.769 *** 
Economic class (dummy: non-poor=1) 0.622 **   1.453 ***   0.696 ***   0.658 *   
Male, Poor (dummy: d1)   2.349 *   0.945    1.041    1.129  
Female, Non-poor (dummy: d2)   3.908 ***   0.924    0.817    3.180 *** 
Female, Poor (dummy: d3)   5.610 ***   0.528 ***   1.448 *   5.505 *** 
Sample Size                 
Tests                 
Coeff.(d1)=Coeff.(d3)    ***    ***    *    *** 
Coeff.(d2)=Coeff.(d3)        ***    ***    ** 
Coeff.(d3)-Coeff.(d1) =Coeff.(d2)3        **    *     
Notes:  Notations:  * significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, *** significance at 1% level 
 Definitions: Economic class: Poor: bottom 3 quintiles, Non-poor: top 2 quintiles 
   Severity: Number of difficulties due to sickness 
 1Model 1 tested the independent effects of the explanatory variables on treatment-seeking outcomes 
2Model 2 tested interactions using non-poor men as the reference group, and dummies for poor men, non-poor women and poor women. Economic class and sex were 
dropped to avoid multi-collinearity. 
 3The test was modified for continued treatment of long-term sicknesses to Coeff. (d1)-Coeff. (d3) =Coeff. (d2) because apriori coeff (d2)>coeff (d1)>coeff (d3) 
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To be or not to be: 
 
 Problems in locating women in public policy 
 
 
Devaki Jain 
 
 
This paper discusses some of the problems women face in gendering public policy. It 
suggests that the impediments faced lie largely in the nature of women’s location in the 
social landscape. It also suggests that despite considerable progress in the general 
understanding of this social landscape we now have, and despite women lobbyists’ 
efforts at skillful strategies for a more responsive public policy, the value of these efforts 
have not been sufficiently recognized by policy makers. Nor have they made significant 
dent on them. One may wonder whether this failure is due to our inadequate tools to 
enforce our voices. Knowledge is not enough. The paper elaborates on how women’s 
collective identity can be forceful politically when backed by knowledge and gives 
examples of this from Karnataka. New developments in decentralisation of governance, 
has opened possibilities for women’s agency at local level. Paradoxically, developments 
at global level have the possibility of undermining this process.  We can only therefore 
confront this not by integrating into the existing development paradigm and   attempting 
small changes at local level but by evolving a different development paradigm that will 
ensure justice for the majority of  the poor and  women.    
 
Women face three problems in incorporating their concerns in public policy.  Firstly, how 
can we have “woman” as an exclusive category given the heterogeneity among women. 
Women, belong to all the classes, castes religions, political ideologies, and cultures in 
society. Thus to project an identity of ‘woman’ as defined by feminine experience to 
represent a collective point of view or opinion, is a challenge. Yet a case can and has 
been made for taking ‘woman’ as a specific category( as an imaginary) on the basis of the 
fact  across these conventional divides various forms of discrimination converge. Indeed 
it was this recognition, namely, the experience of discrimination against women across all 
social groups that led the pioneers on women’s rights, the founding mothers of the UN’s 
conventions to craft the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). The universality of discrimination against women gives 
them an identity across differences. But discrimination alone cannot overcome the other 
problems of gendering mentioned below.1  
                                                 
1 C. Morrisson, J P Jutting, ‘Women’s Discrimination in Developing Countries: A New Data Set for Better 
Policies’, World Development, Vol. 33, No. 7, July 2005, pg 1065-1081 
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The second question arises from the flawed nature of inherited knowledge. Women 
Studies has demonstrated how knowledge of society and knowledge about women are 
constructed by patriarchal biases- that all knowledge is gendered.2  A very typical 
example relates to women’s work. What kind of work is called work, how work is 
valued, the measures used determine the value of their work are all determined by the 
perception of women’s work by society, official agencies, and men. As a result, women’s 
work is under counted, under estimated and often is invisible. There are dichotomies such 
as public and private space3 and hierarchies4 embedded in language and practice. For 
example, the large space occupied by the majority of women workers is called “informal” 
implying its secondary status to the so called formal sector. The non monetized sector is   
either accorded a lower value or no value compared to the monetised.5 –  an approach 
totally invalid for a largely subsistence economy where the non monetised sector is 
substantial Thus if a policy arises  out of such inherited “flawed” knowledge, women 
advocates would not want to participate in it. They would not like to engender it. They 
would like to deconstruct it or challenge it or reject it.  
 
Thus integrating into an existing framework has problems. If the formulation of public 
policy, that arise out of the accepted theories and frameworks and  out of given data and 
analysis are unacceptable to say a group, like women, or  dalits6 then  their integrating 
into that set up, sitting at committees or negotiating tables is surrender. In so far as we 
start from a premise that is inaccurate and flawed, it can lead to undesirable results. But 
this staying away, also has its negative effects, i.e. exclusion. This is one of the 
dilemmas.  In the language of the feminists this is often posed as: “do we want a piece of 
the poisoned cake7?” or another way of raising the same question, “do we want to swim 
in the polluted stream?” Hence ideas like integrating, gendering, mainstreaming, used  
now in current discussions, for inclusion of women in policy making efforts do not 
achieve desired results.  
 
The third problem arises out of women’s unhappiness over constructing “boxes’, to 
contain phenomena within strict boundaries. To women, such boundaries are invalid 
especially where boundaries are fluid. They do not easily accept attempts at imputing   a 
false identity and deriving judgements on that basis. If one defines the boundary of 
                                                 
2 Devaki Jain, Women’s Participation in the History of Ideas: The Importance of Reconstructing 
Knowledge for National Institute for Advanced Studies, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE, Feb 6th, 
2004, Bangalore; Devaki Jain, Power Through the Looking Glass of Feminism. Paper Presented in 
Symposium on Gender of Power University of Leiden, Netherlands 1986. 
3 Devaki Jain, PRI impact on private structure (Domestic sphere) How Important is the private public 
dichotomy. The Case of the EWRS, Seminar Women in Panchayat Raj (27-28 April 2000, New Delhi)   
4 Devaki Jain, Valuing women- signals from the ground, Opening Session For the University of Maryland, 
Broad theme: Cultural diversity and universal norms, June 1st 2001 
5 Goldschmidt-Clermont, Luisella. Unpaid Work in the Household: A Review of Economic Evaluation 
Methods. Geneva: ILO, 1981 
6 Gopal Guru. How Egalitarian Are the Social Sciences in India?, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
XXXVII No. 51 December 14, 2002 
7 Devaki Jain, “The Role of Peoples Movement in Economics and Social Transformation”, paper presented 
at the Opening Thematic Plenary for “Economic and Social Development”, at 1999 Seoul International 
Conference of NGOs, “The Role of NGOs in the 21st Century: Inspire, Empower, Act”, (October 10-16, 
1999 Seoul, Korea) 
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identity as women’s ways of doing things it is rejected as “essentialism”. If one suggests 
that waged work for women empowers them it is called “instrumentalism”. There is a 
tendency, amongst the women advocates themselves to question every notion or concept 
which attempts an arrival at a boundary for identity fixing. I call this the nethi nethi 
syndrome, borrowing from the Upanishads. It is definition by negation.8 
 
But such an over critical viewing of identity that negates any bounding, impedes the 
participation of women in policy as a political presence drawn from a collective identity. 
An identity tag, (based on some markings, bodily or through the experience of 
subordination and exclusion), is crucial for claiming rights and special attention.9 Such a 
clear identity tag, which is more easily available to say dalits, or to “blacks” in Africa or 
other white nations, is difficult to forge for the woman- identity due to her presence in all 
these other categories with all their separate politics. Gendering public policy is 
intimately related to our answers to these questions.  
In a book I have just completed called “Women, Development, and the UN - A Sixty-
Year Quest for Equality and Justice,”10 I have reviewed the historical struggle of women 
to be understood and included and given space and citizenhood on an equal basis in the 
international arena of justice. I found that whenever women did achieve some “success” 
by breaking through the male bastions of knowledge and power, it was through 
strategizing on collective identity as woman, as well as by inclusion of even one woman 
in a drafting committee. I call this strategizing space a place of one’s own11 or the 
women’s tent12.  While the place of one’s own is needed to develop self-confidence, to 
face the bigger world, it also made the “outside” see the “tent”, as a separate entity.  This 
perception perpetuates the Women for women by women to women syndrome, a 
syndrome which is excluding women not only from recasting and reordering 
development, but also denying the course of development to reflect the lived experience 
of women. Policy issues are not only about women’s issues. Women need a say in all 
issues as co partners in the development of society. Thus the place of ones own can be a 
power house or a ghetto, or both.  
 
The 60-year review referred to above does point to some useful directions for women’s 
participation in social change. First, there is value and usefulness in bonding across 
differences on the identity of woman, and strategizing in meaningful ways for inclusion 
in public affairs. Hence an organized voice represented by the women’s tent, is a crucial 
brick in this effort. Such an inclusion is necessary for instance, if we have to stem 
militarisation. Then women’s tent can also be a peace tent. 
                                                 
8  
9 Devaki Jain, Globalism and Localism: Negotiating Feminist Space, Rethinking Gender, Democracy And 
Development: Is Decentralisation A Tool For Local Ownership Of An Effective Political Voice?, Ferrara 
University and Modena University, 20-22 May 2002, Italy 
10 Devaki Jain, Women, Development, and the UN- A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice, Indiana 
University Press, to be released in August 2005, New York, (Website: www.unhistory.org or book can be 
ordered from IUP by email: iupress@indiana.edu)  
11 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own_(Granada, 1977 Published: 1929) 
12 In many international conferences women organized a separate ‘tent’ where many activities were carried  
   out- with an autonomy not available in the general conference schedules. 
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Secondly we need knowledge that the delineates concealed details regarding differences 
within households and families, between the sexes, and in the various processes of 
reproduction, production, exchange.   We may call this mapping the social and economic 
location of women in the above landscapes. Knowing can be a first step  
 
Thirdly power, claimed through some semblance of a collective identity, a USP [?] or 
flag. There has been much discussion on this issue,13 of building a maintainable unity, a 
united stand. This continues to be a quest. However it is suggested here that it is 
increasingly being argued that participation in leadership, in formal politics,14 can 
provide the turning point. Bonding across difference on the identity of woman, and 
strategizing for inclusion as a collective voice can redress all aspects of gender derived 
discrimination: whether it is the demeaning gaze, the mind set; the stereotypical 
perceptions of women’s roles and capabilities, or the embedded discriminatory practices 
– all these are linked elements of gender relations. The recent conference in New York 
called Beijing +1015 revealed again the continuing disjunction between the reality on the 
ground and the sense of progress created by the “visibility”16 level, achieved by gendered 
analysis.  
 
 This disjunction can be seen in two opposite trajectories relating to women and 
development. The first trajectory is the emergence of a strong political presence in the 
national and international scene of the women's movement. There is now a widespread 
consciousness of the necessity of engaging in gendered analysis that recognizes both 
difference and inequality and their implications for development design. The other 
trajectory reveals that the situation on the ground for many women, especially those 
living in poverty and in conflict-ridden situations, seems to have worsened, despite the 
fact that it has been addressed specifically by both the State and development thought.  
 
The question that arises then is, why does this disjunction exist after decades of what 
appears to be a vibrant and ostensibly effective partnership between policy makers and 
the women's movement? How much of the oppositional trajectories can be attributed to 
the external atmospherics of global power politics and its attendant economics? How 
much can be attributed to other factors, such as the style of functioning and priorities of 
the women's movement or its experience of the gendered institutional architecture of 
governance?  
 
Two examples from Karnataka of gendering policy will be discussed to illustrate these 
problems- the problem of differences between women, need not be a hindrance; one can 
                                                 
13 Longino, Helen E. (1993), ‘Feminist Standpoint theory and the Problems of Knowledge’, SIGNS 
Autumn vol. 19 no. 1, 201-212  
14 UN Economic and Social Council, 2000, Assessment of the Implementation of the System-Wide 
Medium-Term Plan for the Advancement of Women 1996-2001; Report of the Secretary-General, 
Commission on the Status of Women, Forty-fourth session, 28 February – 2 March 2000; Report of the 
Fourth World Conference on Women, Held in Beijing from 4 to 15 September 1995; Including the Agenda, 
the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (Extract), in The United Nations and the Advancement 
of Women, 649-735 
15 Commission on the Status of Women – Forty Ninth Session, New York, 28th Feb-11th March 2005 
16 Devaki Jain, “Spaces and Hopes”, The Hindu, April 3, 2005 
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address the common experience of discrimination and inequality by women as a group.  
We can build adequate knowledge of the social embeddedness of gender roles then 
intervene in policy by studying the impact of gender insensitive formulations and 
identifying areas where interventions are possible.  
 
The first is drawn from an attempt made in Karnataka to Integrate Women’s Interest 
into a State Five Year Plan (1983)17.  
Before we discuss the actual study it is pertinent to recall the tremendous advances made in 
understanding women’s work. Without this background knowledge one would not have 
been able to evaluate any policy or program. 
 
The field of women’s work became one of the major research domains both nationally 
and internationally. It was one of the most creative pursuits, influencing international 
organizations like the ILO. This focus helped to underline the ground realities in the 
developing countries. Women’s movement then began to address the core issue of 
survival security for the principal defender of the family, namely the woman.  This 
generated discussion on issues such as measurement and inclusion of invisible unpaid 
work of rural women work, discrimination in wages, job security and revaluing what was 
called the “informal” sector.  
 
This new research about women as workers entered the development discourse. They 
looked at practices of national data collecting agencies that list women engaged in 
domestic work as unemployed. Concern and analysis about unequal wages, 
discrimination of women in the workplace, women's double burden of work for wages 
and work at home, the role that the tasks women perform to make possible other 
members’ involvement in marketable production or service, and the absence of social 
security for women who perform unpaid labor at home. From a more narrow and focused 
approach on women's status vis-à-vis men, this research broadened the scope of 
investigation to look at the broader implications of global and national economic, 
political, and social changes and their impact on women's lives in their entirety.  
 
The study was initiated in the 80’s by ISST partly, because of the impetus of the overall 
‘ideology’ that was developed in international fora, of bringing women into development; 
and partly due to our interest in finding ways to enable women move out of poverty. It 
should be recalled that it was around nineteen seventies and nineteen eighties that women’s 
studies and women’s advocacy were emerging as major players in the struggle for women’s 
equality. There was now a recognition that the “household” needed to be broken open – as 
it was not as believed, a “benign" shelter for all its inhabitants.18  
Individuals within households had highly disparate locations in power, apart from 
inequalities in occupations, health and education. This disparity amongst individuals 
                                                 
17  “Integrating Women’s Interests into State Five-Year Plan,” submitted to the Ministry of Social Welfare, 
Govt. of India in September 1984, used in an article by K.S. Krishnaswamy and Shashi Rajagopal, Women 
in Employment: A Micro Study in Karnataka, Based on the ISST Bangalore Report, in ed., by Devaki Jain 
and Nirmala Banerjee, Tyranny of the Household-Investigative Essays on Women’s Work, for the 
workshop Women in Poverty, Shakti Books, New Delhi, 1985. 
18 The Household Trap: Report on a Field Survey of Female Activity Patterns.  P.215-246.  In Tyranny of 
the Household.  Edited by Devaki Jain and Nirmala Banerjee, New Delhi, Vikas, 1985; Nancy Folbre, Who 
Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint. Routledge, New York, 1994 
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seemed to be more enlarged the lower one went down in the asset/ income scale. Inspired 
by the international efforts at documenting the disparate impact of development between 
men and women, the study focused on examining the reach of the anti poverty 
programmes on women. What emerged was that the household was not benign and 
definitely not a level playing field for men and women. In the poor households women 
had a different source of income from men. The study came up with the idea that women 
within poverty household should be independently identified and reached out to with anti 
poverty programs such as IRDP. We found setting a target for women within such 
programs was flawed on many counts, not the least by inappropriate development offers 
and false reporting by functionaries.  
 
This was further corroborated during the process of preparing a report for the Karnataka 
State Planning Board called District Level Planning for Social Development19. For the 
report District Level Studies were commissioned – one from a backward district i.e. 
Gulbarga and one advanced i.e. Dakshina Kannada. Achieving a target of covering 
couples of reproductive age with contraceptive services was irrelevant in Dakshina 
Kannada (a district in Karnataka’s west coast, known for advancement in social 
indicators) where the fertility rate had already reached one, and in some villages less than 
one, but the fund allocated to the district continued to be allocated only for that purpose 
and when its irrelevance was brought out nothing could be done to shift the funds from  
limiting contraception to more advanced health care.20  
 
Planned development appeared, as it does even now, as blind rubber stamping of 
schemes.  An even more significant lesson was, that the methodology being used did not 
reach poor men either. The process was completely flawed for men and women 
amongst the poor or deprived.  It transpires that method adopted for stimulating 
development was critical, even superceded the task of gendering or integrating women 
into development.  
 
 
The second is a project undertaken in Karnataka by the World Bank21 to improve the 
quality of the cocoon in the sericulture industry. The project did not use the available 
knowledge about women’s work. 
 
Sericulture was one of the dominant land based activities in Karnataka and the perception 
of the policy designers was that women were not an issue in this project. It was perceived 
that women were basically using thrown away cocoons which had holes in them to make 
garlands. They were seen as not engaged in the basic chain of production and the sale of 
cocoons. An actual investigation that sought to break down tasks in the chain of 
production revealed that while mulberry was grown by the farmers, the men, it was 
women who not only picked the leaves but looked after the trays in which the silk worms 
                                                 
19 District Level Planning for Social Development, Devaki Jain, Chairperson of Sub Committee, Karnataka 
State Planning Board (1994), Government of Karnataka 
20 Report from Dakshina Kannada by Shalini Rajaneesh, IAS 
21 Assessment of women’s roles- The Karnataka sericulture development project, ISST, 1982. Task force 
on sericulture, for a world bank funded project,  Government of Karnataka  
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were nursed or nurtured. The silk worms are usually kept in trays called chandrikes in 
shelves inside the home and have to be fed mulberry leaves every three hours just like a 
child, and the offal has to be removed as frequently so that they do not get diseased. 
Women in the strong sericulture farming areas complained that not only were their 
houses completely cramped with silk worms leaving hardly any place for the kitchen or 
their children, but the silk worm was more demanding than the child as it had a 
compulsive demand for leaves every three hours. Thus they were awake most of the night 
and most of them had chronic illnesses due to the suffocating atmosphere in the hut and 
the unremitting labour of cocoon rearing.  
 
Despite their being the main rearers of worms, the women were not at all brought into the 
project. They were not given the training on better rearing on what were the special 
characteristics of feeding and health for the new worms that were introduced’ they did 
not receive information about the new fodder; not shown how to upgrade the quality of 
the yarn they spent time on.  Thus women’s contribution to the process of silk 
manufacture was unrecognized with consequences for policy.  It appears that the old 
Ester Boserup22 story of the nineteen seventies where she bemoans the non recognition of 
women as farmers continues.23 
 
As a result of lobbying both in Washington and in Karnataka with the government, a task 
force on sericulture was set up by the Government of Karnataka with the principal 
secretary of agriculture as its chair .All the relevant agencies were around the table and 
the meeting was to show that there needs to be greater inclusion of women as workers in 
the sericulture development programmes. It was found that this classical invisibility of 
women workers, especially when the productive work is within the home had deprived 
them of being engaged in the training for improved rearing practices as well as marketing  
 
There was no hostel accommodation for women at the Sericulture Training Institute, a 
state government institution. A proposal was made, by the Task force, to build a women’s 
hostel using another government scheme called “Hostels for working women”. However, 
the task force neither sustained itself nor did it make for any transformation in the lives 
and concerns of women in the sericulture project.  
 
A similar experience is recorded of the matching study that ISST took up with the Tasar24 
industry in Maharashtra. Again women were major workers but unrecognized and 
nothing that was done.  The report funded by the Swiss development corporation tried to 
change this perception but it had no impact. The studies undertaken by Institute of Social 
                                                 
22 Boserup, Ester. My Professional Life and Publications 1929<N>1998. Copenhagen Press, 1999. 
    Oral communication: Maithreyi Krishnaraj’s study of Women in Agriculture- a millennium study for the 
government of India, which she had titled ”women farmers of India” on publication was retitled ’women in 
agriculture’  by the publisher in 2004! 
23 Devaki Jain, "Are we knowledge Proof? Development as Waste", speech delivered at Lovraj Kumar 
Memorial, Lecture, New Delhi, 26 September 2003 (Reprinted in Wastelands News, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 
August-October 2003, Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development, New Delhi, pg. 19-30 
24 Inter-state Tasar Project, Report on a field survey Chandrapur District of Maharashtra, Institute of Social 
Studies Trust, 1982 
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Studies Trust (ISST) in various parts of India, and in Karnataka.25 presented information 
on women’s productive roles, and argued that the projects were losing out on success by 
not recognising this.  While this resulted in gendered analysis, it did not change the 
project  
 
Some new opportunities are emerging in India, and more strongly in Karnataka. These 
may help us incorporate the lessons learnt from history, mentioned earlier in this essay.   
To reiterate: we had talked of i) the usefulness and value of bonding across difference on 
the identity of woman, and strategizing for inclusion ii )  the need for knowledge about 
women’s  various productive  and other roles and their location within household,  
families and community .iii ) power claimed through a collective identity  
 
An aspect of the Karnataka landscape of governance and development, which offers 
some niches, some conduits for affirming these views is the long standing, and politically 
well supported decentralized management of development, especially the economic and 
social justice agendas.  
 
For example as far back as in 1994-95, Karnataka’s State Planning Board (earlier called 
Economic Planning Council (EPC)).  set up two subgroups in 1994, one for District 
Level Planning for Employment, and other for District Level Planning for Social 
Development. The main task of the sub group was to provide effective social and 
economic security to the poor, improve the quality of administering these services. , all at 
the district and sub district level of accountability .Interestingly, in 2005, the Planning 
Commission has set up an Expert Group, to draw up guidelines for the States on what 
they call grassroot planning for development, and the thrust is to reduce if not efface the 
state dictated schemes, the pre packaged development bundles that are handed out, and 
leave planning to local communities to design the use of untied funds. 
 
The sub group working with secretaries to government of each sector and some CEOs or 
Chief Secretaries of Districts as they were called at the time, was able to rationalize the 
75 schemes into 15 bundles. And suggested that instead of having 15 schemes coming 
out of 15 departments even these could be bundled into a Social Development Service, as 
one sector and the fund could be used for “Provisioning of social development services 
to the poor”. with the functionaries attached to the service coming under one 
nomenclature called social development services providers. Thus the departmental lines 
would be liquefied, and the multiple schemes, would be consolidated without losing the 
overall intention.  
 
One of the suggestions made by the sub group was that there should be social mapping of 
the state, to show variations in human development indices between districts in order to 
identify gaps in performance and to spot inter-district variations, was not implemented.   
However this compliance came later. During the 1995 –97 Karnataka developed a 
Human Development report that put together district level indicators and indices (Human 
Development in Karnataka 1999, Planning Department, Government of Karnataka, 1999) 
– a first in State Level Human Development Reports in India.  
                                                 
25 Impact of Sericulture pilot project in Karnataka- An Evaluation, ISST, 1989 
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In neither of the illustrations from Karnataka, given above was this opportunity for 
intervention yielded a clear ‘tool” to tell us what to do and how to intervene. However 
there is now, as we write this article an opportunity to engage with political power due to 
the clearer, more firm legally and politically ordained devolution of economic planning 
power and funds to the locally elected bodies, in Karnataka.  
 
Significant changes have been brought about in the State fiscal 2005-06 (embodied in the 
State Budget). State sector schemes pertaining to the 29 subjects in schedule of XI of the 
73rd amendment, have been merged in the district sector schemes to be implemented by 
the panchayat institutions.  From 1.4.2005 about Rs. 3500 crore have been thus devolved 
to panchayat institutions at grama, taluka and zilla levels.  The Departments have been 
asked to amend and issue afresh all government orders, notifications, circulars etc. in 
accordance with these charges. 
 
Most importantly some of the negative features in administration have also been 
removed. Departments are directed not to establish parallel bodies which were scuttling 
devolution intended by the 73rd Amendment. Existing parallel bodies are to be now 
reconstituted under the chairmanship of the adhyaksha of the Zilla Parishad.  Besides, 
World Bank or external aided projects are to be implemented through PRIs only. 
 
Right from the beginning when the Ramakrishna Hegde Government in Karnataka, in 
collaboration with Nazeer Saab,[?full name] the Minister for Rural Development brought 
in legislation not only to set up elected local councils but also reservation for women.  
Women elected to Councils have been invited to meetings held by women’s 
organizations and attempts are made to give them a collective identity and give them a 
sense of knowledge based confidence. As the panchayat raj movement grew and 
broadened with the introduction of the 73rd and 74th amendments by the then Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the SS Foundation, for example, got even more deeply engaged in 
strengthening those women who had been elected to serve on these councils.  
 
One of the first initiatives that they took was to bring them under one organisation 
namely “An Association of Elected Women Representatives”.  While this may look 
baffling since the representatives come from different parties, in Karnataka it was found 
that women were willing to join an association of themselves across party lines. They 
seemed to need that collective strength in order to generate the self confidence to bring 
voice into the meeting. The women’s collectives and collectivities also have an additional 
glint, namely they are united across class, where poor and non poor women engage in 
issues which impact women like domestic violence or water, or reproductive health, 
especially in urban slums and rural areas. 
 
Using the collectives especially at the level of gram panchayats, the Foundation then built 
three other programmes on these groups – The Foundation then initiated similar projects 
in three of the other southern states, Kerala, Andhra and Tamil Nadu and is now co-
ordinating a net work of agencies in these four states all of which are engaged in creating 
collectivities of these elected women and enabling them to strengthen their technical 
skills as well as their political presence in the local self government institutions.  
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Rather than “train” them they have been formed into groups and these groups engage 
with themselves to create their own space, debate among themselves and devise 
programmes instead of being in mixed councils.  Women’s capability for collective 
action, and their women’s capability to form collectivities are transforming many 
programmes, processes and outcomes.  
 
Currently, many women’s organizations are partnering with State governments, to 
strengthen the capapbility of women elected to these Local Self Government’s to 
participate if not lead development in their areas. For example, Singamma Sreenivasan 
Foundation has made a novel endeavor, to enable women (EWRs) to construct budgets, 
such that the interest of women and other subordinated groups is safeguarded.  It is not 
just a programme to raise awareness about budget amongst local women politicians but to 
enable women to direct the economy from a space available to them. This helps them to 
understand, participate and transform local budgets. 
 
The design of the effective participation has been enabled by collaboration with 
Janaagraha  - an urban NGO which uses three cornered stakeholders meeting - namely 
the civil servant who is the commissioner of the municipality, the ward committee and 
the elected corporators to have a transparent process of understanding and influencing 
revenue collection and expenditures and monitoring out comes. This method has been 
tried in two municipalities – Mysore and Tumkur. The municipalities have changed their 
budget allocations as a result of collective lobbying by the elected women corporators 
across party lines.  Similar experience has been found in two other pockets of Karnataka 
– Bijapur and Bellary 
 
Another project that they were “exposed to, was to use their kitchen gardens for growing 
medicinal plants.  This has now caught the imagination of the gram panchayats and at 
least four districts will be engaged in a movement for environment security, health 
security and livelihood security through the growing of medicinal plants. 
 
The outcome of these excercises is that in the Mysore City Corporation: women’s issues 
were not only included, but allocations to certain women’s schemes were increased in the 
Budget 2005-06.  
 
To day, the situation and character of the various actors in governance have shifted quite 
dramatically and in significant ways. The State is receding from its earlier role as being 
responsible to the citizens for their well being especially provisioning of basic securities. 
Civil society including the women’s movement is becoming stronger on the one hand but 
also paradoxically more fragmented. International configuration of power is changing, 
with the UN’s influence receding and the other world organisations like World Bank and 
other multilaterals like the WTO occupying centre stage. The market economy, signified 
by the corporates are playing a larger role in national and international governance than 
before, including the provisioning of public goods. There is also a return to conservative 
politics, and various forms of fundamentalism, across the globe.  
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Simultaneously there are the usual paradoxes in women’s domain. There is an increase in 
the political participation of women in governance, especially at the local level. There is 
an increase in the capabilities and power of the women’s movement, in knowledge and 
organizational capacities in informal economy as workers and traders. and to contest 
violence against women.  There is a shift in the nature of employment opportunities. 
There is increasing absorption of female labour into the new opportunities for earning 
income like in export processing and simultaneously a decline in the opportunities for 
men. This arises because of the nature of the growth poles and the nature of the 
organisation of production and trade. Women are on the move, selling either their bodies 
or their time into earning income for their families. . The UN report on women and 
development for the year 200426 shows how the largest group or proportion of workers 
uncovered by any protection are women, and women migrants. The demand for women 
as workers in the flesh trade has made the flow of women across borders jump by leaps 
and bounds. The value of the flesh trade is now greater than the value of the trade in 
narcotics 
 
At the very beginning, women's quest was for equality or for overpowering, if not efface 
inequality. The strategy of leveling the playing fields by bringing in laws, introducing the 
power of rights, and finding ways to move women out of what looked like disadvantaged 
positions seemed all right for several decades. But it was clearly not enough. There was 
deep, widespread, unimaginable, and invisible discrimination. The women's movement 
responded to this by making inequality visible, but that did not take care of the ignorance 
and non-recognition of women's value as citizens, workers and providers. Their 
contribution to society is equal if not even richer in value then men. So the movement 
generated new knowledge to show the role of women in development--again with the 
expectation that revealing truth would lead to women's equality with men. But that 
strategy still disabled them because they had no voice in the determination of their lives 
and its road map. Thus, the notion of equal participation, of equal power, of leadership 
was worked into the notions of ways to redress inequality 
 
What we have seen is that while knowledge has increased and been funelled to the policy 
spaces, the advice of women, their leadership in directing public policy has not happened 
.to a corresponding extent. The old method of “integrating “ through women only 
packages, mainly social development package schemes for women continues.  
 
The revelatory aspect of this story can be summarized in the importance of space not only 
in funds but at the level of the intellect, for the excluded to claim their rights. 
Decentralisation with a quota of 1/3 seats of women has opened a new gateway in India 
and especially in Karnataka. But it is not enough. 
 
The first need is to reconsider the paradigm of development itself, the identification of the 
engines of growth. Instead of seeing the poor as a target group who need special ladders within 
a framework of economic development, enabling them to become economic and political agents 
could itself become the engine of growth. Thus, from a "trickle down," or social safety net 
                                                 
26 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, DAW, 2004 World Survey on the Role of Women in 
Development – Women and International Migration, UN, New York, 2005. 
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approach, it would be useful to look at what can be called the "bubbling up" theory of growth. 
This alternative theory argues that putting incomes and political power in the hands of the poor 
could generate the demand and the voice that would direct development. The purchasing 
power and the choices of the poor could direct the economy to a pro-poor or poverty-reducing 
economy. The review of the past seems to suggest some dramatic reversal of the current 
theories of where the engine of growth lies if the interest is in poverty eradication.27  
 
Mahatma Gandhi in fact had designed such a theory and a proposal for its practice. To some 
extent it could even be said that such a theory is close to, though not the same as, Keynes's 
theory of stimulating an economy by generating effective demand. Here the further detailing is, 
Whose effective demand? Whose purchasing power? Gandhi's talisman, his test for action, was 
this: "Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the 
following test: Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man/woman whom you may have 
seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him."28  
 
A major fault line that runs through narrations of history and their knowledge base--
whether it is political, economic, or social history, is the failure to take note of, to 
understand and respect and absorb, women's ideational and intellectual skills and outputs 
in the area of theoretical and analytical knowledge. While some of the values emerging 
from the understanding of poverty, inequality, discrimination, conflict resolution, 
deepening participation, method, politics that this interaction or partnership generated has 
been applied or followed upon belatedly, recognition of the intellectual and leadership 
powers of women has remained in the ghettos. The minds of men have not changed. 
 
And for that to happen, it seems that it is necessary to recast the development framework, 
to come out with a treatise, a theoretically stand alone development model which satisfies 
the external world changes and yet women’s quest. The movement did some of this 
twenty years ago, at Nairobi, through DAWN, the third world network29. But another 
such framework is needed now and it can be done if women put their minds together. 
Women’s brilliant struggles, need to be treated as a BODY of knowledge, chiseled into 
theory, into an intellectual challenge to what “is” i.e. the currently dominant ideas for 
national and international advancement.  The importance of an intellectual theoretical 
construct out of the ground experience, which can claim space in the world of 
theoretical discourse, cannot be minimized. A new Das Kapital or Wealth of Nations, is 
the only bomb that can explode the patriarchal mind set and exclusion of the real agency 
of women in public policy. 
 
  
                                                 
27 Devaki Jain, "Enabling Reduction of Poverty and Inequality in South Asia," in Population and Poverty: 
Achieving Equity, Equality and Sustainability (New York: UNFPA, 2003), 99<N>100. 
28 Devaki Jain, Minds, Bodies and Exemplars: Reflections at Beijing and Beyond (New Delhi: British 
Council, 1996), 8. 
29 The Bangalore Report – A Process for Nairobi at Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, 
Institute of Social Studies Trust, New Delhi, 1984  

